“The NGO sector in Haiti is best described as an uncoordinated mass of organizations
de facto unaccountable to any governing or regulatory institution, i.e. no accountants, no
auditors, no reviews, and no publication of poor or dishonest performance.”

-Schwartz Report

The New Ground Rules: Ending the Politics of International Doublure

Haitian Development Authority Plan 2015-2020

Policy Briefing for the Office of the President

Walter Sebastian Adler, Development Analyst

Republic of Haiti

Introduction and Background

A series of human and environmental catastrophes have befallen the Republic of Haiti since the moment of her independence. It has repeatedly been stated that Haiti bears a certain
‘uniqueness’. We assert that this ‘uniqueness’ is artificially enforced to the detriment of all our
citizens and must be corrected by political action. We are the most disaster casualty prone nation in the Americas (UNOHA, 2014). We are the absolute poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere and second only to India the highest perceived ratio of NGOs/to population on earth (Clinton Global, 2012). Perhaps more striking is that our income inequality is seventh most unequal on earth (2012 GINI is 0.61). We are also the only nation on earth with a peacekeeping operation presiding over our military jurisdiction without a ceasefire in place between warring factions. We submit this policy package to exert further control over and enhance the capacity of our social & civil service resources whereby the citizens of our nation will know dignity, human
rights, hope and opportunity. The aim of our proposed policies are to dismantle the Republic of
NGOs and restore in its place an empowered socially, environmentally and economically
sustainable Republic of Haiti.

The foundation of our national renaissance lies in harmonization
of development with national interests. This formula suggested is new regime to register and
regulate NGO activity while building state capacity. This policy package also turns to investment
and improvement of our citizens’ social welfare via health, education and general security while
at the same rebuilding linkages with our international Diaspora.

There are now 11.4 million citizens now living in our Republic and they are living with daily
existential threats to their general welfare and survival. Currently our HDI is 170 (0.51). Haiti
has an adult life expectancy of 63.1. A full 50.16 % of our population is living in
multidimensional poverty (UNDP 2014). A 2012 World Bank survey places 6 million Haitians
(59%) living below $2 (90 HTG) a day while 2.5 million (24%) are living below $1(45 HTG).
Therefore 83% are below our own domestic poverty line. Adult literacy is at 48.7% (UNDP
2014). Only 5% of the population can functionally comprehend French; our language of
education and administration (MIT, 2014). This proposal will recommend policies in the
following strategic arenas; State Capacity, NGO Regulation, Foreign Investment, Diaspora
Engagement, Health & Educational Capacity, Disaster Risk Reduction and National Security.

Literature Review:

On State Capacity: Only 10% of the population are employed in a taxable sector (WB, 2014).
Our state does not currently have the capacity to exert full sovereignty (Farmer & Schwartz,
2014). This is derived from a combination of stressors; a) having no substantial tax revenue base; b) donor circumvention of state structure in delivery of aid via NGOS; c) the sensitive nature of our domestic politics; c) ongoing effects of the MINUSTAH presence; e) our lack of an armed forces and underdeveloped police force d) and massive NGO proliferation (Schwartz, 2014)(CFPS, 2014).

If we examine USAID development policies ranging from HAVA to subsequent newer incarnations,
we observe not only several generations of clusters that paid only lip service to the authority of
the state, but also demonstrated non-coordination facilitated by USAID subcontracting to both
NGOs & Beltway contractors (Schuller, 2012).

A range of capacity building priorities will require both management training and eventually take
over of NGO facilitated services (NORD, 2014). MINUSTAH policies which once urged
‘clusters’ now suggest a firmer hand in regulation of NGO actors in Haitian soil. On either end of
this extreme are polices of India v. NGO policies of Sudan (Oxfam, 2012).

UN OCHA 2014 policy recommendations involve development of command and control over NGOS, public-private partnerships, extension of microfinance sector; new tax identity cards, direct taxation of remittances and transfers, as well as extension of sales taxes on items in the large informal economy (World Bank, 2014). According to the GAO Congressional policy studies in the US; of $631 million allocated to our post-2010 reconstruction: 0.7% went to our government, businesses or organizations; 43% was routed to NGOs and a full 56% was reinvested via contractors. 55% of obligated pledge has evens been delivered (GAO, 2013)

On NGO regulation Policy: The NGO sector remains unaccountable. As of March 31, 2013,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has obligated $293 million (45
percent) and disbursed $204 million (31 percent) of $651 million in funding for Haiti from the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010: less that 1% has gone to our government (USIP, 2010).
While officially, there are 560 registered NGOs, there may be at any given time upwards of
5,000 formations (missionary, humanitarian, and domestic) dispensing services illegally in our
territory. Perhaps not with malice, but with total disregard we have been reduced to predatory
dependency, regulating them will be highly complicated (Chafetz, 2006)(Schuller, 2012 )(USIP,
2010). Reduction of duplication and overlap most coincide with thorough monitoring and
evaluation.

On Investment Policy: ‘Open for Business’ legislation has allowed a degree of exploitation of
our labor force and further destruction of our environment (Johnston, 2013). Investment policy
should shift away from garment assemblage (Titus, 2012). It should absolutely enforce state
ownership of resources especially in light of the recent discovery of gold (HGW, 2014). Note the
Dominican Ministry of Tourism’s Dual Track; segregated all-inclusive hotels on the coast and
islands used to pay to more culturally sensitive development open to all within the interior.
Investment garment assemblage at Sai Ah Industrial & export-processing zones is not a proven
model for development (NY Times, 2014). Through U.S. legislation such as HOPE I & II as well
as the Help Economic Lift Program (HELP) Acts we retain duty free access to the US.
(Chandler/ Clinton Global Initiative). Capital inflows from the diaspora are estimated to be $1.5-
1.9 billion a year (23-30%) of our 2010 GDP Most of the existing policies in place to empower
the diaspora to reinvest financial and human capital are only proving partially effective (Titus,
2012). Allowing dual citizenship (Maretlly, 2011) was critical but needs to be expanded (Zéphir,
2004). Dual citizenship in the information age should facilitate the ability to monitor, evaluate
and participate not only invest (Stepick, 2001).

This investment is not just a question of capital; reengaging Haitian youth in diaspora through a type of Birthright program was invaluable to Israeli policy and would be valuable to us. Studies of diaspora migration yield a durable pattern of either reclamation or interference (Newland, 2004) According to the CFIC briefing, we must shore up our massive brain drain (80% of degree holding Haitians living abroad). Critical studies of diaspora mobilization policy convince us of the critical need not empower, not simply extract remittance support (Newland, 2004).

On Diaspora Policy: Capital inflows from the diaspora are estimated to be $1.5-1.9 billion a
year (23-30%) of our 2010 GDP. Most of the existing policies in place to empower the diaspora
to reinvest financial and human capital are only proving partially effective (Titus, 2012).
Legalizing dual citizenship (Maretlly 2011) was critical but needs to be expanded (Zéphir, 2004).
Dual citizenship in the information age should facilitate the ability to monitor, evaluate and
participate not only invest (Stepick, 2001). This investment is not just a question of capital;
reengaging Haitian youth in diaspora through a type of Birthright program was invaluable to
Israeli policy and would be valuable to us. Studies of diaspora migration yield a durable pattern
of either reclamation or interference (Newland, 2004) According to the CFIC briefing, we must
shore up our massive brain drain (80% of degree holding Haitians living abroad). Critical studies
of diaspora mobilization policy convince us of the critical need not empower, not simply extract
remittance support (Newland, 2004). The Haitian Hometown Associations Resource Group
(HHTARG) is government-sponsored effort to focus the Haitian Diaspora to invest back in the
nation. Haitian American Caucus has done strong work in mobilizing the diaspora to be
increasingly relevant in U.S. regional politics and channel direct aid into Haitian CBOs and
should be empowered to increase their reach. Diaspora mobilization is key ingredient to national
stability (Fitzduff, 2014).

On Health Policy: The current ration of physicians to patients 1 to 10,000 in cities/ 1 to 20,000
in the rural interior (WHO, 2014). According to the Ministry of Public Health and Population,
the cholera epidemic had caused the deaths of 8,570 persons and infected 705,084 as at 20 July, 2014 140,000 were living with HIV (UNAIDS/PAHO, 2014). The 2014. re remain upwards of
103,565 earthquake IDPs living in squalor (Farmer, 2014). Lacking resources our governmental
capacity has remained dependent on foreign medical NGOS. Following the existing polices of
Dr. Farmer and the ZL-PIH in Health policy; he has recommended and implemented with the
new University Hospital of Mirebalais an approach to patient care that empowers Haitian
citizens through direct teaching hospitals and poly clinics. The ZL-PIH policies recommend;
a)utilization of community health workers trained in all communities; b) focus on medical
outposts in rural areas to extend basic coverage; c) establishing continuing education and training
at each site d) combining public health, public education and ‘preferential options for the poor’
(Farmer, 2001). Other successful polices have included those of Bernard Mevs-University of
Miami collaborating between facilities with teaching hospitals abroad. Our diplomatic policy
with the governments of Spain, Brazil, Venezuela & Cuba we have over 700 MDs serving in all
departments; and 1,200 Haitian medical students training in Havana (CMB, 2014). Cuba recently
initiated its French language medical school at ELAM and can absorb an increased number of
our candidate students. Haitian national ambulance service is not yet operational in the capital
(HERO, 2014). Extensive studies of Cuban health delivery support integrated track health
systems (Feinsilver, 2010.) This means removing barriers of entry from one medical rank to the
next, preventing brain drain by educating in country and offering better salaries for axillary
health professions.

On Educational Policy: On 17 April 2013 MIT and Haiti ratified an initiative that will help
develop Kreyòl-language education in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM)
disciplines, part of an effort to help Haitians learn in the language most of them speak at home
(95%). The current government is openly invested in use of Kreyòl to empower youth to
meaningful education. Currently we utilize an out dated French language national testing system although only 1/3 of our facilities are monitored by the Education ministry. On Vocational
Capacity and skill building; BRAC International which is currently giving technical training to
Fonkoze our largest (although questionably successful) micro-creditor has a range of
paraprofessional services that might be developed in Haiti (Smillie, 2009)(BRAC, 2012). The
government of India in 2008 launched an initiative called the National Skill Development
Corporation to up skill and retrain millions of its citizens in a wide range of trades.
Environmental Policy: Deforestation remains at a shocking 93% due to the use of charcoal as
an energy and cooking fuel (UNDP, 2014). Aggressive replanting must be coupled with
alternative energy promotion and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Energy, re-forestation, and
DRR must be mutually reinforcing activities. The Department of Civil Protection (DCP) must integrate DRR into renewable energy promotion (Dolisca, 2007). Sporadic investment in t-
shelter construction and NGO green energy campaigns have not culminated in sustainable programs because of previously stated NGO mismanagement creating a lack long term
coordination (Schwartz, 2014). Policies to expand electrification are necessary throughout the
country. Outside the capital national grid power lasts barely three hours daily and is often
completely lacking in the rural interior. Solar lighting must be expanded. Environmental
degradation should not be linked purely to the preservation of a tourism sector; it needs to serve
the immediate aim of social welfare (Schuller, 2012). Garbage collection is almost non-existent
and public burning of trash in a wide spread practice. MIT Poverty Lab has pioneered a series of
randomized control trials we must apply to all NGO and governmental initiatives as well as
systems of humanure/ bio waste energy schemes that we must adopt. Previous policies to modal
tourism and environmental preservation have only created the illusion of progress and several
small tourist ghettos akin to the Dominican Republic.

On Security Policy: The Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti has recently unsuccessfully
sued the UN in relation to the Cholera epidemic. At current time the Center for Disease Control
USA, Duke University and the Health Ministry of Cuba have all independently confirmed the
high probability of Nepalese MINUSTAH peacekeepers as the source. These foreign troops are
increasingly unpopular and source of great ongoing unrest. With under 10,000 Haitian National
Police and no military, we cannot rationally secure our territory or contain the likely
reemergence of Lavalas disruptions, paramilitary reprisals or expansive narco-trafficking. U.S.
government officials have declared that 83 metric tons or 8% of the cocaine entering the United
States in 2006 transited either Haiti or the Dominican Republic via freighters bound for Miami

(Institute for Peace, 2007)(Whitney, 1996). The August 2014 prison break in Croix-des-
Bouquets illustrate the deep penetration paramilitaries into our existing state security formations.

There are still upwards of 250,000 restavek child slaves used throughout the country (CIA,
2014). This as long as it continues will remain one of the purest reminders of our humiliation in
claiming the victory of our initial slave uprising.

Policy Recommendations:
Parcel 1: (State Capacity Development Policy)

Increase federalization by sub-dividing governance to the departmental (10), arrondissement (42)
and commune (140) levels in a similar scheme as the United States to allow participatory
involvement in development. Not all at once, two departments at a time beginning with
Grand’Anse & Artibonite. The President’s office will maintain control over MSPP, HNP, and
key ministries, which will remain centralized along with an executive veto of department senate
proposals. Power will be divested from the existing Senate/CoD and into the new department
units. We thereby allow greater federal autonomy as each sub-federal will establish its own
department senate, arrondissement house of deputies, and commune council in pattern similar to
post-genocide Rwanda. All NGO/ missionary activity will revolve around meeting policy
objectives set by Department Senates and the office of the Presidency. This new state
architecture composed of elected party officials will submit all service provision, public safety,
and development plans to the President’s office. Fiscal centralization with more operational
incentive going to sub-units.

Lifting bans on all political parties will be contingent on participation in the Haitian
Development Plan. Pursue confidence-building measures that realistically address concerns of
G184/FRAPH/Famni Lavalas. Politically enfranchise the Diaspora by giving them
administrative, voting and business incentivization via supra-territorial departments. Formally
enfranchise the Middle Eastern community, NGO class & diaspora with varying political
representation.

Progressively Tax anyone residing in Haiti for over 3 month. Issue tax ID/ driver licenses to
population. Encourage use of the ID for virtually all civic functions. Require digital monetization
via cell phones to procure social services from licensed state providers or NGO. Utilize ID for
benefit and social services dispersal. Increase professionalization of Civil Service on all levels
via mass capacity trainings. No Development Aid or foreign assistance can be routed to an NGO
operating in Haiti without reporting the amount to our Development Authority. Registered and
Compliant NGOs such as PIH-ZL with be given high levels of autonomy as long as they operate
within the sector goals of the government. All procurement activities, HR and contracted
services must prove there was an adequate domestic bid where applicable. The effect of the
policy will be regaining state control.

Parcel 2: (NGO Regulation & Control Policy)

NGO Proliferation Control must begin with a rigorous census and designation. NGO
Registration will be followed by NGO taxation. Waiver of taxation will be granted by voluntary
enrolment in a newly constituted Haitian Development Authority and subsequent enlistment in a
corresponding governmental sector. All foreign NGOs must follow standardized design,
monitoring and evaluation of projects. All foreign NGOs will form strategic partnerships with
Haitian CBO/NGO/ government agencies. NGO fines will be levied for noncompliance of
regulations. Harmonization of all NGO work to fulfil government strategies will begin
Department-by-Department beginning with Ouest. The effect of the policy package will be to
couple regulation & harmonization with purge. NGOs that will not enable the state to accomplish
development goals have no place operating inside Haiti. All NGO activities and interventions
must meet rigorous standards of Monitoring & Evaluation. All new development treatments must
be submitted to randomized control trials.

Parcel 3: (Direct Foreign Investment Policy)

It is understood that the Republic of Haiti may possess an estimated $20 Billion in gold.
Newmont and Eurasian Corporations have invested $30 million in exploratory digging. We have
not signed the international Safety and Health in Mines convention or the voluntary Extractive

Industries Transparency Initiative, both of which offer some protection to our citizens. The Sai-
Ah Industrial park received $224 million of the funds earmarked for reconstruction. We have no

good record of observing textile assembly trickle down or anywhere else. It is time we make an
investment in our human resources. To do so we require the funds to implement the health,
educational, and vocational restoration needed to secure our future. Ending Doublure, the long
accepted politic of rule through proxy and reclamation of our social service sector capacity is the
beginning of that process. Therefore we must couple by contract Corporate Social Responsibility
funds to be built into every aspect of Direct Foreign Investment.
Concentration of high-end tourist development on Ile-a-Vache, along with both the Northern and

Southern coasts. Focus on Ile-Gonave for all inclusive tourist development coupled with deep-
water port along lined of LGDA/ICA master plans. Focus all-inclusive development of North

Coast. Expand international airports to Cap Haitian, Jacmel, and La Caye to enable direct airport
to resort passage. Renegotiate the Labadie lease as soon as expires to a higher rate. Prohibit
foreign land ownership including natural resources and beaches. Make export processing zones/
industrial zones buy into vocational training schemes. Pursue 51% state ownership in overall
ventures, preferential access to Haitian diaspora.
Restore high import tariffs on foodstuffs produced outside of Hispaniola to discourage
agricultural dumping. Implement import substitution items where and when ever possible.

Parcel 4: (Diaspora Engagement Policy)

Dual citizenship will be extended all persons with one Haitian grandparent; enfranchisement
abroad in exchange for partial designation of remittance to support state function.
Implementation of a state sponsored Birthright Haiti program for diaspora youth will be
implemented. Tax earmarking will be established to allow the Diaspora to see taxes as an
investment not a levy. Specific empowerment of the Haitian Diaspora must result in enlisting
them in political participation as well as taxation. Engagement between the Diaspora and the
Haitian Middle Eastern community is necessary to create a Haitian Middle Class and mitigate
animosities between the Black and Mulatto bourgeoisie and the running caustic antagonisms
between impoverished black masses and the NGO Class.

Parcel 5: (Healthcare Capacity Policy)

Census, registration and integration of all facilities operating health services will be conducted. It
will be compulsory for all receiving medical facilities to initiate Community Health Worker
(CHW) training programs and facilitate the modular expansion of the Haitian indigenous health
sector. Health worker trainings facilitated by Cuba, Brazil and Venezuela will be coordinated
throughout country. All medical NGOs will be required to begin training local staff and
nominate candidates per facility to train in Cuban or Zamni Lasante Medical schools. Expanding
on ZL/Cuban methodology, we well expand a series of polyclinics throughout all communes and
build teaching polyclinics in all departmental capitals. All medical facilities will begin aligning
themselves into a National Health Service under jurisdiction of MSPP. Integration of health
education must be coupled with previous policies on aligning NGOs with state need.

Parcel 6: (Educational Capacity Policy)

The language of national instruction, administration and national testing will emphasize Haitian Creole above French allowing students to opt for testing in either. We will restructure the dated rote memorization French system to reflectnstandards of American universities with which we will develop school-to-school partnerships.

Mass Capacity Investment in vocational training with facilitate creation of Civil Service
Enterprises and new Haitian professional class of civil servants. Civil Service Enterprises will be
formed in every department; public-private hybrid service providers partly owned by the state.
No non-indigenous entity can cold more than 49% of any venture.
Haitians will be trained at BRAC and NSDC style paraprofessional schools to work as teachers,
emergency health workers, sanitation experts, agronomists, hydrologists and construction
contractors. Un-trained citizens awaiting a program opening will serve in a Haitian Public Works
Battalion focused on paving roads, removing trash and rubble, reforestation and other projects
for the public good.

Parcel 7: (DRR Policy)

Disaster Risk Reduction will be used to facilitate territorial control. The Department of Civil
Protection (DPC) will not only establish depots, flood barriers and storm shelters in each
commune they will install sensors and radio transmitters to monitor take off/ landing of small air
and sea craft in/from our territory. Such centers will fulfil the DRR objectives and aid in our
traffic interdiction efforts. We will begin to decentralize Port-Au-Prince via concentration of
economic and social service incentives in other departments coupled with sponsored
resettlement. DCP staging sites are already in each department. Establishing emergency depots at
each site of the commune level is next. Drafting a paid per diem Haitian Civil Defense Corps
composed of certified first responders as well as a CERT responder program via the CAN-MSPP
will bolster emergency staffing nationwide. Activation of the Beacon emergency text system will
be used to mobilize CAN & HCDC members for emergencies and pay them via Natcom/Digacel
cell credits. As well as notify the population in the case of disaster or weather emergency.

Parcel 8: (Security & Border Control Policy)

Expansion of Haitian National Police (HNP) to reach the target of 15,000 officers by 2016. Scale
force to 45,000 by 2020. Implement English policing modal of non-lethal weapons carried by
patrol units with lethal force back up. Begin MINUSTAH phased withdrawal by 2018.
Conversion of HNP members serving in MINUSTAH vacuum to a Haitian Defense Force
(HDF). Utilize this force as a means to secure out borders and airspace from human and narcotic
traffic. Our objective must be on controlling and bating the narco-traffic, phasing out
MINUSTAH without a Lavalas uprising crippling the country, ending the practice of Restoviks
and securing our boarders. As it is the intent of the Dominican Republic to eventually
denationalize citizens of Haitian descent we must establish much closer ties to the Haitian
community in D R to plan for that eventuality and meet it with international law on our side.
Demographically the island can be reunited as long as there are not atrocities allowed to be
carried out.

Critical Synthesis:

If these measures seem radical it is because the situation is dire. We must make use of our new
resources to restore the ability of government to govern. Being beholden to NGOs and foreign
interests has not served out nation well. Control over the development sector is the broken
window that we must predicate our national revival on; reformation of social services and
infrastructure before tourism and more sweat shops. It has been too long and we are too
vulnerable to external forces and nature itself. Let us act quickly during this limited opening to
bring Haiti to what she can be and our people to higher ground.

References & Further Reading:

Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) (2012) Evaluation of Donor Response to
Haiti Earthquake Shows “Building Back Better” Nothing But a Slogan Retrieved fromhttp://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/evaluation-of-donor-
response-to-haiti-earthquake-shows-building-back-better-nothing-but-a-slogan (Accessed on May 16, 2013).
Chafetz, M. E. (1996). The Tyranny of Experts: Blowing The Whistle On The Cult Of Expertise
Author: Morris E. Chafetz, Publisher: Madison Books.
Dolisca, F., McDaniel, J. M., Teeter, L. D., & Jolly, C. M. (2007). Land tenure, population
pressure, and deforestation in Haiti: the case of Forêt des Pins Reserve. Journal of Forest
Economics, 13(4), 277-289.
Feinsilver, J. M. (2010). Fifty years of Cuba’s medical diplomacy: from idealism to
pragmatism. Cuban studies, 41(1), 85-104.
Farmer, P. (1994). The Uses of Haiti (Vol. 3). Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
Farmer, P. (2001). Infections and inequalities: The modern plagues. University of California
Press.
Heinzelman, J., & Waters, C. (2010). Crowdsourcing crisis information in disaster-affected
Haiti. US
Jenson, D. & Szabo, V. (2011) Cholera in Haiti and Other Caribbean Regions, 19th Century.
Duke FHI Haiti Humanities. Laboratory Student Research Team1. 2130 Emerging Infectious
Diseases. http://www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 11, November 2011
Johnston, J. & Main, A. (2013). Research Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid
Transparency and Accountability in Haiti. Center for Economic and Policy. April 2013.
Retrieved from: http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/haiti-aid-accountability-2013-
04.pdf

Katz, J. M. (2013). The big truck that went by: how the world came to save Haiti and left behind a disaster. New York: Palgrave. Macmillan.
Morton, A. (1997). Haiti: NGO sector study. Washington, DC: World Bank, 52.
Newland, K., & Patrick, E. (2004). Beyond remittances: the role of Diaspora in poverty
reduction in their countries of origin, a scoping study by the Migration Policy Institute for the Department of International Development. Migration Policy Institute.
Palma, G. (2003). National Inequality in the Era of Globalization: What Do Recent Data
Tell Us? in Johnathan Michie, Handbook of Globalization, Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2003.
Pan American Health Organization: Epidemiological Update on Cholera (27 June 2014)
Situation summary of cholera in the Americas
Ramachandran, V. & Walz, J. (2012). Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?” Centre for
Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 004 May 2012,
Schuller, M. (2012). Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid and NGOs
Schwartz, T. (2014). History of NGOs and Disaster in Haiti. Retrieved from:
http://open.salon.com/blog/timotuck/2013/02/09/ngos_and_disaster_in_haiti
Shamsie, Y., & Thompson, A. S. (Eds.). (2006). Haiti: hope for a fragile state. Wilfrid Laurier
Univ. Press.
Stepick, A., Stepick, C. D., & Kretsedemas, P. (2001). Civic engagement of Haitian immigrants
and Haitian Americans in Miami-Dade County. Haiti–Immigration and Ethnicity Institute of
South Florida Retrieved November 16, 2006.
Zéphir, F. (2004). The Haitian Americans. Greenwood Publishing Group.
Chandler, A. (2014). The Role of the Haitian Diaspora in Haiti Building Back Better. Center for
Strategic International Studies-CSIS (2014). Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Kristoff, M., & Panarelli, L. (2010). Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?. In Peace Brief(Vol. 23).
United States Institute of Peace.
Titus, R. F. (2012). Roadmap to Haiti’s Next Revolution: A Plan for Diaspora Haitians to
Contribute to a Peaceful Turnaround. iUniverse.
Whitney, KM (1996), “Sin, Fraph, and the CIA: U.S. Covert Action in Haiti”, Southwestern
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (1996), pp. 303-332.