SCENE TWO (2)

A Double Funeral in the Outermost Boroughs

“Так темно, хоть глаз выколи”

Pronunciation:  “tak tyemNOH, hot’ glaz VYkaLEE”

Literal translation: so dark you can stab my eye out 

Meaning: pitch black

“SO DARK YOU CAN STAB MY EYE OUT”

Somewhere in that vast and hideous sprawling red brick barrio called ‘the Boogie Down’, anxiety is high and some are truly miserable. The story continues. A sea of low rise six story tenements and failed experiments in brutalist brick affordable housing run alongside highway beds. Then eventually that barrio sprawl, that cramped dead place of Spanish speaking poverty becomes a green and hilly oasis. Populated by the Albanians actually. This juxtaposition is striking. South of the Cross Bronks Expressway, the place is a fourth or fifth world country. To the north, something manageable takes shape. An Albanian suburb that mostly sat out the class war.

The friends of Sebastian Adonaev, known by many here as ‘Kawa Zivistan’ came from all five boroughs. They find their way north along those endless highway systems. Some too on trains. Some on buses or motor cycles or Guyanese modified muscle cars. The friends of the dead end up eventually in a place called the Wakefield Commune. Like most places in the Bronks, it has way too many people living there and no elevators. The vast labor reserve ghetto south of the expressway for the mostly Spanish speaking working class, it ends abruptly. The Albanians keep everything in their districts clean of the dirt they do everywhere else. The bleak and miserable looking South Bronks with it’s third world mentality and fourth world life span becomes almost a physical reminder of the culture and differences of the races religions. Or, more specifically perhaps how they are treated by the ruling order and secret police.

Viktoria Christiana Contreras is dressed in all black, a lace vale covering a pretty albeit heavily make upped face and contacts which turn her eyes feline brown blue. Her husband, Rafael Contreras is in denim jeans and black shirt as he owns no funeral appropriate suit. He has only sobered himself up long enough to attend the two funerals. Raffa is unshaven. His baby face is markedly hard for the first time in many years. The weather is poorly, really it seems in the Bronx hot or cold, the weather is always poorly. It is nearly the end of summer, but it had refused to snow this year. The weather machines were in real anarchy or Newyokgrad’s oligarchy is slipping. They are in a crowd of several hundred mourners.

The first Funeral is for Kawa Zivistan, the infamous partisan known by those who really know him as Sebastian Vasilivich Adonaev. It is very well attended considering all the bridges he has burned this year. Very few people believe he is really dead. Everyone is speaking of “not seeing it coming.” Also of his ‘incredible potential’ now buried just as many had suspected before his 30^th year. It is rather like a sad circus actually. There are way too many people speechifying, justifying and explaining, and there is an overabundance of booze flask flowing. Who will lead the tribe? Many of the mourners are Negs. Many are wearing blue ambulance Class A dress event uniforms. His parents are kind and bourgeoisie. They don’t break down or cry. They just quietly hold court and whisper on the sidelines. His mother in particular conspiring with select old friends paying their respects.

It is a closed casket affair. Kawa had allegedly shot himself twice in the head with small caliber pistol and then toppled seventeen stories off a roof. Or he was executed. With two bullets to the head. Then thrown off the roof. Either one could have been true if you really knew him. Which to be fair a lot of these people did. Some had served with him in the emergency medical services. Some were from ‘the organization’. A few had fucked him. Others had made love with him for his poems or his hyper-colorful, somewhat naughty little drawings. Most are family. Most are comrades. There is very little left of his face. Seemed possibly the work of the secret police. Or his own work, hard to really say. Similar to how Rahula Today the famous martyr from Detroit had died in 2068. A little too similar. How do you shoot yourself twice?

Theoretically, it is an Ivory funeral. But the only thing Yiddish about it was that it is done on the tasteful but cheap, and scheduled to go on for seven days. There was liquor and also warm fresh bagels and various kinds of smoked fish. He was to go in the ground less than 24 hours after his alleged suicide. There not being a note was the most unnerving aspect of the whole thing. Kawa was amongst other things a very prolific writer. Not leaving a suicide note was highly suspect, completely anticlimactic. Out of character. The inner circle knew exactly why he’d gone and done what he did, kept it to themselves. What he thought he had to do. Whether he died by his own hand, or got snuffed; well it all had to do with that Maccluskey broad.

“Over a woman that didn’t even love him!” explains his oldest friend Nikholai Trickovitch. Then he spits on the floor and does a shot, “That dumb little Suka set him up! Blat.”

“I want to see the fucking body,” demands a woman named Anya Drovtich with thick black dreads and the blue F.D.N.Y. Emergency Medical Service uniform that many are wearing out of respect for the fact that Kawa had once been an E.M.T. with that prestigious organization. For four years until the Bureau of Trials and Interrogations had forced him out after various plots and labor agitations centered around the island nation of Ayiti. As well as a controversial subversive newspaper. Many core members of the resistance are of course E.M.T.s, Paramedics and also some Fire Fighters with the organization Kawa built during the long dark lost years. Anya just says what many are thinking, but few other than the parents, Trickovitch or Mickhi Dbrisk had the familiarity with the dead to outright declare.

Plain Viktoria and wild Rafael stand quietly drinking vodka in the background. They recognize many of Kawa’s associates. From dinner parties. From late night salons on revolution. Comrades and former lovers. Also the fair weather comrades who mostly drank his wine and ate his food. Who do so even in his time of death. Many, if not all are from the from the Z.O.B. His gang, clique, club, party and ‘cult’, which many have and did still call it. Whatever it had been, or still secretly was it wasn’t over with the death of Kawa Zivistan. After decades of clandestine organizing, theirs was a durable Otriad, the realization of an American guerrilla movement.   

Viktoria knows the female faces slightly better than the male ones. Dinner parties and long nights at Mehanata, where Kawa would hold court up on the Mezzanine. Making deals and handing out homework assignments. She’s mostly stayed out of the Z.O.B. club affairs, despite his many attempts to rope her in. Rafael however is absolutely more involved. Inside the internal club politics, he knows almost everyone here. Since despite the blur of the drink, he’s a Kadro.

 “The casket stays closed, sister,” declares Mickhi Dbrisk, a tall Jamaican gangster in a black pea coat. His gray armband and the small silver lion pin on his left lapel indicating him as a person of authority here. Openly marked as member of the ‘People’s Defense Forces’. The bulge of a pistol can be seen if you known where to look.

“I won’t believe he’s dead until I see the body,” Anya repeats.

The mob of comrades and family mills about in the brick-house cold. The mother of the dead man nods to Mickhi Dbrisk. Kawa’s mother has strange circular, red wizard spectacles. His father is portly and normally jovial, albeit not really such as his first son’s latest funeral. Dbrisk opens the casket. There lies a body. A body with no head. In theory it is the body of a prolific poet. A dedicated paramedic, partisan and hooligan named Kawa Zivistan. His head is severed, completely missing. His gray multiform is still very crisp. The Ayitian flag of Palmares is tucked in his left breast pocket. Red and blue with the tree of life. Cannons and spears defending hard won and bloody liberty.

“Where’s his fucking head?” mutters Anya in Arabic.

Rafael Ernesto and his wife Viktoria take a black town car hired out from the Mexican Express. Kawa’s funeral was in the North Bronx but Dasha’s is in Little Odessa, Southern Breuklyn.

Four hours in traffic, three shots of vicious Rakia, two Baltika 9s and a steady flow of Stolichnaya Premium and a pretty long car service ride later, they make it to Breuklyn a bit after sun down. Through way too many different factional check points. Inter-borough transit is getting prohibitively expensive. On the southern coast of Breuklyn they arrive at a pretty bleak gathering. This second funeral is quite small, but rather fancy. ‘The bitch didn’t die on the cheap’, thinks Viktoria. It’s on the very other side of of the grad.

There are fewer than two dozen people there. No speaks anything but Russian and no one cries except the mom. Dasha looks as beautiful dead as she ever did alive. Like a gently sleeping doll. The funeral is nominally ‘Russian Orthodox’, as that was her patron’s religion is.  Although Daria was allegedly some part Ivoryish. Probably a deception. The patron has spared no expense. Her mother had been flown in from Penza. Based on the patron’s insistence she was to be buried here and not sent back to Russia.

  There are a couple lady friends of the night that Viktoria recognizes from the tavern. Dumb foreign gold digging whores, she thinks. There is an assortment of men. All looking suspiciously at each other. Daria had a fan club and none of them are amateur. Rafael’s Russian is much stronger than Viktoria’s. Being American native, she speaks middle English and low English. Though it is his fourth language, he can follow the mood. He makes out vaguely hushed interactions. Scene size ups and accusations.

Viktoria knows actually very little about the nightlife of Daria, outside of the Bulgarian Tavern ‘Mehanata’. She can fill some blanks though. Even though virtually anything the girl said was a total lie. There was a paper work husband named Maccluskey. There was a ‘boyfriend’ named Serge paying for an apartment in Brighton. There was a corporate lawyer named Dmitry, who was her patron and was paying for her school and credit cards. She had a best friend named Tanya, a funny looking little emaciated tramp. Viktoria can basically only guess at who everyone else is besides the patron. Holding court on his failed investment. Allegedly, Daria’s black heart had stopped roughly 48 hours ago. The medical examiner inconclusively blamed a hazardous midnight cocktail of Red bulls, Vodka shots, Cocaine, and something else they couldn’t really identify. Daria was known to play with all that stuff, pretty often.

Some homies found her body at the Stillwell elevated rail station. She was pronounced dead shortly after a work up at Coney Island Hospital. She had in her purse a small book of poems written to her by one ‘Kawa Zivistan’. Who, allegedly killed himself just one day after confirming she was gone.

“Allegedly, blat” was the only word in Americano being bandied about this funeral.

“Who to blame for the death of my daughter?” her mother asks Viktoria in real broken English when no one seems to be paying attention, “which one of these men?”

“I’m sorry I just don’t know.”

“My Dasha told us there was a crazy poet in love with her. Want rescue her from, this kept life. Life of shit in non-glamours Amerika. She say-tell me, this poet man. Trying steal her away. For about one year. Who kill my daughter really?”

“I just don’t know, I’m so sorry” repeats Viktoria.

“Is man here now? This fucking shit, this Kawa Zivistan Suka?”

“No. Kawa is dead too. He shot himself. Twice. After identifying your daughter’s corpse. We just came from his funeral,” says Rafael quietly knowing there are lots of bad man killers here.  Rafael, drunk again, looks like he might cry looking down at Daria’s body. Buried in hyper-expensive completely out of season Peony flowers in fancy white casket with gold trim. He had loved her. While still partly loving his paper work wife Viktoria in sad way too of course. Everyone had loved Daria Andreavna. She had dark magic and ‘tits galore’. She had style, cunning and class. Without knowing very much about her, many men had tried to have her. Because she was young and free and exotic and beautiful and impossible to tame. She was a true collectors item. 

Many men here had tried to own her in one way or another. Her husband, her boyfriends and her sponsor patron included. Many of which are now here.

“Who to blame for this total catastrophe?” asks the mother again.

Nobody really knew. Allegedly, a lot of fucking things had happened over the course of the year, in the wilderness of Newyorkgrad, the third most powerful city on earth. The ziggurat of many, many lights and towers. 

“A senseless tragedy blat. A senseless goddamn waste of…,” the very well-dressed man in the custom cut black silver blue suit whose name is Dmitry Khulushin, had almost said ‘talent’ aloud, but instead, says “…of perfection.”

Daria’s mother begins to sob hysterically which is permissible for a woman and mother to do at a Russian funeral. Skinny little Tanya tries to comfort her but starts crying too. Her daughter had come a very long way to die obscurely, for absolutely nothing. Viktoria grabs Rafael by the arm, “It’s time to leave. Now. Her browns eyes say she means it. Rafael looks like shit. Real poorly. The sometimes hard defenses of his machismo crumpled on the ride over, any minute now he could get in a bad fight. They Fenian exit.

They wait in the terrible cold outside. The funeral was held at ‘The National’ on Neptune Avenue.  Another Mexican Express cab is coming to take them home to District Greenpoint. Rafael begins to weep heavily. Sobbing for Dasha, whom he very much loves, loved, no, loves. And for Sebastian too who was one of his closest real friends in this bleak city. He had introduced them and thus feels now, more than any other moment in the year prior, responsible for what has happened. Since in truth only he knows the full story of it. In both Peruvian as well as Russian culture, ‘real men’ do not by any stretch of fucking imagination cry. Specially in front of women. Paper work wives included. But, cry now he does. Wiping away the tears as they form. Hitting a brick wall until his hand bleeds, then breaks. Viktoria tries to stop him from boxing the wall. He slaps her. She is an American. The child of Fenian Catholics. They work hard and blue collar.They drink pretty heavily. They have lots of kids and cry in front of whomever they want. The ice cold wind blows deathly freeze upon them. The Mexican Express is nowhere in sight. Viktoria can’t believe he even hit her.

Brighton Beach is a bleak eastern oblivion. The endless ugly crumbling boardwalk goes past dilapidated public housing towers out a no where place, to drop out of time or sight. Drown yourself on the end of the Steeple Chase pier. The sun has finally set on this once plump and happy empire, a short lived Pax-American. But will it end in a pathetic whimper, or a vile gang bang? The vultures are circling the ‘grad. Have at it! The Haan hordes and the Russian spy machine are very ready. 

SCENE ONE (1)

A hanging garden in the Financial District

“слово в слово” 

Pronunciation: SLOvah v SLOvah

Literal translation: word for word

Meaning: exactly as written

“WORD FOR WORD”

In Newyorkgrad it gets so evil hot in the end of Summer. The citadel of shrill billionaires and unwashed foreign masses longing to wear designer sneakers becomes a swelter box. Most people of any means flee to their dachas in Strong Island to avoid it. Dawn is now rising on a roof garden in the Isle of Mann. Five friends were up and out all night. They sit atop a seventeen story print house converted to a housing cooperative. It is one of lowest lying structures left in the Financial District. A maze of towering blue and purple towers. Sebastian Vasilivich Adonaev over a bottle of Basque wine, tells old danger tales to those who will and can still mange to listen. It is the second to last weekend of Thermidor and soon summer will end. A fake gold watch dangles off his left wrist as he enunciates his wild tale with his hands. Covering his dark brown hair is a brown leather partisan cap.

On the roof garden of the old converted print house on Nassau Street, slim and enthusiastic Europeans Amelia Monteleone and Viktoria Christiana Lynch Contreras snap off photos and clink glasses bantering heavily intoxicated. Raphael Ernesto Lynch Contreras, a consumate wild man, is baby faced with flowing black hair. Salt and pepper streaks show he’s aging. Slightly poorly thanks to war and alcoholism. He is at least on green card the husband of Viktoria. Raphael sits with his dear friend Sebastian and a beautiful Russian dvotchka named Daria Andreavna. Raphael attempts a boozy mediation. Sebastian and Daria evil eye each other viciously across a low wooden table. She has big blue crazy person eyes. An affectionate rendering in Russian of Daria is ‘Dasha’, and this is what Sebastian has been calling her all night. They had been introduced several months before, but both had been way too drunk to remember. They are both regulars at the ‘Mehanata Social Club’, but he more on Thursdays and she more on Saturdays. Sebastian is telling a dangerously insensitive story. Daria is appalled. Sebastian removes his skally cap and says, “The job, and operation; call it as you want, involves calling on high end prostitutes whose numbers one acquires in the association of athletes, banker men and or those of Post or former Soviet back grounds, mostly at the Banya. Sebastian loves the way everything sounds in Russian. Fucking, fighting, and partisan songs. Though he knows under three dozen small phrases and can barely read Cyrillic. He’s an enthusiast of wanting things he cannot possibly have.

“So shortly after the girls arrive and you present some fictitious cover. You take their coats as they walk in and settle on a price that will involve no bit of touching at all. Make small talk, make big talk. Which ever you like. Then, you tell them that they’re being filmed and also recorded, but that you’re not a cop. Not some rich pervert or a Mossadnik. Or who-ever else weird and dangerous. You’re not there to entrap them for absolutely anything. You can tell them you’re an abolitionist, or keep it real apolitical.”

Puff, puff passes along this ill-conceived venture.

“You tell them to call down to the driver and say their John is layered out like Charlie Sheen.”

“Tiger-blooded,” notes Raphael Ernesto. 

“Then you make tea. You tell them a little storah. A personal tale about why you are not a dog or a pig. No troll or ghoul. Intermixed with the story are questions you plan to help answer on a cost effective timeline. How you came to fully hate this line of flesh work. Because you had loved someone forced into it. Because it is evil to trade in coerced human flesh. You convince them to take and perhaps disseminate to other persons a phone number. To arrest or eliminate traffickers and pimps. Also, how to get such trafficked and victimized people the resources they need to escape such work. With a VISA and a future. They get the job cash for nothing. We’re in an era of creating digital money and printing highly convincing hundos. What’s fucking money? We can print it easily these days faster than the Federals can secure it. A number, a simple number which is a real way out of the night life. They get that number on a card. You also ask them to put it in their phone. Eventually, the poor unfortunate soul either will pass the number along or report it directly to their pimps. But, inevitably you force a violent hand. You spread the knowledge that there is in fact a networked way to escape such slavery, are they so inclined. It’s cheaper and more effective than lobbying or the useless political routes. All the cops and half the politicians are on the take, partake anyway. We go directly to the sex slaves and assure them there is safe way out. The next stage then is to get our various operatives into the spas and brothels to feign cardiac arrest and call in ambulances and firemen in as reinforcements. Then we just burn them down.”

Her jaw basically drops.

“They will kill you for that nonsense,” Daria spits out, “Kill you and your family and people you love. For such bullshit man! For a lot less than bull shit. A number! I spit on your American number. For insulting low grade bullshit that changes nothing. You will die. They will kill those dear to you too. Kill people who owe you money. Nothing at all will be fixed about anything. Not one single girl will walk free. It is bourgeois liberal thinking,” retorts Daria.

All the regality of being born all Slavic, but outside the great dividing highway that loops the Moscow capital separating the have everything’s from the have nothings or have only little somethings. Being born so radiantly beautiful and tough and Russian after the alleged triumph of Capitalist Modernity has left her charming and capable of fight. She is quite far ‘from Russia with love’, rootless and floating in glittery fairy tales that don’t expel the daily hardships of her newly adopted country. Though her card is not green yet.

“I am not afraid to die for a thing I believe in sweetness. At the cost of all my American privileges. They say anyway that I’m hard man to make disappear,” Sebastian flatly retorts.

“But are you not afraid to endanger others,” she retorts.

“He has such dumb American beliefs blat!” she mocks, “I guess you’ve never had to work for anything. Or work to keep something you fought hard for blat. So you would give away most easily. Your life seems so very easily offered. To take, if you ask me,” she snaps at his bait.

“Hey, lady, you are insulting to my dear friend and our gracious host,” sternly interjects Raphael, “This man, you have no idea what he’s been through to back up these words. This man is a people’s hero!”

Daria could care less about the Peruvian definition of so-called ‘heroism’. She is appalled by Sebastian’s cynical little story about call girls passing, itself off as incompetent activism. So she offers to kill him. He obliges her. Thinks she’s bluffing, but doesn’t care if she’s not not.

‘I’ll kill this over privileged American hypocrite,’ she thinks. A civic duty to my new mother land and the old country too blat! ‘This shit head knows not with whom he plays,’ she thinks. Mostly, she maintains a mighty level of the not giving of a single shit. Not one fuck of a fuck, of a shit. She’s an off day. She’s totally blacked out. She won’t remember anything. She only remembers every other night out when she drinks. The rest of them form an intractable blur. A black haze punctuated with irregular black and blue marks. “From falling down stairs.” If she really kills him, the tragedy, as far as a memory, will really belong to no one.

Rafael implores her to be more, “Suave, Suave!” To be more calm and “Tranquillo.” The once infamous Peruvian revolutionist, now moonlighting as a Newyorkgrad low key digital disk jockey and designer jeans mender. He cannot even barely modulate Sebastian’s posturing ego and Dasha’s swaggerous, murderous taunting. Now they’re waving invisible pistols at each others’ faces like wild Middle Easterners.

“You think like a niggle!” she yells at him.

The job of any and all men as far as she is concerned is please her by makings sure her drink is never empty and that life is a series of taken care of attractions, to make her life easier. He has failed at both in his utter self-serving arrogance.

“So you’re gonna kill me? Or just fucking threaten on about it?” says Sebastian in her face.“Absofuckinglutely,” she replies, “your life is bullshit, thus your death is certain blat.” 

Before Rafael can talk them down they’re going up a ladder. Up to the 18^th level deck. It’s more of an easterly platform atop the roof garden with the massive blue glass Geary Building towering just an alley ways distance away. Thousands of expensive little cubicles for the lower upper class. Sports players, fancy pied a terres to stuff a mistress and city homes for the lower ranks of the financial class. But all the lights are out. A great setting for a hastily arranged assisted suicide.

Now, they’re bare knuckled boxing! Daria is in a boxing school in Brighton. She strikes at him hard. But it isn’t his first rodeo. 

“Die you shit! You fucking Amerikansky! You wasted one blat,” she spits at him.

Rafael is actually too drunk to get up the ladder to intervene. Amelia and Victoria have stopped their camera phone art making over white wine and look up with moderate concern, moderate care. Actually, only Rafael knows Daria and Sebastian intimately enough to really care. As he is in love with both of them. Rafael knows a lot about Sebastian’s other life aboard as ‘Kawa Zivistan’, a wanted rebel throughout the peripheral colonies. A  partisan leader in the American guerrilla. Not spooks nor the police forces had taken him so far, or gotten very close to making him die. A beautiful woman might now get close enough. They are boxing pretty close to the ledge. But to be honest, Amelia fucked him twice and it was mediocre. Viktoria only uses him for hints about Rafael’s infidelity. Rafael, has drank too much. His brain is just too wet to get him up that ladder.  

  “You don’t want to live here forever?!” Daria taunts him.

Their boxing and taunting has them perilously near the edge of the roof. She is striking hits and he is just taking her hits and then, then it comes. Thwack. She cracks his jaw hard. He grins at her with a little blood on the lip.

“Hit me to kill me! Just knock me into that fucking pit! Make a good inglorious end to it. It’s all bullshit you know. I’ll just come back,” Sebastian declares in Russian.

The most beautiful woman he has ever seen is just a side story in his own mind. His own much larger tragedy propels him to make questionable life choices, such as this one. “Kill me blat!” he beckons. Then, she tries to really kill him. She’s moves so fucking fast, like she’s basically trained in the ‘School of Alcoholism’. Daria cocks back and doesn’t even blink. She hits him in the throat with the right and then with the left, crack! He topples backwards off the roof. As Sebastian plummets back, he grabs out instinctively. Yanks her along with him. They tumble together off the ledge. They plummet to the alley way below. The flesh snaps apart. Two souls leave their bodies from a pile of bloody pointless death.

The

Israeli & Palestinian State

Preamble

The status quo of Israel in Palestine is not sustainable. 

There are critical security, international relations and domestic crisis issues that threaten the very existence of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples much more so than the ongoing, comparatively low intensity occupation of the Palestinian zones of control in the West Bank and blighted Gaza. The region at large is in an acute state of political and social unrest; the governments of Somalia, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Yemen have fallen resulting in foreign occupations, civil wars and general anarchy. Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia are at proxy war throughout the Muslim world.

Many will object to us describing Israel as a “Jewish military Colony”, object to calling the separation barrier “Apartheid Wall” but linguistics and agreement of a shared paradigm are vital to the success out this unit’s objectives. We assure you the credentials of our core research team from Israel is sufficiently grounded in lived experiences of both the intelligence service and defense forces; while our Palestinian team’s Jihadist and patriotic background would be of little question.

None of us nine are pro-peace; we are pro-survival.

Chaos and revolution are spreading while security, what little there was is unraveling. All of this was acutely exacerbated by the 2001 & 2003 American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; resulting in the virtual non-governance of both countries today.

This treatise has been researched and written by a group of Israelis and Palestinians who are concerned with the collective survival of their respective peoples as they occupy and are occupied in the heart of this massive, un-ending conflict. There is very little hope of this macros-regional war or micro-peace settlement between Israel and Palestine being resolved on the level of government. Palestinians have two competing governments; Hamas and Fatah; Israel has coalition government, but in reality is controlled as a military oligarchy on the behest of Ashkenazi Judaism and the foreign policy goals of the United States of America.

For the approximately 13-14 million humans living in Greater Israel/ historic Palestine; the scenarios are not optimistic in the slightest. Peace is improbable, demographics are not favorable to the 4-5 million categorized Jews and beyond the religious overtone of the landmarks described by three world religions as ‘holy land’; Israel is also a nuclear armed semi-peripheral power aligned completely and dependent on financially a Jewish Lobby and interest in the United States which cultivates the specific and direct interests of two intractable groups; the US military-industrial complex and the 1-2 million Ashkenazi (European) Israeli Jews; which enjoy a standard of living inside the Jewish colony markedly different from the Jews of other ethnic backgrounds.

There has been ceaseless warfare in the Maghreb & Middle East since 2000.

All of the scenarios discussed in the treatise are inseparable from the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but it is naïve and European to link the peace of the region of our specific peace.

A peace that will never be.

Thus we concern ourselves in this manuscript with Israelis (of all religions and ethnicities) and Palestinians (of all demographics). We are concerned with the broader course of humanity, but this has been authored to ensure that regardless of humanities general course; there will always be Palestinians, and there will always be Jews; and if there are to be “Israelis” an identity that is less than 84 years old; we must engage in radical steps to subvert the course of the mainstream Zionist project; delink ourselves of Euro-American hegemony and stop the inevitable slaughter of our collective peoples.

To stop the flood gates from opening, to address the broad systemic internal contradictions of the Israeli state and to secure the third Hebrew commonwealth, a radical policy of reorientation must begin with a realistic assessment of the only other three parties on the ground besides Memshala Yisrael which can broker regional stability. Hamas. Kurdistan. Iran

The central thesis of this treatise has two parts, as its authors are diametrically grounded in two war camps; Political Islam and Zionism; both of which reflect deeply nuanced interpretations of their respective ideologies; but are wildly different in fundamental social policy.

Part One; is that in order to safeguard Israel as a ‘Jewish National Home,’ some very fundamental assumptions on regional security and domestic policy must be altered to reflect new realities emerging on the ground. The most vital among them being recognition of the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement/Hamas), Kurdistan and Iran as the only viable partners the State of Israel has to implement lasting détente, separation and a cessation to this prolonged conflict with an endgame result of peace.

Part Two; actualization of Palestinian human rights and opposition to occupation and apartheid is the only mechanism for survival that Jews, particularly non-white Jews have to secure the survival of their people.

Introduction:

It is no longer a question of moralizing the conflict, obsessing over past failures or temporarily abating a cycle of degenerating violence. Or conducting expensive anthropological studies on identity.

Both the Israeli Knesset, the Palestinian resistance factions, the various Persian & Arab power brokers and the para-state organizations on the ground (and in Diaspora) all realize that neither by sheer will nor by force of arms can they destroy one another. Blame for the modern quagmire that is the Middle East may fall squarely on the post-colonial powers of Europe and the United States for proliferation of arms without stipulation or control. However the new reality is that if the third Hebrew Commonwealth of Israel is to survive; if a Palestinian State is to be brought into being; as well as if any measure of regional stability is to be achieved, radical and unorthodox steps must be taken to close the breach. The breach is not simply a result of Israeli defense against Arab aggression, or vice versa; it is a breach in the foundation of the modern security calculus. All parties involved must become more attuned to the heightened stakes via lessons of history and sound political science.  

This paper treatise offers an objective analysis of the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya in order to advocate for its recognition as a viable partner, not in immediate peace; but in implementation of separation, economic development and most importantly; Hudna. It makes a fundamental case for supporting Kurdish national ambitions in Turkey, Iraq and Syria. We advocate for a full and lasting partnership between Israel and the revolutionary Shi’a government in Iran.

To claim that Memshala Israel has secured its borders, or contained conventional military threats to its existence is to say that glass is made out of sand. The process by which glass is made from sand renders the base substance un-alterably changed and requires much the release of energy through fire and heat to yield something far more unstable than its original form. While the cousins of Ishmael and Yitzhak, the Israelis and Palestinians, are indeed two peoples intractably bound to a single, tiny piece of land, they are met with a reoccurring problem. The Israeli public and government (currently) lack the will to commit genocide. The Palestinian Resistance factions cannot (currently) procure or introduce a means to mass murder that won’t render their own homeland a house of ash.

Surely whispered in both camps is the notion that it wouldn’t be ‘objectionable’ for the other and their kind to be ‘pushed into the sea’ or ‘dumped on the other side of the Jordan.’ The survivors of the Shoah cannot (yet) bring themselves to this, nor would international opinion condone genocide in the Holy Land in this day and age. As for the Palestinians, pushing the Jews into the sea has more to do with rhetoric than ability, conscience or even intention. The ancestors of both races defended the holy land against the Christian Crusaders locked arm in arm.

There are over 1,400 years of precedent for relatively peaceful co-existence and less than 100 to the contrary. Anyone telling you otherwise has a vested interest in your ignorance.

Even the death toll of the First Intifada (estimated at 421 Israeli/1,549 Palestinian) and the more bloody melee of the Second Intifada, which included suicide bombers and collective punishment,  cost only 1,062 Israeli and 5,500 Palestinian lives. The invasion of the Gaza Strip in 2008 resulted in 13 Israeli and 1,417 Palestinians. In the ongoing Gaza Wars in 2010-2015 an estimated 100 Israelis and over 5,000 Palestinians have lost their lives.

That means that in the entirety of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict beginning in 1948; less than 50,000 people have cumulatively died, comparatively to virtually all other ethnic conflicts that is a foot note, a statistic.

The body count of the Palestinian Israel civil war is comparatively low when compared with other global ethnic conflicts like those waged in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and Chechnya.

Hamas must be engaged as the only viable partner capable of securing Palestinian temporary acceptance of the third Hebrew Commonwealth and thereby securing the Jewish National home by buying both sides more time for ultimate reconciliation before more desperate measures are introduced. Kurdistan must be supported aggressively by both people’s overtly and covertly. Iran is the only semi-peripheral power both sides can count on, as all other states besides Egypt are European inventions; and Egypt is an incredibly unstable place locked between a US backed military dictatorship and the Muslim Brotherhood.

This treatise is broken into nine Sections each with sub-segments utilized to illustrate the viability of the central thesis.

Section zero is a brief synopsis of the diversity and contradictions within the Palestinians and Jewish narratives with a focus on linguistics.

Section one is a baseline on Hamas’ tactics and beliefs to establish how they have developed as a movement in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sunni political Islam.

Section two demonstrates Hamas’ evolution in response to failed Israeli tactics of counter-insurgency.

Section three deals with the evolution of the Hamas’ military-political strategy over time.

Section four explains how these evolutions can be interpreted as establishing Hamas as a reliable partner for separation and economic development & is a resistance strategy for the Jewish and Palestinian diaspora.

Section five outlines a strategy for bringing the long warring factions to détente.

Section six is the case for full Palestinian and Israeli support for Kurdistan.

Section seven is an outline of Iran and their proxy Hezbollah.

Section eight is a listing of all known relative players that must be brought into coalition to support the aims of the treatise.

Table of Contents

Section zero “What Jews and Palestinians Believe”

Section one “What Hamas Believes”

Section two “How Hamas Evolves”

Section three “Crusades”.

Section four “Exile”.

Section five “Hudna & Détente”

Section six “Kurdistan”

Section seven “Iran and Hezbollah”

Section eight “Factions”.

Section 0: What Jews & Palestinians Believe

“You don’t eat pork and we don’t eat pork, we’ve both been not eating pork for as long as we can remember, let’s just agree to disagree on everything and just not eat pork together.”

The Grand Narrative of Jews (Holocaust)

The Grand Narrative of Palestinians (Catastrophe)

Objective Proximate Causes

Objective proximate causes are existential problems for both states and both peoples. As in for every square meter of West Bank territory absorbed into a settlement any future Palestinian state slowly ceases to lose ground. For every Arab-Israeli (Palestinian) born inside Israel; the reality of the Jewish State begins to crumble. As revolutions break out all over the region the overall security situation is deteriorating. Peace has always take a back seat to security and has always been punctuated with a new round of violent engagement. The following causes are understood on both sides as the primary provocations which trigger violence in the conflict.

Primary Root: Physical integrity of bi-national territory.

This is clearly understood on both sides in relation to the highly limited size of territory both peoples lay their claim to. Pre-1967 Israel has a population of over 1.6 million Palestinian Arabs. East Jerusalem and the West Bank have been settled by over 650,150 Jews which hold an estimated 9% of West Bank territory. The issues most difficult to negotiate include not only Jerusalem; the capital claimed by both; or the ever expanding settlements or the separation/apartheid barriers; but by where to draw borders so that a viable Palestine can exist alongside a secure Israel.

Primary Proximate Causes: 

Each side holds a seemingly intractable bottom line perspective making their distrust grow even deeper as their leaders fail to deliver peace, security or economic development. These core provocation issues and the policies taken on them most harm the ability to hold any meaningful negotiations for peace. What follows are the ten primary proximate causes which require corresponding Benefit Harm indicators we advocate for in the fourth section to monitor their resolution or disruption. Symmetric Indicators as explained in more detail later are the agreed to measurement systems for a specific proximate causes where belligerent sides in a conflict lay out specific provocation parameters.

According to a report by B’TSELEM (Sep, 2008), Access Denied, Israeli Measures to deny Palestinians access to land around settlements:

“Israel has created in the Occupied Territories a regime of separation by discrimination, in which it runs separate legal systems, one for Israelis and the other for Palestinians, and under which the scope and nature of human-rights violations vary based on nationality. This system has led to the theft of hundreds of thousands of dunams of land to benefit the settlements and their residents”.

1. Structural Apartheid:  Israelis are very loathe to be equated with South Africa and deeply fear the long term ramifications of the nascent boycott, divestment and sanction movement. Apartheid which is a crime against humanity is also the basis of the Israeli-Arab conflict; structural attempts in Israel and the occupied territories to maintain Jewish privilege, especially Ashkenazi Jewish privilege over all other ethnic groups. Apartheid is measured and understood as explicit and implicit structural division for the purpose of fortifying ethnic privilege. The most obvious extensions of this Apartheid are the checkpoints, ethnic identity cards and the Security Barrier Walls.

2. Jerusalem/ Holy Sites: Both Israelis and Palestinians view Jerusalem/Al Quds as their capital. The Old City holds the most holy site to Judaism (Ha Kotel/ Western Wall of destroyed second temple) and the Dome of the Rock; the third holiest site in Islam. A periodic flashpoint for violence, Jerusalem/ Al Quds highlights a major issue between both sides. The Palestinians want full control of East Jerusalem, which was occupied by Jordan prior to the Six Day War in 1967. Israel has actively worked to expand the Jewish presence in East Jerusalem and environs in order to make its division impossible. All West Bank Palestinian Muslims under age 35 are restricted from entering the Dome of the Rock except on major holidays with permits. All Palestinian-Israeli Jerusalem residents have access. All attempts to expand Jewish presence represent an explicit arena of contention. As do Arab or Jewish desecration and neglect

3. Settlement Expansion: Israeli settlements in the West Bank according to Israeli NGO B’Tselem occupy on 1% of West Bank territory but via security barriers and jurisdiction extend to a full 42% of administrative control (Yesha Council disputes this and states that the settlements take up 9.2 %, arguably on some of the best lands). This issue is one of the most glaring issues on the table as the majority of international human rights bodies have repeatedly ruled that the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories have no legal basis and must be removed in order to pave the way for a viable Palestinian state to emerge. Despite such obvious refusal of the settlements Israel has ignored all UN resolutions and recommendations and planned for more settlements to be built on Palestinian lands. Israel unilaterally dissolved and destroyed its Gaza Strip settlements in 2005.

 4. Access to Water: As of today Israel has access to all the major water resources in the area some of which are located in the Palestinian Territories. Most of the natural resources that go into the Palestinian areas are only allowed to go in under Israeli control and monitoring and this would be essential to be removed in order to allow the state of Palestine to grow and enjoy full and real sovereignty.

5. Refugees/Right to Return: in 1948 over 711,000 Palestinian refugees decided to flee their homes thinking that they could return in a matter of weeks or months after Israel’s defeat by the Arab armies. Others were forced out of their homes by the advancing Israeli army which forcibly evacuated of 500 villages (Pappe, 2006). By leaving their homes they paved the way for the actual establishment of the state of Israel and paved the way for almost never returning to their homes. A good number of Palestinians did not flee and became the so-called “Arab-Israelis” and today they are part of the Israeli society albeit as fourth class citizens. Today the Refugees issue is being used for political use only as most of the Arab countries to refuse to give Palestinian refugees and rights or citizenships in order to support “the right of return” and Israel will never allow Palestinian to return as this would mean that the Jewish people would become a minority in their own Jewish land that they have fought so much in order to have. On the Jewish side, persons with one Jewish grandparent are covered under the existing right to return and are given an extensive benefit basket.   

6. The Borders/ Palestinian State Recognition: The Israeli government has repeatedly stood against any idea of a true sovereign Palestinian state due to proclaimed existential security risks. According to Israel any Palestinian state will not be connected in terms of geography with limited air space and sea freedom making the idea of a state kind of hopeless in the eyes of many Palestinians. In addition, there many Israeli restrictions relating to any future state for the Palestinian people such as any state would need to be without any army and even the polices forces would need to fully report its use of weapons. The state would also be forced to rely on Israeli utility companies, water works and be economically dependent for some time.

7. US Military Aid: Israel was the recipient $2.775 billion in 2010, $3 billion in 2011, $3.07 billion in 2012 (and $3.15 billion per year from 2013-2018) while Israel’s defense budget is around $15 billion. The United States and Israel engage in extensive intelligence sharing and defense research. The US also has the largest community of Jews outside of Israel. AIPAC, the Israel lobby in the United States has a disproportionate amount of influence over U.S. policy and the notion of the U.S. an independent outside arbiter is naive.  

8. Demographic Changes: Israelis are acutely worried about demographic changes inside of Israel that will affect the state’s “Jewish Character” in the long run. 1.6 million Israeli citizens of Arab, Bedouin, Druze and Palestinian descent make up currently over 20 % of the population. Equally worrying is that out of an estimated 12 million people in greater Israel (Israel, Judea & Samaria/ West Bank), under Israeli jurisdiction (excluding 1.7 million in Gaza) only 5.6 million are classified as being Jewish.

9. Regional Instability: As various Arab governments erupt in civil strife and internal conflict Israel continues to worry about its own security in an environment rife with revolution, civil war and arms proliferation. Egypt’s 2011 revolution and subsequent coup brought Muslim Brotherhood in and then out of power; Hamas is the Palestinian branch of Muslim Brotherhood. Jordan which is over 70% Palestinian is Israel’s only remaining regional ally besides Turkey which is growing also increasingly hostile.

10. Bi-Partisan Palestine: Since the Palestinian civil war in 2006 Gaza Strip has been controlled by Hamas and the West Bank Palestinian Authority by Fatah. Hamas does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and Fatah is viewed as corrupted. This in essence has created two Palestine’s only one of which is willing to negotiate anything with the State of Israel and neither of which can enforce policy on the other.    

These are the major issue is the grievance that both sides hold against one another. This is a major point that can be far more important than Jerusalem, water, or even refugees. The hatred that both sides have for one another and the pain that each side caused the other are so deep that they cannot simply make any future agreements because of a true lack any sense of trust or sincerity. There has to be a true healing process to be formed that involves both sides with the focus on those who suffered because of the Israeli existence or the Palestinian presence in the Territories.

Section 1: What Political Islamists Believes

“Allah is its goal, the Prophet is its Modal, the Qur’an is its constitution, and death for the sake of Allah its most coveted desire.”

-Hamas Charter

Article 8.

Crusades

“You live in a democracy, which means that all 316 million of you made a decision to go towar against Islam, therefore all 316 million of you are our enemy and the Government you have elected makes you accountable.”

• Al Qaeda

When one regards the modern state, it is important to differentiate between the people and their government. The distinction is indeed quite blurred when a nation proclaims itself a democracy. To an outside observer, the actions of the democratic state, be they foreign policy or imperialist war, seem as though sanctioned by a national consensus. After all, America does tell the world that her people have freedom, and freedom implies choice. To the world it seems that Americans have chosen hegemony over international democracy and national self determination. To nations directly affected by our foreign policies, the rational conclusion is that our democracy and freedom is intended only for Americans and the reaction to that conclusion is hate. If one had always been told America was a democracy and had heard any US national rhetoric on TV, the inevitable conclusion would be that whatever was done by the US government could be blamed on the American people. It is that rational that made our civilians legitimate targets in the eyes of the terrorists. Against the strongest military power on earth, all those opposed to our presence must fight a poor man’s guerrilla war; we call such war terrorism, and to understand why they hate us we must first define who they are.

What would make someone give their life to attack the American system? It safe to say it is a combination of two factors; a profound hatred for the US and a deep sense of hopelessness that anything can change without the use of force. Force being the modus operandi of the US, it must be widely believed that it is the only thing to which our government will respond. These individuals do not necessarily wear kafias. While it may happen that most of the more visible terrorism has its objectives rooted in the US’s involvement in the Middle East, we cannot forget that our foreign policy in both Asia and Latin America has made numerous populations wary if not resentful of the American role international politics. Due to resent media coverage our perception of terrorism is that of Arabs hijacking planes and strapping bombs to themselves. This is not the case. The threat is broader and more complex than what our government tells us.

We’ve been a prominent hegemonic power for over fifty years and have retained hyperpower status since ’91. We, as a hyperpower, are the dominant player in the international community and our tendency to play fair often does not coincide with our desire to retain power. The “international terrorists” are not some isolated community of fundamentalist crazies. It is more pragmatic to assume that on many levels they are supported by the peoples of the third world. “Throughout the Muslim world there is widespread bitterness against America, even among well educated businessmen and professionals, who…resent the way the Western Powers have behaved in their countries”.  Just because the bulk of the third world is not ready to commit themselves to a war of attrition with the US, does not mean they do not support one. This is not to say that all third world populations completely support the tactic of political violence. It is quite possible to hate America both culturally and ideologically without necessarily taking action. What is important to realize is that for these groups to continue functioning they need a ready source of funding and volunteers. The governments of Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq undoubtedly lent state support to terrorist organizations. However, many groups base themselves in nations controlled by governments that are relatively secular, corrupt, and admittedly pro-US.  “Hatred of the United States is not peculiar to the Middle East, nor does it translate directly into a desire to launch terrorist attacks. The relationship between the two is more complicated and indirect, akin in many ways to that between oxygen and fire. Oxygen does not cause fires-the spark must come from something else-but fire requires oxygen to rage. In the same fashion, terrorists need anti-American sentiment…it provides them with people willing to give aid and comfort.” It is obvious that they hate us, now the real question is why.

They hate us because of our history. Analyzing the last fifty years of American foreign policy one must acknowledge that the US government has done some questionable things in the its war on communism. In 1953 the CIA overthrew the prime minister of Iran because he sought to nationalize the country’s oil and was thought to be leaning left toward Moscow at a time when nationalism was oft confused with the global communist revolution. We restored the Shah to power, a brutal dictator who then went about torturing and killing all opposition to his regime. Amnesty International summed up the situation in 1976 by noting that Iran had the “highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts, and a history of torture which is beyond belief. No country in the world has a worse history in human rights than Iran” This would sow the seeds for a fundamentalist take over in ‘79 making the country markedly anti-American. When Israel launched the six day war in ‘67 and achieved a decisive victory against its neighbors using American made weapons, the already substantial Palestinian refugee problem was worsened. With most of the Arab world regarding Israel as the 51^st US state much of the animosity that arose from this conflict was redirected against the US. During the war between Iraq and Iran we sold weapons to both sides fueling a long drawn out conflict that would leave thousands dead. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in ’81 the US armed, financed and trained cadres of what would become today’s terrorist leaders to fight the invading Red Army. “Sunnis from all parts of the Islamic world fought in Afghanistan, and then returned home with the will, confidence, and training to begin terrorist operations against weak domestic governments.”When the Russians withdrew the nation was left with no infrastructure and no aid from the US. As a result the nation was left to the warlords of feudal anarchy and the Al Qaeda network would receive training camps and material support. The fighters, having beaten back the Red Army returned home ready to continue the Jihad. In ’82 when Israel invaded and occupied southern Lebanon in a joint action with the US, it was quite clear that the US was willing to use force to support its democratic allies. Combine all this with the corrupt dictators we supported, and continue to support, in most of the Arab world, the Gulf War, our military presence in the spiritual capital of the Middle East; Saudi Arabia, the devastating sanctions on Iraq, and its eventual invasion and occupation, we get some idea that perhaps some of the animosity they have for us is explained if not justified.

They hate us because of our government. The third world fails to differentiate between the people and the apparatus of the state. When our president makes statements calling groups of nations with no apparent interlinking policy or leadership (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) an Axis of Evil, how is the international community expected to react? Our government is believed to be composed and elected by the American people, so when Congress votes on war appropriations it appears to many that it was a nationally made group decision. In reality the government tends to operate without much direct involvement on behalf of its people. It is clear that our government thinks it is upholding the national interest, but at what cost must the third world pay for our economic security? Morgenthau could not have hoped to have his theories better put to practice. The US government does not seem to have many moral scruples, despite the rhetoric spouted by politicians. It has proven time and time again, from Hanoi to Mogadishu that we will kill to protect our security. Some Americans are slowly coming to this realization, but most have not. To the bulk of American society September 11^th was an unprovoked attack on freedom, not the culmination of fifty years of Middle Eastern foreign policy. To the terrorists, hating the American government is the same as hating the American people that enable its existence.  

They believe that all Americans are accountable. America is a complex society with a vocal minority on both the left and the right in polarized extremes. However, the bulk of middle class America, an enormous demographic, does not choose to voice a concrete opinion or take definite side for or against the government. Only 45% of Americans are registered to vote. The third world interprets this as a combination of indifference and support for the state, for in this case not saying anything maintains the status quo. That status quo is what we are hated for. Your typical American neither cares nor understands the ramifications of globalized capitalism or the reality of our military interventions. Their inaction makes them accountable. Our troops have been involved in hundreds of wars, conflicts, and interventions over the past fifty years. Our economic policies in the third world have led to destabilized economies and American control of valuable resources. Our citizens just want to watch CNN, eat Big Macs, and drive an SUV with a sense of security that they feel can be provided by their government. This gross disregard on behalf of our populace enables our leaders to enact the policies that taint our image in the global community. The hawks refer to terrorism as a protracted campaign of violence directed against non-combatants. But on many levels our non-combatants enable the deaths of civilians in the countries we invade.              

Now that we understand the motives of the terrorists we must address the root issue: how do we stop terrorism? We do not fight terror by killing the terrorists as the Palestinian Intifada has shown us, for every terrorist we kill we create four more. These fighters have both the zeal and the resolve necessary to continue fighting no matter what we throw at them. They may change their national power bases, they may lose key leaders, they may suffer annihilation on an individual basis, but they retain popular support and as long as our government makes the foreign policy decisions that initiated these conflicts, they will continue to. We can never stop violent opposition to America as long as it functions as a capitalist hyperpower. We must address our history; our people must know, acknowledge, and admit to what their government has done. Most of all; we must become accountable. We the American people are responsible for what our government does, it must be made clear that not only do we oppose the state; we will actively work to change it. They will only stop hating us when America becomes what it was intended to be. One nation, under the people, indivisible, with liberty and justice for both itself and the global community.

The Rise of Political Islam

The amalgamation of religious zeal with political organization has proven to be a powerful force in the demand for radical social change in the Arab world. In understanding the circumstance through which the ruins of Arab nationalism gave birth to political Islam we must trace the movement as both a logical consequence of socio-economic factors and as a reemergence of Muslim identity reacting to the failure of western secular ideology.

The Arab world has always struggled with political identity. In a region defined by a deep rooted tradition of religious faith, left with the battle scars of imperialism and foreign domination; the emerging states by the early 1960’s had attempted to co-opt religious sentiment and place power firmly in the hands of authoritarian regimes. Despite the attempts of Nasserism to drown religious fervor in the drum beat of jingoistic patriotism there emerged an identity manifested in groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that sought to keep alive the tradition of Islamic rule. State repression could not stifle the reality of the conditions these regimes produced nor could it kill a deep seated belief system quite inherently ingrained upon the region.

By the end of 1967 the nationalist regimes of Egypt and Syria had been dealt a crippling blow by the Israeli Defense Forces in the Six Day War. Just as the Israeli War of Independence in 1948 had demonstrated the weakness of the monarchs; the illusion of Arab unity and the strength of Arab Socialism were called into serious question over their inability to uproot the “Zionist Entity.”  To add insult to injury the state led economies that were promised to bring economic equality to the region were hopeless failures insuring that a quickly growing, educated, urban class of young people held far greater expectations for their futures than their government could produce. Offered mindless jobs in a hapless state bureaucracy they turned to the Islamist ideology as a vehicle which could bring about an end to the domination of the authoritarian elites. With state suppression of dissident opinion many found that the mosques were the only place where grievances against the state could be addressed. This desire for social and economic justice spread across class lines united in a belief in the sharia and the belief in an Islamic state. The intellectuals did this by concentrating on the moral and cultural dimensions of religion. They won the broadest base of support when they mobilized both the young urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie with an ideology that offered a vague social agenda but a sharp focus on morality. (Kepel p. 67)

Many found common cause with the writings of a man named Sayyid Qutb. Qutb, an Egyptian intellectual and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, wrote profusely on the subject of political Islam declaring that the nationalist regimes were jahiliyya, or barbaric and contrary to the Muslim ideal. He considered the nationalist “worship” of the army, party, or state to be a form of idolatry and his language was directed at the young whom he advocated to carry the torch of Islamic revolution. Along with the writings of Mawdudi and Khomeini, Qutb set up an ideological basis that would soon be spread in more moderate form by the Saudis missionary proselytizing.

In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel achieving an initial level of military success. In solidarity with their Muslim “brothers” the oil producing Gulf States with held oil shipments to the West causing the price per barrel to sky rocket. The real victors in this war were the oil exporting countries, above all Saudi Arabia…In the aftermath of the war, the oil states abruptly found themselves with revenues gigantic enough to assure them a clear position of dominance within the Muslim world. (Kepel p. 69) Oil however wasn’t the only thing the Saudis were exporting. Through the Muslim World League, the Saudis spread the puritanical ideas of the Wahhabite sect through extensive publication and distribution of Islamic literature, the construction of mosques, and the training of imans.  The objective was to bring Islam to the forefront of the international scene, to substitute it for the various discredited nationalist movements, and to refine multitude of voices within the religion down to the single creed of the masters of Mecca. (Kepel p. 70)  While they attempted to the tone down the radicalism of the political Islam preached by men like Qutb, they none the less succeeded in making the message of Islam easily accessible throughout the Muslim world at a time when the economic and social systems of the West were proving to be less than popular.

   Saudi Arabia played another important role in the geo-political rise of politicized Islam. The huge over population and trend of unemployment led to mass population migrations toward the Gulf States. Here, where jobs were available, people were able to send huge sums of money back to their families in non-oil producing states and generate capital which could be reinvested in their own countries. This led to an association of economic gain with religious stability and out of this emerged a form of Islamic banking which would become a War Chest for the Islamist movements.

While the Iranian revolution in 1979 represented a social manifestation of the ideas of political Islam this modal failed to apply itself practically in any of the predominantly Sunni Muslim countries. While movements such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad among the Palestinians, and several variants in North Africa played crucial parts in the struggle against the Western backed authoritarian regimes; political Islam found itself confined as movement unable to break the strangle hold these regimes held on their countries. The return to Islam came as a result of the disparities caused by grafting western institutions on Muslim people’s and the rise of political Islam both symbolizes a return to the roots of their civilization and an increased association of the current regimes with Western impiety. The Muslim world felt a sense of pride in the return to their traditions and the political and economic conditions of its rise persistent then and today spell its continued ideological presence in the modern sphere of Middle Eastern politics.     

Religious Nationalism

It is impossible to grasp the political dynamic of the region by embracing either one’s visceral reaction or a revisionist reinterpretation of historical events. We must divest our respective identities from the end game solution. We must then look at the progression of events and ideas behind the formation of Hamas through the prism of reality not Western notions of morality or international convention. The Hamas movement holds beliefs and a worldview that are a direct descendent of the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood style of political Islam and of the tangible military victories of the Shi’a Revival. We must understand the roots of their world view to calculate their evolution as a movement.

The failure of the Arab states to make social and economic progress their people yearned for, the widening socioeconomic gap between rich and poor, the growing phenomenon of social and moral anomie identified with Western culture especially affected the urban, educated, lower middle-class Muslims. Their disillusion with modernity and revolutionary secularism heightened their inclination to seek refuge in religious traditions as a cure for the current social malaise and as a source of individual and collective hope. The growing trend of Islamification and institutionalization in the cultural and social spheres soon assumed a political, sometimes violent form (Mishal & Sela, p. 27).

To assert Hamas won the 2007 elections due to a Palestinian embrace of rejectionist political violence and collective fundamentalism is to make the equally baseless claim that Israel is a product of Western guilt following the Holocaust. Both claims would be divorced from over 1600 years of generally amicable relations between the houses of Ishmael and Yitzhak. The most uncompromising, principled and ruthless advent of Palestinian Resistance is surely Hamas much as the Hebrew Commonwealth must trace its own nationalistic yearnings of nationhood to the French Revolution, the Jewish enlightenment, labor Zionism and Jabotinsky militancy following centuries of persecution in Europe. Hamas’ rise is also a product of historical factors including the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian Revolution and the successes of the Hezbollah movement in forcing the withdrawal of Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 and 2005. The amalgamation of religious zeal with tightly compartmentalized political organization as Para-state infrastructure has proven to be a powerful force in the demand for radical social change in the Middle East, which has been utilized by Hebrew and Muslim alike. The circumstances through which the ruins of Arab nationalism gave birth to political Islam is both a logical consequence of socio-economic factors and a resurgence of Islamic identity reacting to the failures of western secular ideology.

Islamist movements are loose coalitions of three elements: a counter elite composed of businessmen and professionals, a second stratum of frustrated intellectuals and unemployed or underemployed university of secondary school graduates, and a mass base of the young, semi educated unemployed…these people harbor deep grievances. They are personally and collectively frustrated. Education and exposure to the wider world have broadened their horizons, but the grim realities of the job and housing market have dashed their hopes (Richards & Waterbury p.347).

The Muslim world has always struggled with political identity. The emerging states had attempted to co-opt populist sentiment and place power firmly in the hands of the authoritarian regimes by the early 1950’s and 1960’s in a region defined by a deep rooted tradition of religious faith and left with the deep and humiliating battle scars of colonialism and foreign domination. An identity became manifested in groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that sought to re-implement the tradition of Shar’iah law and a revival of Islamic values in the world beginning at a grassroots level. Arab state repression could not wholly stifle the resistance produced by the conditions of their regimes despite the attempts of the Nasserists to drown religious fervor in the drumbeat of Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism. Nor could they harness the deep-seated belief system of religious national identity that the political Islamists could harness via the Masjid and imagined history.

          The nationalist regimes of Egypt and Syria had been dealt a crippling blow by the Israeli Defense Forces in the Six Day War by the end of 1967. Just as the Israeli War of Independence in 1948 had demonstrated the weakness of the monarchs; the illusion of Arab unity and the strength of Arab Socialism were called into serious question over their inability to uproot the ‘Zionist Entity.’ Adding insult to injury, the state led economies that were promised to bring economic equality to the region were hopeless failures insuring that a quickly growing, educated urban class of young people held far greater expectations for their futures than their government could produce. They turned to the Islamist ideology as a vehicle which could bring about an end to the domination of the authoritarian elites and rehabilitate the political weakness the Arab street felt was responsible for the emergence of a Jewish State when they were offered mindless jobs in a hapless state bureaucracy. With state suppression of dissident opinion many found that the mosques were the only place where grievances against the state could be openly addressed. This desire for social and economic justice spread across class lines uniting the implementation and belief in Shar’iah law with the conception of an Islamic state; the Qur’an as their constitution.

The intellectuals did this by concentrating on the moral and cultural dimensions of religion. They won the broadest base of support when they mobilized both the young urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie with an ideology that offered a vague social agenda but a sharp focus on morality. (Kepel p. 67)

In the year 1928, an organization by the name of Al Ikhwan Al Musliimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood) was established in Egypt by religious scholar Hassan al-Banna embracing Islamic Dawa and activism as a grassroots response to Western cultural imperialism and the weakness of the post-colonial Muslim world. Many found common cause with his ideas (for which he was murdered by the Egyptian state in 1949. The organization of Al Banna evolved over time. There was state repression of the writings and oratory of a second man named Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was an Egyptian intellectual and member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was also arrested, imprisoned and murdered by the Egyptian state in 1966. He wrote prolifically on the subject of political Islam declaring that the nationalist regimes were jahiliyya, or barbaric and contrary to the Muslim ideal. He considered the nationalist “worship” of the army, party or state to be a form of idolatry. His language was directed at the young whom he advocated to carry the torch of Islamic revolution first against their own corrupt regimes and then the Dar al Har, governments of the West. Along with the later Shi’a writings of Ayatollah Khomeini, it was Qutb who almost single-handedly codified the ideology for revolutionary political Islam. The ideology of revolutionary religious nationalist filled a vacuum left in the early 1970’s as Pan-Arabism, Arab Socialism and secular nationalist factions were met with defeat on the battlefield against Israel and brought the iron heels of repression upon the necks of their own people, notably the Palestinians.

The Muslim Brotherhood by the 1980’s was the dominant organizational framework for political Islam throughout the Middle East. It members were at times hunted and hounded by authoritarian regimes, or in other cases, like in Saudi Arabia or Hashemite Jordan, it was co-opted by the oligarchs. While the Brotherhood attempted to the tone down the radicalism of political Islam preached by men like Qutb, they none-the-less succeeded in making the message of Islam easily accessible throughout the Muslim world at a time when the economic and social systems of the West were proving to be less than popular. After the murder of Qutb in 1966, the Muslim Brotherhood spread rapidly. Its leadership took haven in Saudi Arabia and its activists laid in for a long haul strategy of Islamic society implemented from the bottom up.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Muslim Brotherhood expanded rapidly, despite period of government repression in several countries, to become one of the largest (if not the largest) Islamist organizations in the world. Experts often haggle over the exact membership of the worldwide movement, but the Brotherhood has penetrated every Muslim country, with predictably strong membership in the Arab world but also surprisingly large numbers in the West (Schanzer, p. 15).

The events of the 1967 Six Day War in which Israel occupied the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and Jerusalem was instrumental in allowing the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt to connect their activists via Israeli occupation. The burden of Palestinian liberation was being taken up by the secular nationalist operations of the Fatah dominated PLO, no longer trusting of military victory via the Arab-Socialist coalition, but upon forces organized on the ground. While the PLO conducted wave after wave of terrorist strikes and struggles against Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood focused itself on the spiritual reformation of the Palestinian people in the occupied zones.

   The Iranian revolution in 1979 represented a social manifestation of the ideas of political Islam. This model had failed to apply itself practically in any of the predominantly Sunni Muslim countries. While various MB factions in Syria, Islamic Jihad among the Palestinians and several variants in North Africa had waged various campaigns under the banner of Islam against their authoritarian regimes, political Islam found itself confined as a movement unable to break the stranglehold these regimes held on their countries. The return to Islamic practice had increased exponentially despite the failures of the revolutionaries. The rise of political Islam both symbolized a return to the imagined roots of their civilization and an increased association of the current regimes with impiety. The seizure of state power in Iran in 1979 and advent of Lebanese Hezbollah sent a clear message to Sunni Muslim loyalists of the Muslim Brotherhood. Religious nationalism could be marshaled and the successes their Shi’a brothers had achieved against Israel and the West could be tactically replicated within occupied Palestine.

The vast material network and supply lines of communications and logistics the Brotherhood possessed throughout the Muslim world would in 1987 merge Sunni Political Islam with tactics of Shi’a asymmetric resistance. On the eve of the first Intifada Hamas was born. There is virtually no doctrinal distinction to be drawn from the mother organization. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood’s creation of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Hamas was a tactical evolution borrowed and enhanced by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and their surrogate force Hezbollah. While isolation based on religious confession can hinder the logistics and mass support in the Muslim world for these two victories of the Shi’a Revival, Hamas being spawned out of the Gaza City Branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood laid the groundwork for an internationalist manifestation of Sunni political Islam, which could rely on a vast pool of resources both doctrinal and material across sectarian lines in its fight against Memshala Yisrael.

The Masjid as a bunker and a school

The development of autonomous space and minimization of the Israeli intelligence forces ability to penetrate the organization and its zones of control is directly linked to the period after 1967 when Israel encouraged the rise of political Islam via the Muslim Brotherhood to discourage support and indoctrination carried out by the secular Fatah, PLO and Palestinian left then responsible for innumerable acts of armed resistance. The creation of a corporate identity on the basis of religious fundamentalism, albeit then not harnessed toward Jihad, was thought to offset gains the PLO and Palestinian leftists were making to organizing resistance activities.

The Israeli decision, despite obvious second thoughts, to grant the license to the Islamic Compound in Tel Aviv was an indicator of what would become unannounced, but official, Israeli policy. The Israeli government perceived its staunch enemy to be the nationalist and secular PLO and, by allowing Islamist rivals to flourish, believed that opposing Palestinian groups would do its work on the ground in a way that did not necessitate active Israeli involvement (Chehab, p20).

Israel allowed and granted official license for the Muslim Brotherhood to construct a massive network of mosque-centered, bootstrap social services, which by the late 80’s had become a new Muslim nucleus of Palestinian civil society complete with social infrastructure and civic organizations not controlled by the Israel occupational authorities or the wildly corrupt Fatah party. The nucleus of this organizing was the Al-Mujamma (Islamic Center), a focal point for hundreds of grassroots social services and schools of Islamic indoctrination.

In the beginning the Muslim Brotherhood was quite cognizant of the fact that it would have to begin its campaign of dawa on a mass scale in order to arrive at a Palestinian polity that was Islamic was well as independent of Israeli rule. From the outset, the mother organization of Hamas (Muslim Brotherhood) was engaged in education, proselytizing and vast reorientation of largely secular Palestinian society from the pulpit rather than the barricade. While throughout the 70’s and early 80’s groups like Black September, Fatah-PLO, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other secular nationalist groups launched successive waves of hijackings, bombings and political violence; the political Islamists who were quite aware of the force of state repression being carried against their movement throughout the Arab world, chose to engage in a program of Islamification from the ground up, by which the final armed struggle for Palestine would be proceeded by a return to ‘true Islamic practice’ by the Palestinian masses.  

Until the advent and formation of Hamas as the mechanism for revolt and insurrection catalyzed by the competing forces of militant Islamic Jihad and PLO domination at the opening of the first Intifada, the Muslim Brotherhood and its chief instruments of indoctrination, Islamic University of Gaza and the al-Mujamma movement, sought to reform the religious character of Palestine via the Masjid and bootstrap social services. The Muslim Brotherhood tapped a vein of latent religiosity that had proven so successful for the Shi’a Hezbollah movement in Southern Lebanon via tapping into the hierarchy of needs. ; Palestinian society has taken an obvious turn toward conservative Sunni Islam as evidenced by the wearing of Hijab as a superficial indicator of Islamification as well as avoiding gender mixing, western dress and the permeation of Western culture. The Hijab is now commonly worn where it was once not. Cinemas have all but closed and Hamas has instituted, often by force, a regime in Gaza akin to the Taliban’s Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.  

Hamas now directs the most sophisticated hearts and minds apparatus of any of numerous factions on the ground. Israel cannot easily penetrate the vast network of mosque-based charities and instruments of indoctrination via religion as it is loath to shut down the only functional network of charities operational in the occupied territories, which would risk an even larger human rights disaster than that which currently exists. Israel will not risk international condemnation to demolish a mosque, nor will it raid a hospital or a school. Yet the mosque is to Hamas the focal point of the resistance above all other tactics. Islamification, the blending of nationalism and religious zeal, the purge of Western influence from the Palestinian masses and the re-crafting of identity are the bedrock of the new Jihad.

The corporate identity of a movement cannot be suppressed with assassination, retaliatory airstrikes, sanctions or siege. The zeal that is being taught via the Hamas Masjid network and the successes of their grassroots charities are a bunker the Israelis cannot penetrate and a rallying point that cannot be captured.

Social Programs and Grassroots Advocacy

The sheer scope of the Hamas’ network of social infrastructure is breathtaking and bears direct responsibility for the group’s popularity. Islamic Jihad, Fatah and the other factions of the PLO do not come close to providing the wide range of services the charities set up by Muslim Brotherhood and now controlled by Hamas.

As a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and indeed inextricably intertwined with it, Hamas has been able to build on the mother organization’s extensive infrastructure in expanding its public base of operations. It is thus that nursery schools, kindergartens, social and sports clubs, libraries, and other such associations fall under its auspices, and the Islamic University continues under its control. These various institutions, to say nothing of the network of mosques-are useful vehicles for spreading Hamas’ ideas and influence and enlisting supporters (Abu-Amr, p.14).

The foundation of Hamas’ popularity and deep connectivity to the civilian base, which shelters its leaders and fighters was established through the decades of Islamic activism of the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel’s tacit approval of this dawa organizing, as well as Israel’s fixation on standing Arab armies and PLO terror squads inevitably allowed Hamas the breathing space and time build a mass base in both Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas has Islamified Palestinian society via the bread basket by combining the millions in aid from foreign backers and the ground apparatus of its mother organization

The Islamist movement whose Dawa tradition has most influenced Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, is notable for having a politically activist nature. Academic scholars have noted that Brotherhood activists use communal activities at the grassroots level to “reshape the political consciousness of educated youth.” By focusing on impressionable youth and in areas lacking social welfare services, the Brotherhood’s Islamic institutions serve as “functional substitutes for the welfare apparatus of the state and constitute a natural and familiar setting in which young activists can reach out to uncommitted peers.” In other words, social service institutions function as an ideal tool used by Islamists to radicalize and recruit Muslim youth (Levitt, p.17).  

Hamas administers its social services network via its indirect affiliations. This prevents Israel from connecting specific charitable organizations, hospitals, mosques and Palestinian civic associations with pipelines from arms and guerrilla operations. This enables vast amounts of foreign capital to fill Hamas’ coffers from Iran, Syria, Sudan and the West without allegations being made besides regular ones by America and Israel that aid money is being used for armed struggle. Each piece of indirectly affiliated Muslim Brotherhood, al-Mujamma foundation, or spiritual/educational apparatus is absolutely employed in the war effort with Israel. It is estimated that not only does Hamas utilize these boot-strap operations for indoctrination and its hearts and minds victory, each doubles as a command base, a cache or a means for the dissemination of propaganda. The most epic failure of groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah-PLO and Islamic Jihad was their myopic obsession with armed struggle without establishing such networks.

It is not logical to assume that Hamas would not engage its organizational and social programs purely for humanitarian purposes if one studies the absolute nature of the Hamas war against Israel. One can also draw lessons from years of insurgency by studying Israeli allegations of ambulances being used to move arms, of hospitals being converted into military operations centers and of mosques as being used as platforms for the spread of religious hatred.  The Palestinian people certainly have their backs to the wall if one looks at sixty years of occupation and the full quarantine and siege underway in Gaza since 2007 combined with the reality of Israeli military prowess and the grinding bloodshed of two failed uprisings. Hamas social programs have become the bed-rock of their Para-state, which is utilized for both survival and the ongoing war effort.

These social services are vital to the masses of occupied Palestine, as are those administered by Hezbollah to the Shi’a of Southern Lebanon. Israel encouraged their establishment in the late 80’s and from them Hamas derives the bulk of its support in leadership of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Democratic Participation

Hamas had previously boycotted participating in the Fatah dominated government. Its leadership had posited that legitimizing the PA would by default give legitimacy to final partition. This changed in the staggered municipal elections of 2004-2006. When Hamas ran candidates in the January 2006 election, for the Palestinian National Congress, it shocked the world (and itself); by winning. To the shock and appall of Israel and the West, Hamas captured a plurality of 42.9% of the total votes as well as 74 out of 132 available seats in the congress.

Hamas’ strategies reflected a perception based on neither a full acceptance nor a total rejection of the political order emanating from the Oslo accords and the establishment of the PA. Although Hamas made its struggle with Israel a religious duty, it did not lose sight of its socio-political interests. Senses of political realism and “here and now” considerations were signs of pragmatism. Hamas’ thrust toward extremism was balanced by its awareness of political constraints and structural limitations. Hamas refused to accept basic assumptions or to officially recognize the consequences of the peace process. But, it did not seek all out confrontation with the emerging new political order prompted by the PA-Israeli dialogue. Thus the Hamas discourse represented its inclination to stick to its ideological premises and pursue its long term goal of establishing an alternative social and moral order, but it also  demonstrated its implicit acceptance of the current political realities (Mishal & Sela, pp147-148).

The newly formed Hamas government was immediately boycotted by all Western aligned countries, and of course Israel, upon assuming power within the Palestinian Authority in elections that had been internationally monitored and had engaged some 80% of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Like Hezbollah before them, Hamas refused to put down their guns and acknowledge Israel’s right to statehood while engaged in the formation of an elected para-state. Although democratically elected, both the EU and USA deemed the election of a designated ‘terrorist group’ wholly illegitimate and proceeded to cut all but the most basic aspects of foreign aid via humanitarian groups and the UN.

The election was a vote of no confidence for the perceived inept and corrupt Fatah faction. It also intensified the internal fitna between Hamas and Fatah. This civil strife, which had been going on since the late 80’s and had resulted in numerous small-scale violent clashes between the two groups now reached a boiling point. A Hamas electoral victory alongside the vast networks for dawa and charity they already controlled placed incredible pressure on the Fatah party of take radical steps to consolidate a semblance of control. Both Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades and Yasir Arafat himself were highly responsible for initiating the second wave of bloodletting in the Second Intifada. Yet, after the Hamas victory the West continued to pin hope on the fact that the PLO-Fatah might revive the doomed Road Map to Peace. The West and Israel with continued skepticism, redirected aid and arms to bolster the PLO. They had been the official Palestinian negotiating party in Oslo after all; the enemy Memshala Yisrael believed it tacitly understood. Hamas prepared to seize Gaza.

Hamas crushed the Fatah regiments and police forces in Gaza in a six day military operation culminating on June 14, 2007 and assumed full control of the besieged Strip. This resulted in the international blockade of Gaza on all sides and a desperate Western attempt to shore up the positions of Fatah in the West Bank before a second seizure occurred. PLO President Mahmoud Abbas nullified the Hamas government with Western approval and set up another un-elected Congress based in the West Bank. Hamas now dominates the Gaza Strip ‘ghetto’ of 1.5 million and while is temporarily ‘contained’ by the blockade and sanctions; surely has its eyes set on the West Bank.

While various commentators view the participation in the elections as an evolution toward moderation it must be called for what it is: another card in their deck of tactics. Their mandate to rule the para-state of occupied Palestine was not a result of an across the board Palestinian embrace of terrorist tactics or political Islam. However, two lessons ought to be drawn from their stunning victory. First, the West once again has demonstrated to the Muslim world that it prefers the corrupt oligarchy that can be controlled as opposed to the democratic regime that it deems adversarial.  Second, Hamas has evolved from a religious nationalist association, to a guerilla army and now on to an elected para-state. This is a testimony to Hamas’ ever increasing political sophistication. Not even in the EU or United States does 80% of any country even show up to the polls.  Occupied Palestine could reasonably be called the second emerging true democracy of the Middle East except for the fact that unlike a true democracy, the political loser Fatah will surely not give up power without an even bloodier fight.

Hamas’ behavior during the 2004-2006 electoral campaign suggests that it is acutely aware not only of what constitutes power in an electoral environment, but also of its dependency on gaining votes. Its emphasis on grassroots consultations and surveys in the shaping of the electoral program and the selection of its candidates suggests that, in an electoral context, Hamas heeds public opinion-within the boundaries of its ideological commitments. It remains to be seen whether a U.S.-Israel sponsored peace process is capable of reconciling itself with an electoral system which can bring opponents of the peace process to power. But, the fact that Hamas has invested so much effort in the playing the electoral system well suggests that, at last in Hamas’ eyes, a future Palestinian state is likely to be built around an electoral system in which power is concentrated in elected offices (Gunning, p.191).

It may no longer be stated that the PLO-Fatah is the ‘sole legitimate’ representative of the Palestinian people. After the 2006 elections Hamas was, but now Fatah controls the West Bank and Hamas is isolated in Gaza Strip.

Pragmatism and Political Maturity

In most Western academic literature on Hamas there is the attempt to pigeonhole the movement as fundamentalist and unwavering in its call for the destruction of the Jewish state. While most Arab intellectuals produce tomes to the contrary, it is actually Hamas’ unwavering zeal to destroy Israel and dogmatic insistence on religious doctrine that make it the ideal partner to implement a meaningful truce.

In the 22 years since the December 8^th, 1987 founding of Hamas the party has exhibited near total commitment to its core mission, the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. In its Islamification of highly secular Palestinian society, and its 2006 electoral victory over Fatah it has assumed the reigns of democratic para-state power without compromising itself in the minds of the Palestinian masses. As compared to the PLO, which has all but accepted a two state solution ceding more than 78% of the territory to the ‘Zionist entity’; renounced armed struggle against Israel (accept when pressured into it simply to compete with Islamic Jihad and Hamas); was beaten and expelled from Jordan in 1970; was beaten and expelled from Lebanon in 1983; and had for all intents and purposes neglected the running of social infrastructure while lining the pockets of its bureaucrats and family members living abroad.

Hamas is hardly to be compared to the Paki-Afghan Taliban in three important regards. First, the leadership of Hamas is largely composed of Western educated technocrats who while they embrace a framework of religious nationalism are fully cognizant of international law, global political trends and world history. Secondly, they can rely on and cultivate deep religious understanding of their faith and are for the most part capable of carrying out internal debate applying Shari’ah in a loose and far more inclusive structure than other more literal fundamentalists (like Taliban and Pakistani Salafists). Third, there exist numerous competing trends of leadership within the movement which forces Hamas to engage in a balancing act between modernity and zeal which it has thus so far navigated rather well.

To draw a parallel to the evolution of Memshala Yisrael, observe its three founding resistance factions Ha Haganah (The Defense), Ha’Irgun HaTzva’i HaLe’umi (ETZEL/National Military Organization) and the smaller, albeit more inclined to sensational terrorism: Lohamei Herut Israel (Fighters of the Freedom of Israel, also called the Stern Gang). While none of these three factions were particularly rooted in Jewish religious fundamentalism they serve as telling indicators of future of the three principle clusters of the  Palestinian resistance. Upon victory in 1949, the Haganah (likened in this metaphor to the PLO) assumed responsibility as the ‘sole and legitimate’ instrument of Jewish National Defense and its Labor Zionist backers were designated as the sole representatives of armed struggle. The Revisionist Irgun (which in this case I shall liken to Hamas) was co-opted into the government, but was virtually cut out of the labor coalition until the Menachem Begin victory of 1977. The Stern Gang, which in this allegory I liken to Islamic Jihad, after serving its brutal function was suppressed entirely. The members of the Haganah and members of the Irgun, most certainly were as ideologically divided as Hamas and Fatah, and certainly one came to the forefront; the one with more time, money and guns on the ground, the one first on the scene. For near forty years the Fatah dominated PLO and its leftist ilk have engaged in every tactic under the sun from hijacking, to car bombing, from Columbia Yard to the White House Lawn. And like the founders of the Labor Zionist (descendants of Haganah) realized in 1977; the PLO in a single election learned their number was up. The Irgun (Herut Party and Likud Party) had watched the mistakes of the Haganah. In the realm of Palestinian national struggle, Islamism has triumphed over Marxism and secular nationalism. In the future realm of Israeli politics: Revisionist Zionism can reshape and re-orientate Israel at the brink of ruin after a near thirty years of Labor Zionist influence and rule.

The forces that are coming to power now, are forces that brought about the beginnings of this war. The Palestinians were Muslim before there was Palestine. The Revisionists, like the Islamists of Hamas had patiently watched both their near and far enemies, developed a base and reignited the war. Just as Stern Gang had a use, as does Islamic Jihad, but just as Stern Gang lacked a base; Islamic Jihad will be absorbed or destroyed before long. But Likud is not just an evolved and matured Irgun; it is a sophisticated political machine evolved via observation and years in power. Hamas will react in a simlar fashion, in fact it already has. These rumblings about long term ceasefire (Hudna), the new responsibilities of governance, its gradual divestment form the tactic of suicide bombing, its several periods of unilateral calm(unilateral cessation of bombings); its participation in the Palestinian Authority Elections; and its interactions with para-state actor Hezbollah have all evolved Hamas. It is no longer proper to view Hamas as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood bearing arms. They too will become more mature with power and with time. Fatah is largely discredited, its ideology of secular pan-Arab nationalism disproven, and its time is up.           

Section 2: How Memshala Yisrael Behaves

“Our feet are standing within thy gates O Jerusalem and they will never leave. This is Zionism, and the United Gentiles call it ‘Racist’ and debate how to take my city away from me. Foolish world; sooner will the sun fail to rise tomorrow. The Jews have come home to their Zion and have welded their city together with fierce tightness that none least of all the humor that is the United Nations can sunder. A people patiently bides it’s time for millennia will not easily-ever-give up its state and capital.”

-Rabbi Meir Kahane

Listen World, Listen Jew

The Israeli Defense Forces, by all accounts, are superior to Hamas’ Ez Ed Din al-Qassam Brigades in funding, training, raw numbers and sophistication of firepower. Yet, despite its superiority in strength the IDF has repeatedly failed to uproot the Islamic Resistance or destroy its leadership in nearly 25 years of continuous counter-insurgency and siege. The strategic failings of the Israeli military in attempting to destroy the Islamic Resistance are many. This section will survey the Israeli strategy in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip and look to illustrate failures in several tactical segments. This section outlines the primary military deficits that have allowed Hamas to survive and thrive despite tremendous and overwhelming Israeli military pressure against them.

Unpreparedness for Asymmetric War

Certainly Hamas is a very large movement, and within it you can find a range of voices and concepts, this is part of our diversity. Still, some account should be taken of extreme pressures on the ground in terms of the Israeli occupation and military incursions, not to mention the economic boycott and the deprivation of rights. Such a situation can occasionally push people to give priority to self-preservation. Such a situation can produce errors and excesses. But this a reaction, an attempt at self-defense in the face of attack. Oppression and abuse always produce counter-reactions, which can be extreme and which we do not desire (Khalid Mishal in interview with Journal of Palestine Studies, p.178).

In analyzing the outcome of a military confrontation between disproportionately matched forces the following observation is made by military strategist Ivan Arreuin-Toft: “in regards to strategic interaction weaker powers can win conflicts when they employ tactics that minimize direct confrontation with the enemy, cultivate and maintain civilian support, and prolong the duration of the conflict.” Hamas has heeded this critical lesson well. The key factor according to Toft goes beyond the will and interests of the two parties (Israel and Palestine). It relies on applying the proper response to the enemy’s tactics that favor the conditions suitable to resistance by the weak; that is to say favorable to irregular warfare and a guerrilla campaign.

The Toft analysis is seen in light of Andrew Mack’s ideas of ‘interest asymmetry’. This understanding of asymmetrical warfare has three key elements: 1. “Relative power explains relative interest” (Hamas is representing an occupied people/ Memshala Yisrael is the strongest military power in the region), 2. “Relative interest explains relative political vulnerability” (Memshala Yisrael must answer to public wary of war and occupation) and 3. Relative vulnerability is why strong actors lose”. Summed up, Mack is saying that weak powers (like Hamas) have a high interest because it is the survival of their people that is at stake and their political freedom where as strong power’s are viewing the conflict through a prism of expansion, a theory of political dominos, or an issue of credibility. This makes them more politically vulnerable because the rational for waging a long war has to be justified on the home front to an increasingly adversarial population. The stronger power will often, according to Mack, abandon the war because of unrest at home on behalf of population or local elites (as Israel has done in several recent military engagements). Toft introduces the idea that while interest is a factor it is not the sole factor. The decisive element to the equation is known as strategic interaction.
In a conflict there is always a grand strategy (the totality of an actor’s resources devoted to the military, political, and economic objectives of the engagement) and the tactics (the art of fighting battles and specific instruments of war employed). According to Toft the objective of war is to compel the other actor to do its will. To understand this combination of grand strategy implemented through the tactics employed Toft identifies four specific types of engagement: two offensive, two defensive. Direct Attack is the use of force to capture an opponent’s values (cities, strategic assets, economic centers) and eliminate the opponent’s armed forces’ ability to resist (which Israel successfully utilized in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973). Barbarism is a systematic violation of the laws of war (War Convention) directing violence at non-combatants via rape, torture, and genocide to achieve the military or political goals of the campaign (which Memshala Yisrael is relatively loath to do). Direct Defense is the use of armed forces to thwart an adversary’s capture or destruction of values (which Hamas avoids).  The goal is to cripple the advancing force. Guerrilla Warfare is the organization of a portion of the society to engage in irregular warfare while avoiding direct confrontation with the enemy. (This is the bulk of the security threat Memshala Yisrael must contend with.) Since every strategy is presumed to have an ideal counterstrategy Toft argues that these four strategic interactions in varying combinations are at the heart of explaining asymmetrical warfare scenarios where the weak win.

In a situation of Direct Attack v. Direct Defense nothing mediates the imbalance of one side’s armed forces. The defending, weaker power as a result most is almost certain to lose the interaction.  In the situation of Direct Attack v. Indirect Defense i.e.; guerrilla warfare; the forces of the attacker tend to kill large numbers of non-combatants in their attempt to uproot an irregular force. This stimulates weak-actor resistance. The defender has sacrificed values for the ability to engage the attacker when he is least prepared to resist. Values are sacrificed for time. In this scenario the weaker actor can win. With Indirect Attack v. Direct Defense attacks on civilian population centers generally harden the resolve of the defender and general acts of barbarism stiffen resistance to the enemy (as Suicide attacks and Israeli collective punishment have illustrated). In the case of Indirect Attack v. Indirect Defense where barbarism is used to repress an irregular campaign cases prove that the stronger power when willing to use barbarism on an occupied population soon make the costs of the guerrilla campaign too high to sustain (which Israel has not attempted to do). These are Toft’s strategic interaction outcomes.

In general Toft’s thesis supports the idea that each side is always better off using a mixed strategy; that is to say by using the opposite approach of the one being offered in resistance or attack. Anything that allows civilian participation in resistance, prolongs the conflict, and avoids direct engagements deflects a stronger conventional force. Whenever a stronger force can directly meet a weaker enemy or resorts to barbarism in the face of irregular warfare the weaker party is likely to lose. Toft therefore believes it is interaction not interest that explains the phenomenon of why the weak sometimes win.

Surprise is the essential feature of Guerrilla Warfare. In a circumstance where one cannot beat ones enemy in a direct confrontation the best approach is to draw out the conflict, attack when unexpected, and rely on civilian support. Passing off one’s forces as civilians but functioning as combatants; poses a challenge to the War Convention (on acceptable conduct under arms) by blurring the definition of combatant/non-combatant. If surrender is an explicit agreement and exchange: an actor stops fighting for benevolent quarantine. Than in guerrilla war the actor allows occupation (surrender) but carries on all the activities of a war. Guerillas don’t subvert the war convention by attacking civilians (as terrorists do): they invite the enemy to do that by hiding in their midst.

Walzer states that resistance is legitimate and the punishment of resistance is therefore also legitimate. There is a twofold justification for guerrilla action which serves as a framework for those that fight it. First, the people are no longer being defended by an army; the only army in the field is the army of the oppressors; the people are defending themselves. Second, if you want to fight them you are going to have to fight civilians and you won’t be war with an army you’ll be at war with a people and a nation. In this kind of war the lines are blurred.

Both Memshala Yisrael and the Islamic Resistance have incredible (and obvious) stake and interest in winning this war. However, the framework Israel has chosen to fight from make it particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. Says Walzer: “Soldiers are supposed to protect civilians who stand behind them; guerrillas are protected by civilians among whom they stand.” Hamas completely blurs this line as does Israel with its national service mandatory conscription, but the reality is that Israel is still fighting the six day war, which worked in 1973, but hasn’t worked since.

Embrace of Effects Based Operations (EBO)

The IDF has zealously embraced the American tactic of EBO. The aim of Effects Based Operations (EBO) is to paralyze the enemy’s operational ability in contrast to destroying its military force. According to Col. John Warden, the author of The Enemy as a System¹³ in which the idea of EBO was first developed; there are three preconditions to EBO use. First, the enemy has a system-like structure; second, the system has critical junctions; and third, there is sufficient familiarity with the enemy’s system and its critical junctions. The EBO system is designed to reduce casualties by using “Shock and Awe” tactics on key elements of the targeted actor’s infrastructure. This could include elimination of the leadership or bombardment of key communications components as was so successful in both the 1956 War in Sinai and the 1967 Six Day War in which Memshala Yisrael was engaged in pre-emptive strike against Soviet supplied Para-modern armies with fixed assets, critical junctions and top down chain of command.

This strategy, in regards to Hamas and Hezbollah has failed with the Israelis for three reasons. First, Israel is unfamiliar with overall command structure (specifically identity and location of the external command of the HAMAS movement); second, the Islamic Resistance command structure is designed to reduce operational confusion by eliminating critical junctions (i.e.: granting autonomy to both regional divisions, infrastructure, and combat groups); and third, failing to utilize ground forces effectively Israel did not neutralize the bulk of  Hamas bunkers, tunnels, fighting groups; nor disable the groups arms cache or logistical pipelines by which the movement can be materially resupplied by its allies Syria and Iran.

EBO only works when coupled with an overwhelming use of force on the ground and Hamas has re-organized itself to function even if a break down occurs in its lines of command. Not only does it zealously protect the identity of external leadership outside the territories from which it receives state-sponsor funding, it has subdivided districts of command and control (seven districts with five sub-districts per sector) within the Gaza Strip and West Bank to enable fighters to operate if necessary without critical junctions by which a modern army would need to coordinate battle.

 Each sector within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is organized with the armaments it needs to hold out for long periods of time without needing to be re-supplied or issued direct orders from a central command. In this way Israel would have to seek out and destroy each and every combat group (totally embedded and harbored by the Palestinian population at large) and not rely on overwhelming aerial force to neutralize their ability to operate. As successive wars in Lebanon and Gaza have demonstrated, EBO is the tactic of the ‘last great war’ and using it is akin to fighting a land war in Asia. Not only does EBO fail against guerrilla armies, the primary deficit inflicts the greatest harm on the Palestinian civilian population while doing little to materially weaken the Islamic Resistance. In so far as tunnels remain open, an external leadership can raise funds abroad, and Hamas can continue to operate its network of grassroots social services EBO is in effect useless. If anything, by attacking these listed critical junctions maximum burden falls on the civilians of the Gaza Strip while providing propaganda value for Hamas. Unwilling to engage in re-occupation of the Strip and casualty intensive uprooting of underground logistics bases from which the resistance functions, Memshala Israel has directed operations largely utilizing targeted assassination in essence presuming individual leaders as critical junctions themselves.

Over Reliance on Air Power

The Israeli engagement in the Gaza War of 2008 was largely limited to air power. The IAF proved quite incapable of capturing of terminating large numbers of central leadership, disrupting supply tunnels, or accomplishing more than exacerbating an already grievous human rights disaster to little or no political or military gain. The reality is that while Hamas is certain to lose the firing mechanism (the launcher) anytime it fires a medium or long range missile from Gaza into Israel proper; there is (as was surely demonstrated in the 2006 Second War in Lebanon) little Israel can do to prevent Qassam or Katusha rocket fire simply because the launchers are cheap, mobile and ultimately disposable.

Differentiating between military and civilian targets is therefore problematic if not impossible on both sides, precisely because Hamas uses most civilian facilities as covers for their military operations and can justify most reprisals on the Israeli public due to the complete mobilization of Israeli society into the war machine. The IAF was proven incapable of contending with Hezbollah’s short and medium range missile batteries where the signature is low, the firing mechanism simple and expendable, and the volume far higher. Hamas utilizing similar operating systems with an even lower signature in its prolonged siege of areas like Ashdod, Ashkelon, Sderiot and Negev Settlements utilize simlar mechanics of operation while eliminating many of Hezbollah’s restraints on movement (i.e.: with similar weapons Hamas can strike the remaining key metropolitan urban areas of Israel; Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Be’er Sheva and Eilat). As long as Islamic Resistance Fighters can set up and fire short range Qassam rockets close to the barrier wall with a range of 3-10 km depending on rocket class (1-3) the IAF can only cope with a part of the missile threat. And an ineffective part at that, back to the zero sum game of tit-for-tat reprisals. That is to say, failure to seriously commit ground forces led to engage a Hamas military arm leaves the organization still very much intact and the missile threat undiminished.

Long and Medium Range rockets need to be fired from trucks or installations especially outfitted to fire missiles of this size. Since the Hamas rocket campaign is more psychological than material (15 Israeli deaths since 2001); further enlarging its short range arsenal allows Hamas optimum psychological impact in Israel without exposing the lives of its fighters to retaliatory strikes.  

Presumably the Israeli public and world opinion would not tolerate a highly casualty intensive re-occupation of the Strip by ground forces. The result of moving the necessary amount of troops into Gaza to disarm the Hamas Qassam brigades and demolish the numerous supply tunnels and subterranean bunker systems would result in a Grozny like atrocity. The Gaza Strip is the world’s most densely populated area with a population of 1.5 million. Hamas understands perfectly well that it can hold that strip for at least as long as the world will exert pressure on Israel (notably the Obama Administration and the EU) to disengage. Hamas is more than understanding of Israel’s unwillingness to engage in atrocity on the mass level or the Israeli public’s ability to tolerate a high threshold of causalities.   

The expectation that the IAF could single-handedly dispatch a highly organized guerrilla army on the ground gave rise to false expectations. The solution to short range launchers is better intelligence and the commitment of ground forces. As long as the Islamic Resistance controls the area from which short range rockets can hit Southern border cities; air force retaliation is not an effective deterrent.

The options available are not attractive. Using ground forces to reoccupy Gaza will alienate Israel in the international community and commit the IDF to a method and theatre of fighting for which Hamas is better prepared to inflict substantial casualties. A second option relies on punitive strikes upon an area from which the missiles are launched which is called barbarism, collective punishment and a war crime under the Geneva Convention. Thus so far Israel pursues the second option. It’s the choice between the method that is ineffective and the method for which one’s enemy calls the terms of engagement. Being that the Israeli public is not likely to allow a reoccupation of the Gaza Strip due to the risk of life involved the remaining option remains with air power whose limitations we have illustrated above and whose implementation only hardens the resolve of those who support the Islamic Resistance.      

Inadequate Intelligence

Memshala Israel, like most state actors continues to fight the last war, with the last wars tactics. The bulk of its counter insurgency operations against Hamas are from the playbook of combating terror inflicted by 1970’s formations Black September, PFLP and the PLO (from a time when information could be purchased from collaborators with ease). The focus had been on secular-nationalist factions largely operating from abroad, with limited territorial infrastructure to win the hearts-minds-bread-basket game Hamas so ably administers. Not only did Memshala Yisrael encourage the rise of political Islam as a counter balance in the territories, it has achieved backwards operational familiarity with the more disciplined and horizontal style of command utilized by Hezbollah and Hamas, as taught by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. As a result the IDF was in the largely in the dark at the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, but more grievously during the brief Gaza War in three crucial intelligence arenas.

In regards to weapons; Israel failed to contain the traffic of arms and munitions through tunnels into the Gaza Strip, thus allowing for a massive proliferation of small arms vital to attrition based urban fighting. Memshala Yisrael was also unclear as to what extend the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their surrogate in the region Hezbollah had facilitated training programs, infiltrated supplies and evolved the Hamas military arm into something of far greater combat proficiency.

In regards to combat and defense tactics; the IDF trained in scenarios largely based on combating conventional force invasions from Arab states and Palestinian terror cells (akin more to Islamic Jihad than Hamas) found themselves in an “unfamiliar work environment” when the deployment of IDF ground forces occurred in a hyper-restricted manner. Simply put Israel was not prepared for the sophistication and training of the Islamic Resistance fighters because intelligence reports underestimated not just their size but depth of training.  

Critical failures in intelligence prioritization on behalf of the Shin Bet and Mossad contribute to misunderstanding and reactionary development of armed intervention. All of the military operations carried out in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Southern Lebanon in the last nine years have accomplished nothing in regards to deterrence.  The Islamic Resistance has in fact largely been strengthened because of them. The intelligence situation of the 1980’s and the field today are not comparable. Hamas and Hezbollah have maintained strict adherence to communications security and have left the IDF unprepared to deal with their military arms once hostilities resumed in 2000. Since the critical formation of Hamas and its internal security arm where once Israel might have had thousands of informants on payroll ready to sell out the resistance for coin and visa, Hamas has hunted down and murdered hundreds of informants, compartmentalized its command, and kept the identity of its external leadership secret from the military intelligence arms of Memshala Yisrael.

Underestimation is a critical failure in asymmetrical warfare especially when it leads to gross unfamiliarity with the organizational structure of one’s adversary.      

Strategic Settlement

The settlements have become an integral part of the escalation of violence between Memshala Yisrael and Hamas. The surge in settlement activity on behalf of Likud government in an effort to create a permanent hold on Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria is viewed by the Hamas government and the Palestinian people as a whole as tantamount to ethnic cleansing of their land hill by hill. For by transplanting hundreds of thousands of Jews into the occupied territories the Israeli government has sought through settlement to effectively legitimize the annexation of the Palestinian land. The formation of the settlements has been a progression, their trends and development evolving in response to whatever coalition holds power in the Knesset. While the settlement program was initiated by the Begin government beginning in 1977, it has proceeded unabated even during brief periods of Avodah (Labor) and Kadima control.

The Settlements are fortified civilian compound communities with the occupied territories captured in the six day war of 1967. While concentrations have been established in the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (until vacated in 2005) at the time of publication there are 280,000 settlers concentrated largely in the West Bank in 121 authorized settlements, as well as 190,000settlers in East Jerusalem and 102 unauthorized outposts of various sizes.

Large commuter settlements like Mod’in Illit, Maale Adumim, Betar Illit, and Ariel are veritable mini-cities with near 40,000 plus residents. Some such as those in the Gush Etzion Bloc are ideologically dedicated to reclaiming lost or destroyed former holy sites such as those in and around Hebron. These sites continue to be one of the most divisive issues in the conflict as their supply and security involve vast restrictions on Palestinian movement and continuity of a future state. Hamas and every other Palestinian faction interpret settlement growth as ongoing attempts to seize and hold more of already diminished Palestine.

As stated, by 1967 Israel had conquered not only Gaza, the Golan and Sinai, but the region of Judea and Samaria known as the West Bank. In order to legitimize the conquest the Israeli government created military posts on seized or abandoned land to create a “security zone for the protection of the state”. This of course was another way to justify expansion.

The original settlement wave, post the establishment of military compounds in outlying areas was started by the squatters of the Gush Emunim movement. They stressed the need to keep the whole of Israel intact by taking over land conquered during the Six Day War and creating armed encampments that could be expanded into towns to establish Jewish control. The Allon Plan, the intended plan of the state, sought to settle Israelis in the relatively unpopulated Jordan rift to create a buffer against future attack while consolidating Palestinian population centers into three mini-cantons. The Gush Emmunim, representing a more radical trend in settlement activity sought to position themselves near Palestinian population centers and holy sites under Palestinian control. Their activities were supported by the Begin government who legitimized widespread settlement activity and promised to help establish more upon coming to power in a landslide victory supported by the Sephardic Jews in 1977.

In order to establish a cold-peace with Egypt, Israel agreed to return the Sinai along with the settlements it had set up there. Israel had never before abandoned a settlement and the Begin government decided they would make up for the loss with a consolidation of the more ideologically significant West Bank. By the 1980’s the Memshala Yisrael said that it would create only ten settlements and enlarge the three existing ones, but the object was clear, consolidate a hold on the West bank by establishing settlements at strategic points that could be linked later and annexed into the state.

The Begin government held through the 1981 election by a slim margin by rapidly expanding the settlements before election day. At this time much of the population was greatly in favor of holding the settlements and the Begin government appealed to the people by promising to hold Judea and Samaria. They organized tours of the West Bank settlements and began a building project to expand them for thousands of families. The commuter settlement had been born.

The Drubles plan was put together by the World Zionist Organization called for an expansion of the settlements to accommodate 100,000 settlers. It was his belief that such an expansion could legitimize hold on the West Bank. This Program of 100,000 would become Israel’s new settlement policy. The problem was that Gush was running out of human resources and the state was short of volunteers. They created a land reclamation fund and began subsidizing immigrants move into the territories.  Hebron became a heated center of settler activity as religious zealots more radical than even the Gush movement began violent efforts to reclaim the Tomb of the Patriarch starting in 1981. As the government moved immigrants into newly constructed settlements, the zealots sought to drive Palestinians out of the Hebron holy sites which resulted in various riots and inter-communal violence.

By 1986 the 100,000 mark had been met and the courts had opened up much of the seized land for development. The Likud party was strong with the settler lobby and many non ideological settlements had been established through the subsidies.  While there was opposition on the basis of renewed attempts of land for the peace, by the early 1990’s the settlements were firmly established and had little intention of being removed by either Likud or Avodah governments.

The settlement strategy was piecemeal and waves would be followed by radical action and then by lulls. The settlements remain a crucial stumbling block for the peace process being that they are now at such a substantial population. Massive amounts of funding have gone into their creation and they must be defended against constant attack by the IDF. To Palestinians, they are a constant reminder of the permanent intent of the occupation and a prelude to finalized annexation.

Separation via Barrier

The security wall was not initially supported by the Sharon government due to the fact that it would harden a boundary that would allocate more land to the Palestinians than was considered desirable. As the Al-Aqsa Intifada intensified it became clear that pleasing the public and keeping hold of the land were not mutually exclusive. Israel’s far-left opposed the barrier on the grounds that such highhanded unilateralism would set back the peace process, but the political mainstream embraced the wall as a self-defensive measure to be implemented to stem the waves of suicide bombers largely emanating from the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm triangle.  

The security wall was originally intended to seal out the West bank along the 1967 border, but plans soon changed. The actual construction of the wall runs deep into Palestinian territory to incorporate the settlements into is defensive boundary. While the barrier in the north initially follows the 1967 border path, albeit built on the Palestinian side, the farther south the barrier runs, the more it starts to swerve and dip eastwards to include the settlements. It is the extent and reach of these detours from the Green Line that convinces Palestinians that the barrier is both a project for Israel’s security, but more a means to realize the colonial ambitions of the settler movement and its supporters. Several Palestinian population centers are trapped between the Green Line and the barrier. The inhabitants of these areas will be prohibited from entering Israel to the west, and barred from reaching their lands, businesses, and extended families in the West Bank to the east. 30,000 Palestinian farmers who live on the east side of the barrier are now cut off from their orchards, groves and farms on the western side. The UN reports that 160,000 dunams (36,000 acres) or 2% of the West Bank’s total land area, now falls on the Israeli side of the barrier. This brings Israel in control of a full 80% of country should a unilateral break be affected giving the East Bank (of the Wall) and Gaza for some incorporation into a future state.

The Israeli government claims that the land has been seized for security reasons and that it is legitimized by law that they can utilize it until a threat no longer exists. To the Palestinians the wall looks less than temporary; an enormous investment has been made in it construction. The barrier is between 60 and 100 meters wide, built of concrete walls, electronic and razor-wire fences, trenches or ditches, and is surrounded by three roads: one to trace infiltrators, another for army patrols and a third wide one for tanks. The wall has cut many farmers off from their land and many have abandoned it. The Israelis use an old Ottoman law that states that if the land is abandoned for three years it can be claimed by the state. Since 1967, Israel has invoked this law to take over 60% of the West Bank as state land, to build 135 settlements and to transplant more3 than 500,000 of its Jewish citizens into occupied territory, including East Jerusalem. The wall and settlements will insure that a two state solution cannot be a viable reality as the “Palestinian State” will become little more than a patchwork isolated communities. Once this canonization reaches a critical juncture, disengagement will become politically impossible for any Israeli leader to accomplish.

Management of Civilian Casualties

It is in fact commendable to both the Israeli Defense Forces (and intelligence services of the Mossad and Shebac) as well as to the Parties of Palestinian Resistance that so much restraint has been used.

This is not discount the many tens of thousands maimed, the tens of thousands of homes and lives destroyed, or the incalculable human suffering caused. But measure via raw, unsentimental body count; less than 10,000 men, women and children have dies in the bloodiest decade of intra-communal fighting these two groups have seen.

Compared to the two separatist wars in Chechnya: most estimates give figures of between 3,500 and 7,500 Russian military dead, between 3,000 and 15,000 Chechen militants dead, and no fewer than 35,000 civilian deaths—a total of at least 41,500 dead. Others have cited figures in the range of 80,000 to 100,000 in a period between 1994 and 1996. Round two of the fighting from 1999 to present is placed at 3,643 Russian soldiers, 1,722 Interior ministry troops and 1,045 Chechen police officers killed, 113 militants killed. Chechen civilian deaths in the Second conflict run between 25,000 killed and up to 5,000 “disappeared in filtration camps” to as high as 50,000 killed in various stages of shelling..

Comparable death tolls of non-combatant deaths in Darfur are placed at 300,000, in Rwanda at 500,000 and Sri Lanka at 80,000. These conflicts all took place after the start of the first Intifada. The devil in the details is that the Palestinians and Israelis show incredible, incredible restraint.   

Both Hamas and Memshala Yisrael accuse each other of war crimes and of the indiscriminate targeting of civilians; in fact both justify some of their more messy operations as retaliations for each other’s attacks. Israel claims that Hamas fighters hide weapons and command centers amid civilian neighborhoods and fire rockets from within civilian population centers (which they obviously do). And Hamas does not deny this at all claiming the basic principles of a guerrilla war. Hamas claims that suicide attacks and the firing of rockets at Israeli population centers is a reprisal for murdering Palestinian civilians and movement leadership. Hamas also contends that since virtually every member of Israeli society will be, is, or serving in reserve for the IDF; than the line between combatant and non-combatant is equally blurred in a fully war mobilized society. Israel thus finds itself in a difficult situation. It is dealing with a popularly supported guerrilla army shielded by a sophisticated Para-state apparatus (that is now the elected leadership of the PA) that is willingly shielded by the masses. Israel continues to engage in tactics that lead to the deaths of non-combatants further radicalizing the Palestinians in favor of the Islamic Resistance.

This latest tit-for-tat cycle of retaliatory violence (directed against civilians) appears to have stemmed from the Goldstein massacre of 1996 when a revisionist settler opened fire in the Mosque of the Patriarchs killing 32 unarmed women and children. Just as the massacre in Deir Yassin triggered the massacre of the Mt. Scopus medical column, each side has unlimited justifications for political violence and unrestricted willingness to turn that violence against non-combatants, even if both sides non-combatants are directly or indirectly engaged in the struggle. An Israeli would say little Muhammad Dura would have surely grown up to support Hamas, and a Palestinian would claim that while it is objectionable to kill children, they would one day go off to join the IDF.

As per recent reports by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, during the period of fighting from 2005 until 2008 116 Israelis, including both civilians and security forces were killed in both Israel and the Palestinian Territories involved in “direct conflict related incidents” and 1,509 were injured. During this same time, 1,735 Palestinians, including civilians and militants from various groups, were killed and 8,308 wounded in “direct conflict related incidents”.

As compared to previous rounds of war, the Israeli ability to inflict harm increases while that of the Palestinians decreases, this result is not purely determined by an advance in Israeli counter-insurgency. It is as much via a Hamas change in tactics.

Assassination of Leadership

Since Mid-2001, Hamas has lost three of its founding members- Ismail Abu Shanan, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, and Abdel al-Aziz Rantisi- in addition to more than 300 cadres in Gaza and abroad. The assassinations increased popular support for Hamas which quickly recovered from the loss of its founders, although it became cautious about naming its new leader publically in an effort to protect their lives (Knudsen & Ezbidi, p.198).

There is probably no better example of a failed Israeli tactic in this regard. For each member of the Palestinian leadership, particularly Hamas, it terminates; the Israelis supply 100 more convicted zealots to the movement which so rewards the notion of martyrdom in the Jihad as if it were synonymous to charity or prayer.

During the first Intifada Israel sought to decapitate the movement by deporting its primary and secondary leadership to Lebanon. The 417 leaders (of both Hamas and Islamic Jihad) were in fact delivered right into the open arms of Hezbollah movement. While the round up and deportation of major players of the first Intifada briefly united Fatah and Hamas (as well as much of the international community) in outrage against Israel, it did little to neutralize the nascent movement. In fact, not only did a long and active partnership between Sunni Hamas and Shi’a Iran form out of this deportation, the street credibility of Hamas skyrocketed. In fact, each time Memshala Yisrael deports a Hamas leader or arrests one, or has them ‘liquidated’, the organization evolves to tighten security, more radical leaders emerge and the Palestinian street celebrates the sacrifice of the group.

Hamas has vast pool of trained recruits and cadre to re-coup its ranks from. Drawn from a large body of sources and supporters, the horizontal nature of their structure; external/internal leaderships, Shura Council support from clerics, wide ranging and diffuse pools of recruitment, autonomous military units; all of this makes the Israeli EBO strategy of liquidating leaders little more than a political maneuver to their own people.

Now with the Al-Aqsa Intifada underway a policy of liquidation, or what Israelis officially termed ‘targeted killing’, ‘pin-pointing attackers’, or ‘neutralizing the organizers of attacks’, namely Palestinian activists affiliated to Fatah, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad, was approved by the Cabinet. The aim of the policy was threefold: to weaken the Palestinian command on the ground, to deter new potential Palestinian leaders from joining the ranks; and perhaps most importantly, to foil and pre-empt Palestinian attackers- suicide bombers and others from carrying out their missions in Israeli towns and cities (Bregman, p.220).

However, as best demonstrated with the botched assassination attempt in Jordan of Khaled Mish’al, the 200,000 plus Gaza City funeral procession for Sheik Yassin, or the countless instances of glorification within the Hamas ‘cult of martyrdom’; killing individual leaders (even on the highest level of command) has done the reverse of the intended effect. Rather than have an identifiable nemesis who might be brought to bargain, there are now multiple levels of leadership with varying influences (few of them moderate).  

Each leader Memshala Yisrael kills fuels the commitment within the ranks to strike back harder and more aggressively. Next to settlement construction and prisoners it is assassinations that provide the greatest fuel to the fire of Islamic resistance ignited by Hamas.

Section 3: The Evolution of the Hamas Strategy

“I want to proclaim loudly to the world that we are not fighting Jews because they are Jews! We are fighting them because they assaulted us, they killed us, they took our land and our homes; they attacked our children and our women; they scattered us. All we want is our rights. We don’t want more.”

Sheikh Ahmad Yassin

Hamas Founder

Localization of Jihad

To date, Hamas has not carried out a single attack outside of Green Line Israel and the occupied territories, nor has it deliberately targeted Westerners or foreign nationals whose governments support Israel. This is not to indicate that when you ignite your own body in a blaze of c4 and ball bearings indiscriminately hoping to slaughter civilians that some foreigners have not been killed.

Hamas posits itself as the vanguard of Pan-Islamic revolution, but suffice to say it has very nationalistic goals that preclude its involvement in international Jihadist activities except in direct cooperation with Israel’s immediate enemies: Sudan, Syria, Hezbollah zones of control in Lebanon and of course Iran. While it may rhetorically support the actions of various international Jihadist groups, it hardly embraces an irrational utopianism akin to say, Al Qaeda. For that reason Hamas is loath to take symbolic of tactical acts of collaboration (such as those extended by Bin Laden and Chechen guerillas) for any cause not involving Israel and Palestine. It has a rational localized objective and does not distract itself with what it perceives as antagonistic actions (attacking the West and U.S.) that will only marginalize its fight with Israel.

Iran and Syria have long term policy interests in a strong and militarily formidable Hamas and both countries have been formative in nurturing and supplying both Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Lebanese Hezbollah with anything they needs. Both Damascus and Tehran have facilitated various factions within the resistance as a means of power projection in the Levant and in pursuit of harming their common enemy Memshala Yisrael. Over the years Hamas as made use of both foreign aid and training working as military a surrogate while it maintains its long term goal of an Islamic state in Palestine.

Syria is not interested in another head-on military clash with Israel that it is certain to once again lose. Its support for Hamas and Hezbollah falls in three main areas of interest. First, Hamas serves as a thorn in Israel’s side and reminder over the annexed Golan Heights that Syria seeks to keep in the focus of any peace settlement with Israel. Second, cross border war is bad for the Lebanese economy which in turn could displace the hundreds of thousands of Syria workers in Lebanon and exacerbate the refugee problem the Syrians already have. War by proxy minimizes this risk. Third, Syrian provoked wars with Israel further tarnish the Syrian relationship with the Lebanese people while working through Hezbollah and Hamas promotes pro-Syrian policies from indigenous proxies.

 From the very beginning in 1982 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards supplied Hezbollah with the material and ideological support it needed to grow as an organization. As Hezbollah’s skill and arsenal developed it continued to rely on Iran for the tools it needed for its war with Israel. A product of the “export the revolution” policies of Khomeini; Hezbollah is dependent on Iran for all of its arms and much of its funding. Lebanon is home to the largest Shi’a Arab community second to Iraq and Hezbollah gives Iranian policy a platform in Lebanon. Contact with Hamas was initiated in 1986 and beginning in 1987 Iran began an arms and money pipeline hoping to shore up Sunni Hamas and Islamic Jihad as allies in the common fight against Israel.   

Both Syria in the way of movement logistics and Iran in the way of funding seek to use Hamas as their proxy in the war with Israel. Hamas over the years has exploited this reality to its advantage retain its own autonomy in voice and operations.

At times Israeli or American pundits and politicians attempt to claim that groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are part of the larger ‘Islamo-fasciest’ constellation of ‘Global Jihadist’ groups united around the ideas of Al-Qaida. This mythology transforms the loosely affiliated, former-Mujahedeen of the Jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan into a shadowy transnational conspiracy. It (via the War on Terror) proceeds to lump a wide range of militant Islamic nationalist groups waging struggled with their near enemy (local corrupt regimes); with franchise type cellular networks willing to engage in indiscriminate violence against the far enemy (Israel and the West); along with state actors like North Korea, Iraq and Iran which endorse and fund terrorist insurgencies. This cluster of identities does not embrace a single world view, have a coordinated leadership, or share more than a wide constellation of perceived grievances.  Periodically Memshala Yisrael and the U.S. assert that Hamas is linked within the broader Al-Qaida network: an irrational and expansionist Islamic regime.  

It is true that Hamas has embraced terrorism since 1996. It is also true that numerous foreign nationals have been killed in its various attacks. It is further true that Hamas rhetorically makes statements in solidarity with various components of the Jihadist movement. It is true that Hamas receives state aid from Iran, Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Libya in various degrees over time. It is true that Hamas has mutual aid and training alliances with Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and various wings of the Ikhwan. This does not mean that Hamas has ever, or will ever embrace indiscriminate violence against the West, nor will it materially support internationalist Islamist groups whose guns are not singularly turned on Israel. To that end Shi’a Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas, in sharing a common enemy (Israel) and common patrons (Iran and Syria) while not sharing a theological framework, engage in tactical mutual aid. Both however, clearly an explicitly denounced the 9/11 attacks on the trade center (while at the same time claiming the Pentagon was a valid military target). Both have not carried out a single attack (even against Israelis) on foreign soil. Both have limited nationalist goals (Shari’ah states in Lebanon and Palestine.)

While pariah states such as Syria, Sudan and Iran (for varying reasons) all provide vast degrees of support for Hamas, they too have only a limited interest in striking out at the Western far enemy. Sudan for ideological reasons provides Hamas supply conduits into Sinai but is more preoccupied with its internal civil war (read ethnic cleansing). Syria has a long term grievance over the Golan Heights that it fears will be permanently annexed to Israel in the event of any peace settlement. A long time enemy of Memshala Yisrael its capital Damascus is also a major base of operations for Hamas EXTERNAL leadership. Syria supplies land routes and training bases to move Iranian supplies into Palestine. However, as smuggling routes are far softer for infiltration via Sinai, Sudan and Syria are logistical bases for camps and smuggling, not financial powerhouses behind the movement. The real patron extraordinaire is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s leadership beyond its embrace of revolutionary Shi’ism remember the recent past of 1978 when it was Israel who trained and supported the Shah’s brutal internal security corps.

Memshala Yisrael and the world’s only Islamic republic are locked in a mortal combat of conflicting ideologies both with a road through Jerusalem. Hamas certainly embraces the old Chinese military adage that the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’, but that does not mean that the friend of Hamas’ enemy becomes its enemy. Hamas has no aspiration for a transnational Islamic revolution or a restoration of some golden aged Caliphate. It has a simple pragmatic aim; restoration of Palestine restored via localized nationalist resistance.

Sophisticated command Structure

The Hamas structure, post-interaction and training via the Iran revolutionary guards has taken on the form of a highly evolved Para-state apparatus. Its structure is both difficult for Memshala Yisrael to engage and even more difficult to infiltrate. After repeated waves of imprisonment, assassination and deportation Hamas has taken moves to secure its leaders and further neutralize the forces within Gaza and the West Bank that have supplied information on its members and branches.

Hamas is organized in four areas of operations. The Gaza Strip, under Hamas control since 2007 is at this stage their largest center for weapons caches, social services, recruitment and religious indoctrination. However, since their election to control of the PA and their armed seizure of the strip from the Fatah faction a year later, tight sanctions and security cordon has largely prevented members inside rte strip from leaving. The second area is the West Bank, now under the control of Mahmud Abbas led Fatah but Hamas still maintains vast organizational networks their via charities and Masjids, as well as numerous combat cells, particularly in the Jenin-Tulkarm-Nablus triangle. The third area is inside green-line Israel where Hamas enjoys varying degrees of logistical support and sympathy from the INSERT number Arab-Israelis. The fourth area are the training bases, regional command offices, fund raising fronts, and pipelines of arms that Hamas has established largely in Iran, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, and various cities in the West.

Hamas is led by and INTERNAL and an EXTERNAL leadership, guided by a carefully concealed Advisory Council called Majalis Shura. A Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi) coordinates the various branches of the organization while shaping its poltical message and sanctioning its tactics. This Political Bureau is organized into five sub-division; Foreign Affairs, Finance, Propaganda, Internal Security, and Military Affairs. Both the internal leadership (residing within the territories) and the external leadership (abroad) hold various posts on the Political Bureau which relies on the Advisory Council for material support and theological rulings. While it is now fairly established who holds power on the Political Bureau, Hamas has managed to completely conceal both its leaders in the territories (Internal) and its secretive Shura Council. It is believed that this external leadership (which composes most of the Bureau) is at times at odds with leadership on the ground, but has classically exhibited more influence via access and coordination of foreign purse strings.

Directly subordinate to the Political Bureau are District Committees (five in the West Bank, seven in Gaza) which serve as local implementing bodies of Political Bureau (ie: external leadership) directives through intermediaries, largely unknown to Israel who are influential West Bank and Gazan organizers. These District Committees are largely political in nature, largely logistically autonomous and are only partially aware (beyond a few key spokes people in the Bureau) of the identities of other INTERNAL and EXTERNAL leadership. These Committees are organized into five sub-divisions: Education, Prisoner Support, Area Security, Publishing, and Finance. The Political Bureau operates in ‘informal affiliation’ with the multitude of Muslim Brotherhood controlled social services; particularly the Islamic Center (al-Mujumma al-Islami) the vast charity and mosque network founded by former Chairman Sheik Yassin; the Islamic University in Gaza which Hamas controls via its faculty and funding, a wide range of Hospitals, clinics, and professional associations; as well as the National Islamic Salvation Party (Hisb al-Khalas al-Witani al-Islmai).  

The twelve localized District Committees aid in the political-charitable-military interface, but are largely to further legitimate political ends of the movement. Most charitable work is being performed under the auspices of an informally affiliated subsidiary and military operations are carried out via autonomous combat groups.

Apart from the victims of guerrillas, few still identify irregular paramilitary warfare with terrorism but the two activities do overlap a great deal in their operational characteristics. The tactical logic of guerrilla operations resembles that in terrorist attacks: the weaker rebels use stealth and the cover of the civilian society to concentrate their striking power against one among many of the stronger enemy’s dispersed assets; they strike quickly and eliminate the target before the defender can move forces from other areas to respond; they melt back into civilian society to avoid detection and re-concentrate against another target. The government or occupier has far superior strength in terms of conventional military power, but cannot counter-concentrate in time because it has to defend all points, while the insurgent attacker can pick its targets at will (Betts, p.8).   

All Hamas fighters are mainly civilians that do not stay in the field outside of specific combat engagements. Thus, the Islamic Resistance is a reserve army that is sheltered by the  population making it even harder for Israel to pinpoint specific members or sector leaders.  Islamic Resistance fighters are students at universities, farmers, and professionals in the major cities. Sector leaders can instruct a fighting group’s members to report to an Operational Headquarters where they receive their instructions before deployment. Once assembled the group is instructed by a Sector Commander on the specific nature of the operation. Fighters are then armed, uniformed, and put into the field.  

Hezbollah has a relatively flat and decentralized organizational structure, and compromises a network of territorial units operating almost autonomously and, generally, without the need for maneuvering forces or transporting supplies. The fighters, weapons, and supplies are deployed in the field in advance and blend easily within the civilian populations or in “nature reserves” (concealed bunker systems in valleys). On the other hand, Hezbollah does not have an operational center of gravity whose destruction would lead to the collapse of the organization’s other organs and obviate the need to destroy them individually (Tira, p.4).

And it is the Iranian Hezbollah modal Hamas has embraced.

During the Gaza war Hamas generally refused to wear uniforms and defend fixed positions, Islamic Resistance fighters then are indistinguishable from civilians. Each member only has knowledge of the few other men in his combat group although Hamas is attempting to build a popular army in a Gaza to keep roughly 40,000 fighters in reserve. Because the Israeli army is trained for large scale engagements with aggressive Arab armies fighting from fixed positions this structure makes it difficult for the IDF to effectively stop Hezbollah because they are not fighting on the same playing field. That is to say Hezbollah maintains an indirect defense.

Bunker Systems

Since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 Hamas has wasted no time in constructing elaborate fortifications throughout the strip, building elaborate bunker complexes, supply tunnels, and underground attack corridors under Israel’s security barrier.

Although it was suspected that Hezbollah was building defensive fortifications, neither the UN peacekeepers nor the Israeli military had any idea as to the scale they had assisted the Palestinians. When Israeli troops discovered and dynamited one of the bunkers days after the cease-fire, they found a structure consisting of firing positions, operations rooms, medical facilities, lighting and ventilation systems, kitchens and bathrooms with hot water-sufficient for dozens of fighters to live underground for weeks (Blanford, p.7)  

Not only do the numerous Hamas bunkers allow the Party to conceal its low-signature mobile fleet of short range Qassam and Katyusha rocket launchers, it allows the Islamic Resistance to move and remain hidden long before the IAF makes retaliatory strikes. That is to say these sophisticated bunkers build with Iranian funding and technical support prevent the IDF from effectively neutralizing the Gaza Strip command posts of the Islamic Resistance without a protracted occupation and an unacceptable amount of casualties.

The oddest deployment of ground forces took place in the last sixty hours of the fighting. The ground forces were deployed after the political campaign ended; in other words, the deployment was not intended to achieve any political objectives. The forces were deployed without the area being cleared of enemy combatants, i.e., the aim was not search, destroy, and inflict damage on Hezbollah’s firing capacity or its forces. When the ceasefire came into effect, IDF forces were interspersed with the enemy forces, and hence there were difficulties with land and air supplies (Tira, p.5).

Hamas ally Hezbollah was able to fire over 100 Katyusha rockets a day at Northern Israeli cities and Settlements because these bunkers allow them to unveil and quickly fire without the IAF being able to successfully pin point firing locations to neutralize the launcher and crew. Such installations once active in the Gaza Strip could target the reminder of Israel’s major population centers in the next round of hostilities. The bunker complexes also serve the vital function of concealing the Islamic Resistance Fighters. The approximately 20,000 fighters of the Izz Ed Din al-Qassam Brigades could never hope to withstand a direct confrontation with several Divisions of the IDF. In absence of centralized command or fixed fronts and positions the bunker complex allows fighter units to wait out Israeli advances and attack the Israeli supply lines once the IDF has passed deeper into urban territory. Basically, the Hezbollah inspired bunker system allows Hamas to make the best use of its guerrilla training and assets by forcing the IDF to fight on its terms in a theatre it controls and maintains civilian support.

Short Range Rockets

Hamas, under the tutelage of Hezbollah (and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard) has begun a compartmentalization of military action moving away from suicide bombings (which Hamas is surely cognizant are inexplicable and anathema to the West) towards use of short range Qassam rockets as resistance modus-operandi.

Integral to the balance of fear is the constant and unpredictable nature of where and when Hamas can strike. In utilizing rockets not suicide attacks Palestinian resistance factions, replicating lessons learned in Lebanon via Hezbollah instinctually realize how alienating the West via suicide bombings makes it harder to paint themselves as freedom fighters as opposed to terrorists. Rockets which don’t cost much to produce and fire (and rarely sacrifice trained operatives to do so) are a dual result of three factors, a) the effectiveness of the security barrier, b) a Hamas evolution and understanding of how the Western media views their ‘martyrdom operations’, and c) internal debate regarding the religious justification for sacrifice vs. suicide in Jihad.

During the Al-Aqsa Intifada Hamas began production (under Iranian ) tutelage of a domestic arms industry. The product was the Qassam-1 Rocket, a short range missile that could be built out of a wide range of household and construction  items available in Gaza to fire a protracted battery of rockets over the wall into Israel proper. The early modals had a maximum range of 3 miles (4.5 kilometers). Most of the suicide attacks of the Al-Aqsa intifada occurred between 2000 and 2004, prior to the construction of the security barrier, largely using operatives form the West Bank. The Qassam missile strategy is to instill a renewed balance of fear, and enable besieged Gaza to strike at various surrounding areas. To date 15 Israelis have died from Qassam rocket attacks which have become increasingly sophisticated and longer in range. Thousands of these home made rockets have fallen on the Israeli town of Sderiot and during the 2008 Gaza War of Operation Cast Lead; Hamas demonstrated it could fire Qassam 3 and Katusha rockets as deep into Israel as the largest Southern City:(4^th largest in Israel) Be’er Sheva.

The Qassam Rocket class 1-3 are quickly produced out of basic goods both available from the UN relief agencies and more sophisticated via smuggling operations through the Sinai tunnels. The Qassam is propelled via a mixture of sugar (available via relief organizations) and potassium nitrate (found in fertilizer). The explosive war head is packed with TNT (smuggled in) and urea nitrate (another readily available fertilizer). The rocket is constructed out of steel cylinders of varying sizes (UN relief or scavenged pipes) and a simple trigger mechanism is then built at the end out of a cartridge, spring and nail. The Qassam is impossible to aim and thus what it hits is purely up to probability and direction of firing. The manufacturers of the Qassam rocket class do not have canted nozzles (the rocket thus doesn’t spin), this is to simplify launch procedure at the expense of accuracy which is nil with home-made short range missiles to begin with. The Qassam’s basic components are highly unstable which prevents a stockpiling and barrage type tactic. Instead, missiles are built and quickly fired in order to create the low intensity version of the terror inflicted via their suicide attacks.

Suicide Terrorism

Suicide bombings are undoubtedly the most contentious element of Palestinian resistance. They merit equal condemnation with Israel’s killing of civilians; yet it is important to explain why some individuals carry out these acts, as well as why some groups promote their use. The explanation resides neither in the propagandized version of Islam (which says the bombers are brainwashed to believe that if they die martyred they will go to paradise, where some 72 virgins await them). Neither is it because they hate Jews and want to kill as many as possible. Fundamentally, the explanation is to be found in despair so overwhelming that these individuals believe they have no future and thus they are willing to sacrifice themselves. In the context of occupation, and the Israeli’s daily assaults on their families and friends, the despair combines with rage and an explosive desire for revenge fuels their actions (Rubenberg, pp.338-339.)

The Palestinians are in a comparable position to the Jews of the early 19^th century, their homeland in the hands of a foreign power, their numbers divided among many continents and nations, their collective welfare in the hands of squabbling political factions. They live in ghettos, the bulk of their number in poverty with little chance for social and political advancement. The Israelis on the other hand possess international recognition by the world’s great powers, a modern conventional military capable of defeating all other forces in the region on the battlefield with the possible exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran; as well a vibrant economy, and the ability to strike at Palestinian leadership and population centers with near impunity.

Palestinian organizations that use martyrdom operations maintain that they never target children. They insist that they target predominantly army personnel, and that any attacks on civilians are either unintended or inevitable, as long as Israel continues to target Palestinian civilians. Additionally, they argue that Israel is a military state where every man and woman, part from the ultra-Orthodox Jews, serves in the army. They explain that they target buses because soldiers travel in them. They target bars and night clubs because these are meeting places for off-duty service men and women who earlier in the day would be actively engaged in military operations in the occupied territories (Tamimi, p.186).

A great body of scholarship has been done on the motivations for, psychology of and history behind suicide bombings, called by Hamas ‘martyrdom operations’. Hamas began utilizing this tactic operationally in 1996 and is to date the leading Palestinian faction in its prolific use. However, as documented a combination of a) Iranian influence, b) the separation and barrier and c) internal religious discourse has led to a discontinuation of suicide bombings in the past few years. Of course this does not preclude their total discontinuation, but it appears that Hamas seeks to develop more conventional military capabilities to achieve some degree of recognition as a guerrilla army, not as a terrorist group.

The Iranian influence is very important in this regard. Although Shi’a Hezbollah inflicted heavy causalities against France, America and Israel during the Lebanese Civil War via the use of suicide truck bombs, by and large Shi’a revolutionary groups draw a hard line between combatant and non-combatant which makes fatwa based justification of suicide bombings directed at civilian population centers impossible to justify on a religious grounds. Iran (next too foreign money raised to run al-Mujamma charities) is the largest financial contributor to the Hamas movement. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has provided engineering support, training facilities, weapons, and a whole range of contributions which lend the Hamas ear to the powers in Tehran. Hamas, as a keen student of history has evolved its tactics since 2000 to more closely resemble Hezbollah, the Shi’a Lebanese proxy of Iran.

It is far easier to rationalize a missile fired toward an enemy city as an act of war (albeit without a targeting system) than is a cross-dressed man in a lethal leisure suit lighting up a club of underage kids with ball bearings.

It is of importance to recognize that from the outset there has been a debate within Hamas as to whether these kinds of attacks are even permissible in Islam. Desperation being the mother of violent invention, it is clear that Hamas initially embraced these ‘martyrdom operations’ in the hopeless days of the first intifada and intensified them after the death of Oslo in the Al-Aqsa intifada of 2000. The Iranian embrace hands Hamas more deadly tools and training, but forges them into an army of resistance fighters who must then act like soldiers, not desperate terrorists eager for death and revenge.

Section 4: Hamas as a Partner in Separation

“I have also shown to you already that, in our submission, there is no question of ousting the Arabs. On the contrary, the idea is that Palestine on both sides of the Jordan should hold Arabs, their progeny and many millions of Jews. What I do not deny is that in that process the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine.

What I do deny is that it will be a hardship.”

Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky

Founder of Revisionist Zionism

There comes a time beyond outsider pontification, and insider political imagination when the forces on the ground most come to the realistic calculus that the end game for this conflict must be in separation. As we have outlined, militarily neither side’s strategy proves remarkably affective at eliminating the other, and certainly hardens the resolve of both confessions. Historically, each has a vague historical (and at the same time existentially immediate) claim to this land. Religious zeal aside there is overwhelming archeological proof of this being the historical Hebrew homeland, and suffice to say the Dome of the Rock occupies its place as Islam’s third holiest site. From a human rights perspective the Palestinian people, cognizant of a nationalist identity or not, were living on this land for at least the last 1,930 years.

The mindset and values of Israeli Jewish society and Palestinian Muslim society are so different and mutually exclusive as to render a vision of bi-national statehood tenable only in the most disconnected and unrealistic of minds (Morris, p.187).

Surely Israeli society is an incredibly diverse one in both ethnicity and political perspective. It has vast potential to be an exporter of development, science and structural development of the third world once it can divest itself form this war. Surely Palestinian fundamentalisms and Hebrew fundamentalisms are not the desired ends of either peoples, but a part and parcel result of this war.

To end the war we must separate the combatants, but this task must fall upon the shoulders of the hardliners; the Revisionists and Hamas who can at present muster the poltical will to take this bold step. To cantonize and ghettoize the Gaza Strip and West Bank into inviable micro-states will not end this conflict. The separation must be implemented and development must follow.

Hamas has in recent years undergone an incremental process of political integration, a process mostly ignored by the movement’s foes and detractors. It has displayed political and tactical moderation, including keeping unilateral ceasefires until June 2006, abandoning the claim to mandatory Palestine and accepting a two-state solution comprising the 1967 territories. Hamas has not, however, complied with external pressures to abandon armed resistance, disarm and recognize Israel. The main reason for doing so is not only ideological, but strategic: complying with the demands would leave Hamas without any credible sanctions in the final-status negotiations that until now have been the only scenario for a lasting peace (Knudsen & Ezbidi, p. 204).

We are at the brink. The demographic realty is that within twenty years there will be an equal number of Arabs and Jews occupying the territorial space of Palestine, this will not broad well for either Israel’s commitment to democracy or the Palestinian’s already diminished human rights. The willingness of Iran to fuel violence by proxy as well as the total lack of dialogue and cultural exchange within the Middle East between the Muslim nations and the third Hebrew commonwealth leaves no lasting avenues for human exchange. Vultures swoop over Palestine and both the Christian and Muslim world have explicitly demonstrated their zeal to use both Jew and Palestinian as pawns in a game.   

If Hamas will not put down its weapons (and who could rationally expect it to) or acknowledge the right of the Jews to occupy their land, then let us work with what they have offered for some time. The premise of Hudna: long term truce.

Hamas is silent about what happens when a notional long term Hudna signed with the Israelis comes to its appointed end. While Hamas’ leaders have left open the length of the term of the proposed Hudna, regarding this as subject of negotiation with the Israelis once they have accepted the principle, their general philosophy is that the future should be left up to future generations. It is usually assumed that a long term Hudna will probably last for a quarter of a century or more. That is viewed as too long a time for anyone now to predict what may happen afterward. There will always be a possibility that the Hudna will come to a premature end because of a breach. If that were to occur, it would be unlikely that the breach would come from the Hamas side. This is for the simple reason that it is a religious obligation on the Islamic side to honor such an agreement until the end, once made, unless violated by another party. Should the Hudna last until the proscribed date, one scenario is that those in charge then will simply negotiate a renewal (Azzam, p.168).

Were emerging, strong Israeli leaders able to the muster the will of their divided society to accept their sworn enemy Hamas as a partner in Hudna it might have lasting impacts that would shake the region to the core. The signing of such a truce need not happen on the Lawn of the White House or need be rewarded with some Nobel Prize. The proof of its worth would be in its results. The objective would be simple to grasp. The House of Israel and the House of Ishmael have been sixty years and more locked in bloody combat. To stop the war one need not peace, but instead the structural pursuit of lasting ceasefire coupled with a program to build two economically healthy nations with intertwined need.

Surely the Jewish radicals of the Kach underground and Gush Emunim would prefer a Jewish civil war to a lasting partition, surely no one on either side wishes to give an inch. But this program is an inch by inch reclamation coupled with one more territorial reality. Other than Egypt, Israel and Iran what county in the region has any claim to historical borders other than those imposed by Sykes-Picot. That is to say that the Palestinian Diaspora must surely be aware the extent to which the Arab regional powers owe them, have failed them and have despised them.  

A Hudna, signed by a Zionist government and Hamas would be an act of covenant not international relations. To Hamas it would be a holy act and an existential necessity to prove the validity of Islamism in Palestine. To Memshala Israel it would mean a settlement of a prolonged drain on its nation’s coffers and moral and an opening of its society to the developing world. As per the Blue Print, not the Road Map: Jerusalem would be divided (the Palestinians would maintain control over the Temple Mount, Christian and Muslim Quarters and the East of the City as AL Quds). The West Bank and Gaza Strip would be supplemented by additional territories in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Sinai; settlements would be exchanged for Arab towns and land would be purchased (or simply seized) from neighboring countries unwilling to endorse this lasting truce. Refugees abroad would have the right to return to newly constituted Palestine and those with specific claims to land and property inside Israel proper would be bought out and compensated. Hamas would have free reign to Islamize Palestine in so far as it did so within a Democratic sphere and allowed secular space in its new society. But, even if it refused to moderate its zeal for religion, it would be empowered by Israel to dismantle the armed forces of all other factions and be the sole army on the ground.

The messy business of a population transfer must begin immediately at the off set of implementation. It goes without saying that Israel’s Arab Israeli population will seek and lobby to have their Palestinian cake and eat it too as it were. That is to say some will find it far easier to live as second class citizens in a multi-ethnic Hebrew dominated commonwealth, then as forced participants in a newly independent, Shari’ah dominated Palestinian nascent state. Suffice to say these are the painful realities of survival. Israel cannot maintain even a minute percentage of 20% Arab population within its borders; so-called Arab Israelis, Bedouin, and any Druze unwilling to serve in the armed forces will find themselves on the other side of the line.

This process must proceed in staged evacuations one for one; one settlement block for one Arab Israeli town, there will be misery, separation anxiety, and great soul searching as to moral justification and long term finality of peace. There will be obvious Palestinian anxiety on absorbing a largely secular, more affluent Arab-Israeli middle class, and finalizing the loss of sum 78% of their historic territory to the Zionists. The Israeli public will surely grieve the infighting of evacuating 200,000 plus settlers from the West Bank and ceding any claim to East Jerusalem, “Judea” and “Samaria”. But it is the very homes of the settlers, their infrastructure, their roads, their settlements into which the larger Arab Israeli evacuees must be placed.

I reiterate that this process will not be easy, nor will it be quickly accomplished. There will be resistance on the part of the settlers, anticipatively armed resistance; and there will be obvious international objection to the forced deportation of the Arab-Israeli into the newly created Gaza-West Bank Palestine.

The vital stage must be to insure that Memshala Yisrael and Hamas dominated PA work together to implement this transfer and maintain Hudna with the realization that territorial integrity of their respective nations is vital.

It is irrelevant as to whether Hamas recognizes Israel’s right to exist, or if the final treaty implementing the separation plan is one of ‘peace’ or instead ‘Hudna’. It is irrelevant if the two sides agree to a 10 year truce, a 60 year truce, or a 100 year truce. Phase 1 is separation in its most utter form, the sealing of each side behind their lines. As the Jew and Arab are separated from each other’s forced and hateful embrace the iron wall must be strengthened. The separation barrier must be built taller and its gates must be locked on both sides. For in the period of Hudna there must arise a new generation who does not remember the war or the blood spilled in repetition.

The common media adage suggests that the Arab world is particularly hostile to democracy. In virtually all but a single regional state a cruel military oligarchy rules with a junta and an iron fist. Surely, second to Israel the greatest acknowledged enemy of the Arab masses are their own governments. However, in both Israel and occupied Palestine the Palestinian Arabs have repeatedly demonstrated a zeal for both democratic process and a commitment to civic society. Although the election of the Hamas government was a seemingly critical blow to the trampled peace process, it has not been argued that this was not a supervised and legitimate expression of Palestinian democracy. Within Israel itself the Arab parties and the 1.3 million Arab-Israeli Palestinians participate in the regions only democracy, within the Jewish State.

We are not dealing with howling mullah unfamiliar with Western ideas of statecraft. The Blue Print as a plan is flexible and staged in its intricate redrafting of the Middle Eastern Map, its specifics are for another treatise at another time. Paramount to the survival of both people’s is a rational acknowledgment that they have failed for nearly 100 years at both peace and war. Surely some of the responsibility for rebuilding the Palestinian nation falls on the oil oligarchies and the European Union, just as surely does America have a long term relationship with Israel. But, before any realistic mobilization of these respective mini-states can be used to demonstrate Democratic Islamism and Zionist Universalism respectively; they must stop the war.

It has been found that social movements like those which are responsible for the modern concepts of Israel and Palestine thrive on ‘imagined community’, strictly defined identity, and symbols of some historical Golden Age. When coupled with religion a social movement has the ability to draw from a deep well of support and sustain a struggle indefinitely.

The acronym for Hamas translates to the word Zeal. There was once a group of Hebrew revolutionaries in the year 66 CE that carried the same name in their war with an occupying power the Roman Empire. Their faction, the Zealots and Sicarii carried out merciless acts of terrorism against their own people and the Roman occupiers. The Hebrew people are ‘stiff necked’ the Torah says, prone to stubborn arrogance as well as religious fervor.  I am not a man of peace, but a man of pragmatism. If on this wide earth the Hebrew and Palestinian people have found no meaningful source of shelter and security for their respective kind; if locked in bloody struggle the sins of Europe and the sins of Arab oligarchy are channeling both out houses to cosmic, unending war; then we must separate and do so quickly.

If in a simple ten year Hudna both Houses can be made relatively homogenous and their peoples can, uninterrupted by siege and war build two nations, side by side. Then one day, as each subsequent Hudna is renewed the fundamentalists on both sides will find their grasp weakened, they will find blue jeans and art museums are more to the mass appeal than puritanical embrace of religion. The time to act is now. The leaderships of both houses are old men who know nothing but war. But old men die. Younger more visionary leaders who forge their respective nations in the prism of human rights not theological canon can from inside their war torn land and from its vast Diaspora bring both peoples apart and then raise them up side by side together.

Section 5: An Intervention Blueprint

Walter Sebastian Adler & Yousef Bashir

21 April 2014

Introduction

Conflicts around the world today are fully shaped by the lasting machinations & legacies of the former colonial powers. Denial of that is revisionist and irrational. National interests and the economic dependencies fostered in that period have paved the way for the inhabitants of those former colonies to remain entrenched in deep ethnic conflict and lasting hatreds fueled by the ongoing proxy conflicts of the great powers, or economic considerations. US-Russian Cold War calculations repeatedly fueled the major Arab-Israeli Wars. Iranian-Israeli relations repeatedly utilize Palestinians, Kurds and Lebanese in their proxy engagements. Arab Spring uprisings will continuously bring to power regimes that are increasingly anti-West and anti-Israel.

Peoples marginalized and displaced by the process of colonization hold lasting grievances that in new wars will continue to trigger violent engagements. The ongoing tensions and currently intractable low grade violence between the Jewish and Palestinian communities is certainly more complex than colonialism yet far more immediate than distant wars and expulsions with ancient Babylon or Rome. Moving forward it is less vital that root cause be debated conclusively, but instead that the proximate causes are understood and acted upon to secure a lasting settlement. The mechanisms of which we believe are outside the normative nation state framework.

This analysis will propose the rationale and series of interlinked tactical interventions to be carried out in Israel Palestine that will break the intractable deadlock of the failed peace negotiations. It will highlight the combination of renewed multi-track diplomatic efforts that will in harmonization produce three viable confederated states; coexistence; as well as peace and economic development between various peoples involved. Most importantly it will showcase a new intervention theory called Parallel State; the Para-State approach to seemingly endless inter-ethnic conflicts.

Section One

An analysis of the problem

Historic Grievances & Immediate Threats

The seemingly innumerous problems with the so-called peace process are founded in the complete lack of agreement on how and when the conflict began; who allowed this process to occur and ultimately who currently supports its continuation. This rhetoric and historic revisionism contributes to the lack of meaningful dialogue and subsequent action. Via a MSTC rapid historical phase analysis we observe highly divergent reference points and alignments of modern grievance.

Jewish/Israeli Perception:

a) Slavery in Egypt b) Canaanite Conquest, c) First Hebrew Commonwealth, d) Babylonian Exile, e) Second Hebrew Commonwealth, f) Roman Occupation, g) Judeo-Roman Wars, h) Diaspora, i) Zionist Congressional Organizing, j) Shoah, k) Independence War, l) Sinai War 1956,  m) 1967 Six Day War,  n) 1973 Yom Kippur War o) 1982 Lebanon War, p) Intifada One, q) Oslo Process, r) Intifada Two, s) post 2005 Separation Barrier, t) 2008 Hezbollah War, u) Gaza War 2010, v) Post 2010 Intractability.

Palestinian Perception:  

Caliphate b) Ottoman Rule, c)Revolt of 1843 c) British Rule, d) 1948 Catastrophe, e) 1967 Occupation of West Bank and Gaza, f) Formation of PLO 1964 g)1967 Catastrophe h) Post-1967 Resistance Period, i) 1970 Black September Massacres in Jordan, j) 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War, k) Sabra-Shatilla Massacres, l) First Intifada One, m) Oslo, n) Second Intifada o) 2005 Hudna/ Apartheid Wall p) 2006 Hamas Electoral Victory/ Hamas/Fatah Civil Conflict q) 2010 Gaza War, r) post 2010 Intractability.

The contradictions of these clustered collective perspectives are virtually irreconcilable. But that is not as important as you may believe. We do not have to agree to a narrative only aims and indicators.

From the Palestinian historic narrative there occurred a series of grave injustices and failures of leadership that took place throughout Ottoman and British occupations. Working against their rightful existence in the state of Palestine; Arab, Turkish and English collaborators enabled a Jewish colonial presence which by the end of the Second World War; facilitated by Euro-American guilt over German atrocities allowed mass Jewish immigration to occur into historic Palestine which had not had any substantial Jewish population since 73 CE (Laqueur, 1972). Between 1936 and 1939 the Palestinians organized a large revolt against the British commission’s recommendations to divide Palestine. Deborah J. Gerner in Encyclopedia of 20th Century Ethnic Conflict stated that;

“Initially the rebellion was nonviolent; however after a British commission recommended splitting Palestine the revolt flared again in a much more violent form”.

Following a series of provocations, ethnic cleansing and the military defeats of Arab armies; by January 1949 Palestine was literally wiped off the map in order to give birth to the State of Israel. For many Palestinians the source of the conflict goes back to the end of the First World War when Palestine was conquered from the dissolving Ottoman Empire by Great Britain and France which via the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided up the Arab world to ensure there spheres of interest.  During the same time period the Balfour Declaration was issued in Britain which promoted the idea of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Zionist political manipulations in the United States fueled by the calculations of the Cold War enabled the State of Israel to expand rapidly past the boundaries established by the United Nations in 1948. Following the event called “the Catastrophe” (Nakba); Israel enraged in rapid annexation of all of historic Palestine in 1967. A series of wars with its neighbors; a series of atrocities inside Israel and other nations; and a continuous brutal occupation is now further compounded by daily expansions of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and a state of total siege and blockade in the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip.

A commonly held perception is that the Europeans and Americans helped the Jews build a Zionist colony on their historic homeland (Hroub, p.37). In many cases they fled to Arab nations that reduced them to permanent internal refugees and others that massacred and expelled them. After being betrayed by the other Arab leaderships they were forced into an extended exile that continues to this day. The Americans, controlled by the Zionist Lobby will arm and support the Israelis no matter what human rights violations are committed (Hroub, p. 110). Currently, not only has every Arab nation for the most part failed to help them or defeat Israel; the Americans have invaded Iraq and removed their primary ally Saddam Hussein, their political leadership has been completely divided between Hamas (Gaza Strip) and Fatah (West Bank); and Israeli settlement expansions in the West Banks are proceeding; displacing Palestinians from whatever bi-national settlement potentially is achieved (over 9% of West Bank has been settled).

The Jewish-Israeli historic narrative is around two thousand years longer in collective formation; reinforced by the annual retelling of the narrative within the religion itself. To Jews this is their historic homeland, given to them by their god after slavery in Egypt; from which they were exiled after three violent wars with the Roman Empire (66-135 CE). In the collective memory of the Jewish people they then lived in a series ghettos within Muslim and European countries that ended regularly with pogroms, rape, robbery, deportation and eventually the genocide of the Shoah (Holocaust) between 1939-1945.  Inspired and motivated by the global Zionist movement and its founder Theodor Herzl; Jewish gradual colonization of Palestine had begun in the 1840’s but rapidly accelerated following the first world war in 1919. From the Jewish Zionist prospective Palestine was the only viable homeland for the Jewish people though settlements were offered and discussed in Sinai, Dominican Republic, Cyprus, Uganda and Argentina. The Zionist Movement had succeed by 1943 in purchasing nearly 400,000 acres, amounting to around 6% of the land for an estimated $560,000,000 paid to corrupt Ottoman officials, absentee Palestinian landlords living abroad and peasant Fellahin (Laquer/Rubenberg). This provoked a massive Palestinian Uprising in 1936-1939 which was crushed by the British Colonial Authority shattering prematurely any nascent resistance to the Zionist program. Jews entered the Allied forces en masse during both WW1 & 2 and gained military training throughout the war while virtually all Palestinians abstained from military service and some of Palestinian leadership openly collaborated with the Nazis (Khalidi, p.115).

It was of course vitally important to these planners that Zionism and later Israeli forces first overcome Palestinian resistance and then clear as much of the country as they could of its Palestinian population. They understood perfectly that otherwise the Jewish State called for by the partition plan would not have control of its internal lines of communication. Most importantly, they understood the well-established demographic calculus of Palestine, which meant that without ethnic cleansing, the new state would have nearly as many Arabs as Jews. But least as important as this objective was the driving forward and establishing of strategic lines on which the Arab armies could be confronted should they enter Palestine as they did on May 15^th, 1948 (Khalidi, p.127).

In 1948 United Nations Resolution 181 divided Palestine into two new, highly unreasonable states; one Jewish and the other Palestinian Arab but this was rejected completely by the surrounding Arab countries who quickly decided to go to war with Israel which defeated them easily despite the mythology of six Arab armies v. Jewish partisans and holocaust survivors; it was militarily comparable match (Morris, 2009).  For the Jewish people this was a historic victory and the beginning of modern Israel while for most Arabs and Palestinians this was an unjustified post-colonial war; an illegal partition of the land and a humanitarian catastrophe. Subsequent Arab-Israeli wars in 56, 67, 73, 82 and 08 only made the Palestinian political question less likely to be answered and expanded the size of the Zionist state. Egypt and Jordan pressured Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip not to challenge the status quo or engage in acts of resistance against Israel (Gerner). Palestinians were massacred by Arab armies in Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (1982).  Palestinians lacked any unifying, effective leadership for decades and lacked any formal political representation until the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964. In addition to this all most of the Palestinian leaders were expelled, assassinated or exiled once the Israeli 1967 occupation of Gaza and West Bank began.

According to UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) nearly 5,000,000 Palestinians are still refugees while the State of Israel has been fully recognized by all of the Global North and most non-Muslim nations. To the Palestinians this created a lasting hatred and feeling of betrayal by the international community but most importantly created a feeling of hostility towards the new citizens of Israel who were celebrating their victory and freedom at the expense of another nation.

The widespread Israeli belief is that without US military support and a strong military-industrial complex they will be annihilated by their Muslim neighbors. The Palestinians have never been an existential threat to Israel as compared to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran, but they remain the most serious catalyst of organized political violence against Israel. Ultimately whatever political color Israelis hold three deep resentments will shape any peace process: A) there are dozens of Muslim States and this is the only Jewish State; their historic persecution necessitates a national home. B) Whatever they have done to the Palestinians is pale in comparison of what other groups have done in the same situation and continue to do. C) If this is nothing resolved in the next forty years the “Arab-Israeli” population (of 1.6 million) will grow inside pre-1967 Israel to point where ensuring a “Jewish State” will become impossible to maintain.

Critiques of UNRWA state that it fosters dependency, lacks fiscal transparency and is unusual as the UN’s only ethno-specific refugee organization (Berkowitz, 2008).

Romirowsky and Spyer in How UNRWA creates dependency state,

“As it stands, the self-perpetuating bureaucracy of UNRWA is one of the central factors offering day jobs to members of terror groups, propping up Palestinian dependency and perpetuating the myths and falsehoods about Israel which help prevent a solution to the conflict.”

To many Palestinians UNRWA is their only reliable existing para-state (Kimmerling/Migdal, p. 160). War failed, Intifada 1 & 2, Oslo failed; Track 1 & 2 has also failed. The result is a de facto one-state (or three-state) solution which is an incubator for a wider longer violence. Multi-track diplomacy is about all levels of engagement working on conjunction as a system, but due to the unfeasible nature of the previous engagements; we are proposing a more radical intervention package without necessitating recognition of anyone’s states.

“This grisly inventory finds the total number of deaths in conflicts since 1950 numbering about 85,000,000. Of that sum, the deaths in the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1950 include 32,000 deaths due to Arab state attacks and 19,000 due to Palestinian attacks, or 51,000 in all. Arabs make up roughly 35,000 of these dead and Jewish Israelis make up 16,000.

These figures mean that deaths in Arab-Israeli fighting since 1950 amount to just 0.06 percent of the total number of deaths in all conflicts in that period. More graphically, only 1 out of about 1,700 persons killed in conflicts since 1950 has died due to Arab-Israeli fighting.

Adding the 11,00g0 killed in the Israeli war of independence, 1947-49, made up of 5,000 Arabs and 6,000 Israeli Jews, does not significantly alter these figures.

In a different perspective, some 11,000,000 Muslims have been violently killed since 1948, of which 35,000, or 0.3 percent, died during the sixty years of fighting Israel, or just 1 out of every 315 Muslim fatalities. In contrast, over 90 percent of the 11 million who perished were killed by fellow Muslims.” (Pipes, 2007)

After tallying the extent of specific civilian casualty inter-communal violence between Palestinians and Israelis since hostilities began in 1948 a total combined loss of life has been estimated at wide range between 14,000 to 21,500 civilians.

Section Two

An analysis and justification of an intervention(s) to address the problem(s), including theories of change to use.

Our underlying analysis is that Western imposed peace negotiations have completely failed, Palestinian statehood is inevitable; and demographic realities inside of Israel make the continuation of a Jewish state impossible if the status quo is maintained. This intervention package to be coordinated by the Palestinian & Jewish diaspora. It is geared to reinvigorate meaningful dialogue, foster functional reliance and allow three viable administrative division within a Palestinian-Israeli Confederation based on violence cessation, recognition of each other’s territorial claims and freedom of movement & rights attainment within the three territories (Gaza, Pre-1967 Israel, and the West Bank).  

The four underlying theories of change are:

“Parastate Infrastructure”; the development of capacity via civil services, trade unions and social enterprises interlinking diaspora financing to community based organizations. Operating in a given nation wracked by failed state policies; a parallel state is built in the shadow of a failing one. This economic leverage is first utilized in the building the capability through Civil Society organizations to provide services to populations; then coordinating their functionality to mirror those attributed to best practices of developed countries. The Para State is build piecemeal out of CBS, SMO, NGOs and small businesses with a unified vision of human rights attainment for the communal identity they share. Successful demonstrations of Parallel State Development are the American Nation of Islam, the Kurdish national movement, the Irish Republican movement, the Bangladeshi mega “NGO” BRAC, Iranian built Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas and of course the Zionist Movement’s formation of the State of Israel.

“Trilateral cooperation” assumes triumvirate confidence building with full inclusion of Hamas, Fatah, and the Israeli Coalition government functioning as three cooperative administrative units assuming separate but coordinate jurisdiction over their zones of control. All confidence measures revolve on acceptance of Eight Core Agreements; 1) Israel’s’ right to exist in historic Palestine, 2) Palestine’s right to exist in modern Israel, 3) Agreement to a thirty year Hudna (ceasefire) that rewards security and development cooperation with a roll back of Israeli military presence to 1967 borders 4) Right to return of all foreign nationals with one Jewish or Palestinian grandparent to areas under respective tri-national control, 5) Palestinian (“Arab-Israeli”) populations centers inside pre-1967 Israel fall administratively under Palestinian Authority if 67% are Arab 6) Israeli settlement expansion freeze and 1 m3/ for 1m3 reciprocity of pre-1967 Israel in exchange for West Bank territory settled, 7) Bi-nationalization of Jerusalem  8) All political offices will be held based on democratic election; the peace process is to be governed by human rights indicators & tri-state administration of Gaza, Israel & West Bank.  

“Multinationalization”; is economic and human rights centered development coupled with civil disobedience; utilizing battalions of foreign volunteers. Multi-nationalization is deliberate and strategic diversification of a project’s field team to recruit and include a composition of staff whereby harm directed against this staff is mitigated by their groupings of foreign nationals. This strategy plays directly to racist/ nationalist media tendencies and multiplies the “outsider Impact” of the field teams effort. Multi-nationalization is however completely subordinated to leadership directives of the CBOs the effort helps facilitate the impact of.  

“Functional Reliance”: formation of strategic and economic partnerships that involve multi-ethnic enterprises to build solidarity via functionally relying on the other ethnic group to co-lead, manage and serve in programs. It also involves mass inclusion of belligerent populations within ethno-heterogeneous civil services functionally relying on peace to ensure development.

Our intervention recommendations involve measured, scalable responses in the following categories based on threat levels corresponding to rights violations in the 3 categories of Symmetric Indicators to be outlined in the fourth section. For the sake of vast simplification of the algorithm findings matrix here are the primary intervention recommendations by category:

Interventions to be taken by Non-State Actors

Multi-nationalizing the conflict decreases impunity of violent reprisals. Increasing overall levels of Developed-nation volunteers serving in territories as well as Arabs serving in Israel is ideal especially during escalations of conflict.

Gaza blockade naval flotillas should be launched periodically but attempt to enter Gaza from international waters only in response to symmetric indicator based events. .  

Boycott, Divestment, Sanction campaigns directed against Israeli economic, educational and cultural sectors should be strengthened.

Refusals to serve in occupied territories and diversions to National Service should be encouraged. Mass Israeli dissident infiltration of National Service should mirror mass Palestinian infiltration of the UNRWA agencies.

Person-to-person correspondence campaigns increased. Social media ought to broadly utilized in order to increase the awareness of the other side’s perspectives and lives through a mass facilitation program.  

“Seeds of Peace” style camps and activities should be rapidly stepped up and further established in Cyprus, Egypt and Jordan. These camps should be seen as vital organizational training grounds for this effort.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli economic ventures should be encouraged especially activities that link asset ownership and management. Palestinians should switch to their own currency pegged to the Jordanian Dinar.

Palestinian populations in diaspora should be organized into Parastate administrative units. Politically and industrially organized and administered by either Hamas, Fatah or an emergent Party. All States that have since 1948 not recognized benefits of citizenship of Palestinian diaspora ought to be viewed as hostile to peace. Factions are urged to pursue annexation efforts of territory into a Greater Palestine.   

Mobilization of a Palestinian Lobby to harness Palestinian-American remittances and votes. This lobby like AIPAC must focus on all areas capable of social agency. It must mirror AIPAC’s tactics and organizational structure in every possible regard. It must also focus on reducing AIPAC monopoly of agency in regards to the Near East within the United States.

Occupational Annexes should never be excluded as they are based on precedent. Sykes Picot was the first precedent arbitrarily drawing up the borders of the region. Israel itself is of course the second occupying and annexing far beyond the 1948 agreed borders. Russia is the th third taking territory, basing soldiers there and annexing it via referendum. Valid occupational annexes include any territory bordering any of the three administrative zones Gaza, Israel, and West Bank containing a 67% majority population of Palestinians or Jews.

Interventions as Policy recommendations to State Actors

Recognition of Bi-partisan Palestinian State in exchange for recognition of Israeli Administrative control of pre-1967 borders excluding population centers with 67% Palestinian Arab majority. Further equalizing administrative land disputes proceed to equalize land holdings to 1m3/1m3, a 50/50 land and resource split involving trading taxation/ administration of Arab-Israeli population centers for Jewish Settlement in West Bank.

Settlement freezes/ and scheduled settlement turn-overs.

Prisoner amnesty for quarterly periods of violence cessation.

Israeli Development assistance in exchange for periods of violence cessation.

Institute full draft in Israel with enlargement of National Service to channel Arab-Israeli intuitional exclusion into capacity building via service in Gaza and West Bank.

Piecemeal, scheduled administrative turnovers proceed for periods of violence cessation.

Targeted kidnappings of soldiers are only to be traded one for one.

Scholarships for Palestinian students at Israeli universities.

Extension of Joint-Palestinian Israeli Civil Service inclusion.

Mashav will develop modules to teach Palestinians cooperative economic and organizational frameworks necessary for state capacity.

 Mashav and UNRWA will fund the creation of joint Palestinian-Israeli peacekeeping and emergency relief brigades and deploy them under the UN peacekeeping architecture.

 Joint Palestinian-Israeli kibbutzim and Moshaviim for collective living, industry and agriculture will be established in Gaza, West Bank, Israel proper and Sinai subsidized by American Jewish community, USAID, Qatar, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Long Term Conflict Intervention Recommendations:

Political/Diplomatic tools

• Outsider Mediation for implementation of localized programs.

• Coexistence-Coordination Offices established in each village, town and city.  

• Political Capacity and Aid assistance to all factions espousing peace and recognition.

• Hudna/Recognition/Normalization especially between Israel-Hamas; Israel-Iran, and Israel-Hezbollah.

• Human Rights Defense Missions increased inside of Syria along with continued non-military support for any Syrian factions that might recognize Israel.

• Dispute resolution mechanisms further established.

• Crisis Management Systems better implemented.

• Public Diplomacy/Pressure: U.S.A. must reduce military aid to Israel.

• Threat/Use of diplomatic sanctions: A regional arms embargo must be put in place to curtail weapons flow into a region that will be plagued by increasing civil unrest.

Legal/Constitutional tools

• Constitutional Reforms in place in both Israel & Palestine to better reflect Human Rights obligations.

• Formal power sharing mechanisms set in place to create a functional bi-partisan Palestinian State alongside an Israeli one.

• Human Rights monitoring must be carried out by outside multinationals.

• Police, judiciary, corrections capacity assistance must increase in Palestine.

Economic/Social tools

• Conflict-sensitive Israeli led Development Assistance via Mashav.

• Intergroup dialogue interactions stepped up on all four tracks.

• Restrictions on US financial flows.

• Conditional incentives/inducements: (debt relief, trade preferences, investment)

• Threat/Use of targeted economic sanctions (BDS): Although this has been viewed with controversy among countries like Israel and the USA but has received wide and major official and non-official support from many countries around the world such as England, Norway, Denmark, and others who imposed sanctions on Israeli banks that fund and have ties with the Israeli illegal settlements. We think that this is indeed an effective tool that can add more pressure on the Israeli refusal to accept and respect International Law but we also think that it can generate more awareness and more understanding among the public in Israel for example and not explaining the problems with an angry tone.

Military/Security tools

• Security guarantees including “Arab-Israeli” units of the IDF to help in security of West Bank and Gaza. Joint defense training between Israeli, Hamas, and Fatah fighters.

• Systematic Confidence-building measures

• Security Sector Reform: All Israelis and Palestinians to be drafted into either IDF or PDF (Palestinian Defense Force) regardless of ethnicity. Only way out universal draft will be enrolment in a revised National Service Corps to be radically expanded in scope to all civil services.

• Joint Israeli-Palestinian Military Observer/ Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Missions will be enhanced via the United Nations.

• Arms Embargoes will be encouraged between Russia and America to cut arms flow into the Middle East generally.

• Preventive Military/Police deployment will cease except by combined units. All Israeli security-intelligence forces will be pulled out of post-1967 borders except to facilitate settlement turn over.

• Threat of Force/Deterrence

Primary Resource Agreements:

Joint PA/Israeli control of Galilee water resource

Joint Administration of Hospitals and Universities

Doubling Israeli-Palestinian land mass via purchase/ annexation of Sinai and Transjordan

Palestinian control of Dead Sea

Security Parity (Demilitarization/ Arms transfers)

Israeli non-proliferation for Iranian non-proliferation

Demilitarized Golan (to be included in the Palestinian State)

Demilitarized Gaza Strip (to be connected to West Bank via a security corridor and train tunnel)

Demilitarization South of Litany River and North of Kishon River

Return of Sheba Farms to Lebanon

Golan Heights transfer to PA control

Implementation of a 2 Child maximum per family

Extension of West Bank PA down to Gulf of Aqaba

Triple Seacoast of PA (Akko, Gaza City, and a third site build between Aqaba and Eilat)

4 Separate Courts, Civil and Religious; 2 per polity

Separate Knesset/ Palestinian Congress both based in East and West Jerusalem respectively.

Release of all Palestinian political prisoners

Right of Return respective and regulated, parity in returning numbers negotiated to return to respective zones of control.

EU to aid Palestine (infrastructure only)

US to aid Israel (infrastructure only)

Bedouin autonomous region in Sinai or population transfer to Palestinian zone.

Structural dual citizenship benefits (tax credits, work visas, health care, educational)

Dismantling the barrier walls

Reduction of Israeli arsenal in exchange for greater aid, (Aid for decommissioned weapons program).

Structural reform from Knesset Parliamentary system to tri-territory Representative Democracy.

Section Three

Suggested partnerships that are required to develop the intervention(s) and how these might be obtained.

The concept of a Para-State is an intermediate tactic of development coupled with resistance to human rights violation meant to forge realities on the ground leading up to the changing of borders and setting of policies of governments the Parallel State exists beside. To achieve any of of our “unrealistic” demands and programs we of course accept that one cannot ignore the hard line of either side which is holding power. Fatah is awash with collaborators, opportunists and corrupt officials. Hamas is led by Islamist fundamentalists. Likud, Kadima and even Avodah have entrenched elite interests to serve.

Ceasefire and Separation

There comes a time beyond outsider pontification, and insider political imagination when the forces on the ground most come to the realistic calculus that the end game for this conflict must be in separation before there can be meaningful coexistence. As we have outlined, militarily neither side’s strategy proves effective at eliminating the other, and certainly hardens the resolve of both confessions. Historically, each has a vague (and at the same time existentially immediate) claim to this land. Religious zeal aside there is overwhelming archeological proof of this being the historical Hebrew homeland, and suffice to say the Dome of the Rock occupies its place as Islam’s third holiest site. From a human rights perspective the Palestinian people, cognizant of a nationalist identity or not, were living on this land for at least the last 1,930 years.

The mindset and values of Israeli Jewish society and Palestinian Muslim society are so different and mutually exclusive as to render a vision of bi-national statehood tenable only in the most disconnected and unrealistic of minds (Morris, p.187).

Surely Israeli society is an incredibly diverse one in both ethnicity and political perspective. It has vast potential to be an exporter of development, medicine and technology to the developing world once it can divest itself from this ongoing war. Surely Palestinian fundamentalisms and Hebrew fundamentalisms are not the desired ends of either peoples, but a part and parcel result of this war.

To end the war we must separate the combatants, but this task must fall upon the shoulders of the hardliners; the Revisionists and Hamas who can at present muster the political will to take this bold step. To cantonize and ghettoized the Gaza Strip and West Bank into non-viable micro-states will not end this conflict. The separation must be implemented and development must follow.

Hamas has in recent years undergone an incremental process of political integration, a process mostly ignored by the movement’s foes and detractors. It has displayed political and tactical moderation, including keeping unilateral ceasefires until June 2006, abandoning the claim to mandatory Palestine and accepting a two-state solution comprising the 1967 territories. Hamas has not, however, complied with external pressures to abandon armed resistance, disarm and recognize Israel. The main reason for doing so is not only ideological, but strategic: complying with the demands would leave Hamas without any credible sanctions in the final-status negotiations that until now have been the only scenario for a lasting peace (Knudsen & Ezbidi, p. 204).

We are at the brink. The demographic reality is that within twenty years there will be an equal number of Arabs and Jews occupying the territorial space of Palestine, this will not broad well for either Israel’s commitment to democracy or the Palestinians already diminished human rights. The willingness of Iran to fuel violence by proxy as well as the total lack of dialogue and cultural exchange within the Middle East between the Muslim nations and the third Hebrew commonwealth leaves no lasting avenues for human exchange. Vultures swoop over Palestine and both the Christian and Muslim world have explicitly demonstrated their zeal to use both Jew and Palestinian as pawns in a game.  If Hamas will not put down its guns (and who could rationally expect them to) or acknowledge the right of the Jews to occupy their land, then let us work with what they have offered for some time. The premise of Hudna: long term truce.

Hamas is silent about what happens when a notional long term Hudna signed with the Israelis comes to its appointed end. While Hamas’ leaders have left open the length of the term of the proposed Hudna, regarding this as subject of negotiation with the Israelis once they have accepted the principle, their general philosophy is that the future should be left up to future generations. It is usually assumed that a long term Hudna will probably last for a quarter of a century or more. That is viewed as too long a time for anyone now to predict what may happen afterward. There will always be a possibility that the Hudna will come to a premature end because of a breach. If that were to occur, it would be unlikely that the breach would come from the Hamas side. This is for the simple reason that it is a religious obligation on the Islamic side to honor such an agreement until the end, once made, unless violated by another party. Should the Hudna last until the prescribed date, one scenario is that those in charge then will simply negotiate a renewal (Azzam, p.168).

Were some emerging, strong Israeli leaders able to the muster the will of their divided society to accept their sworn enemy Hamas as a partner in Hudna it might have lasting impacts that would shake the region to the core. The signing of such a truce need not happen on the Lawn of the White House or need be rewarded with some Nobel Prize. The proof of its worth would be in its results. The objective would be simple to grasp. The House of Israel and the House of Palestine have been for around one hundred years locked in bloody combat. To stop the war one need not peace, but instead the structural pursuit of lasting ceasefire coupled with a program to build two economically healthy nations with intertwined need.

Surely the Jewish radicals of the Kach underground and Gush Emunim would prefer a Jewish civil war to a lasting partition, surely no one on either side wishes to give an inch. But this program is an inch by inch reclamation coupled with one more territorial reality. Other than Egypt, Israel and Iran what county in the region has any claim to historical borders other than those imposed by Sykes-Picot. That is to say that the Palestinian Diaspora must surely be aware the extent to which the Arab regional powers owe them, have failed them and have despised them.

A Hudna, signed by a Zionist government and Hamas would be an act of covenant not international relations. To Hamas it would be a holy act and an existential necessity to prove the validity of Islamism in Palestine. To Memshala Israel it would mean a settlement of a prolonged drain on its nation’s coffers and moral and an opening of its society to the developing world. As per the Blueprint, not the Road Map: Jerusalem would be bi-nationally controlled (the Palestinians would maintain control over the Temple Mount, Christian and Muslim Quarters and the East of the City as AL Quds). The West Bank and Gaza Strip would be supplemented by additional territories in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Sinai; settlements would be exchanged for Arab towns and land would be purchased (or simply seized) from neighboring countries unwilling to endorse this lasting truce. Refugees abroad would have the right to return to newly constituted Palestine and those with specific claims to land and property inside Israel proper would be bought out and compensated. Hamas would have free reign to Islamize Palestine in so far as it did so within a Democratic sphere and allowed secular space in its new society. But, even if it refused to moderate its zeal for religion, it would be empowered by Israel to dismantle the armed forces of all other factions and be the sole army on the ground.

         The messy business of a population transfer must begin immediately at the offset of implementation. It goes without saying that Israel’s Arab Israeli population will seek and lobby to have their Palestinian cake and eat it too as it were. That is to say some will find it far easier to live as second class citizens in a multi-ethnic Hebrew dominated commonwealth, then as forced participants in a newly independent, Shar’iah dominated Palestinian nascent state. Suffice to say these are the painful realities of survival. Israel cannot maintain even a minute percentage of 20% Arab population within its borders; so-called Arab Israelis, Bedouin, and any Druze unwilling to serve in the armed forces will find themselves on the other side of the line.

         This process must proceed in staged evacuations one for one; one settlement block for one Arab Israeli town, there will be misery, separation anxiety, and great soul searching as to moral justification and long term finality of peace. There will be obvious Palestinian anxiety on absorbing a largely secular, more affluent Arab-Israeli middle class, and finalizing the loss of their historic territory to the Zionists. The Israeli public will surely grieve the infighting of evacuating 600,000 plus settlers from the West Bank and ceding any claim to East Jerusalem, “Judea” and “Samaria”. But it is the very homes of the settlers, their infrastructure, their roads, their settlements into which the larger Arab Israeli evacuees must be placed.

         We reiterate that this process will not be easy, nor will it be quickly accomplished. There will be resistance on the part of the settlers, anticipatively armed resistance; and there will be obvious international objection to the forced deportation of the Arab-Israeli into the newly created Gaza-West Bank Palestine.

         The vital stage must be to insure the Israeli coalition government and Hamas dominated PA work together to implement this transfer and maintain Hudna with the realization that territorial integrity of their respective nations is vital.

         It is irrelevant as to whether Hamas recognizes Israel’s right to exist, or if the final treaty implementing the separation plan is one of ‘peace’ or instead ‘Hudna’. It is irrelevant if the two sides agree to a 10 year truce, a 60 year truce, or a 100 year truce. Phase 1 is separation in its most utter form, the sealing of each side behind their lines. As the Jew and Arab are separated from each other’s forced and hateful embrace the iron wall must be strengthened. The separation barrier must be built taller and its gates must be locked on both sides until the time is correct. For in the period of Hudna there must arise a new generation who does not remember the war or the blood spilled in repetition.

         The common media adage suggests that the Arab world is particularly hostile to democracy. In virtually all but a single regional state a cruel military oligarchy rules with a junta and an iron fist. Surely, second to Israel the greatest acknowledged enemy of the Arab masses are their own governments. However, in both Israel and occupied Palestine the Palestinian Arabs have repeatedly demonstrated a zeal for both democratic process and a commitment to civic society. Although the election of the Hamas government was a seemingly critical blow to the trampled peace process, it has not been argued that this was not a supervised and legitimate expression of Palestinian democracy. Within Israel itself the Arab parties and the 1.3 million Arab-Israeli Palestinians participate in the regions only democracy, within the Jewish State.

         We are not dealing with howling mullah unfamiliar with Western ideas of statecraft. The BluePrint as a plan is flexible and staged in its intricate redrafting of the Middle Eastern Map, its specifics are for another treatise at another time. Paramount to the survival of both people’s is a rational acknowledgment that they have failed for nearly 100 years at both peace and war. Surely some of the responsibility for rebuilding the Palestinian nation falls on the oil oligarchies and the European Union, just as surely does America have a long term relationship with Israel. But, before any realistic mobilization of these respective mini-states can be used to demonstrate Democratic Islamism and Zionist Universalism respectively; they must stop the war.

         It has been found that social movements like those which are responsible for the modern concepts of Israel and Palestine thrive on ‘imagined community’, strictly defined identity, and symbols of some historical Golden Age. When coupled with religion a social movement has the ability to draw from a deep well of support and sustain a struggle indefinitely.

         The acronym for Hamas translates to the word Zeal. There was once a group of Hebrew revolutionaries in the year 66 CE that carried the same name in their war with an occupying power the Roman Empire. Their faction, the Zealots and Sicarii carried out merciless acts of terrorism against their own people and the Roman occupiers. The Hebrew people are ‘stiff necked’ the Torah says, prone to stubborn arrogance as well as religious fervor.  I am not a man of peace, but a man of pragmatism. If on this wide earth the Hebrew and Palestinian people have found no meaningful source of shelter and security for their respective kind; if locked in bloody struggle the sins of Europe and the sins of Arab oligarchy are channeling both out houses to cosmic, unending war; then we must separate and do so quickly.

         If in a simple ten year Hudna both Houses can be made relatively politically homogeneous and their peoples can, uninterrupted by siege and war build two nations, side by side. Then one day, as each subsequent Hudna is renewed the fundamentalists on both sides will find their grasp weakened, they will find blue jeans and art museums are more to the mass appeal than puritanical embrace of religion. The time to act is now. The leaderships of both houses are old men who know nothing but war. But old men die. Younger more visionary leaders who forge their respective nations in the prism of human rights not theological canon can from inside their war torn land and from its vast Diaspora bring both peoples apart and then raise them up side by side together.

What factions influence the ongoing conflict?

Israeli/ Jewish:

Sabra Ashkenazi Elite in Avodah/ Likud/ Kadima

American Jewish Diaspora via AIPAC umbrella

Sephardic Elite

Ultra-Orthodox Parties/ Sects

Russian-Israeli leadership/ Israel Betanyahu

Mizrahi Jews

Ladino Jews

Druse

Ethiopians

Bedouins

Non-Jewish Migrant workers

Non-Jewish African refugees

Palestinian/Arab/Iranian

Fatah (West Bank Palestinian Elites)

Hamas (Gaza leadership)

Palestinian Left Wing

“Arab-Israeli” Palestinians

Palestinian Euro-American Diaspora

Jordanian Palestinians

Palestinians in Syria/ Lebanon/ Iraq /Egypt

Iranian Revolutionary Guard

Hezbollah

The Core Track 1 Parties are obviously the State of Israel (Likud & Avodah), the Palestinian parties Fatah (discluding still Hamas); the United States, Russia, the European Union, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League. The core parties to implement Parastate Strategies however are the dissident and opposition parties that make up the adversarial political culture on both the Israeli and the Palestinian side in country and diaspora, the political construction on both sides have shown to add more complications and challenges in the face of finding any peaceful resolutions to the conflicts over the years via Track 1 & 2 because they revolve around intractable elite actors. On the Israeli side Israel is widely considered as one of the few democracies that exist in the Middle East region if not the only one. The political system in Israel is based on a multi-party participation in the Knesset which has 120 seats. The politics of Israel is full mix of right wing, left wing, center, and religious parties; but the current Likud government led by Netanyahu is the most conservative in Israeli history. There are a number of parties that represent the Arab population of Israel but such parties and other minority parties such Meretz, Balad, United Arab List, Hadash have limited seats in the Knesset.

There is more however to the Israeli politics as there groups who play a major role in the Israeli politics and it influences it a great deal such as the Israeli lobby in the United States AIPAC and other groups that help and promote to finance and help build the illegal settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before 2005. The politics in Israel can be quite complicated and hard as the Prime Minister  cannot act alone without the support and consent of the parties that are part of any political coalition. For example right now Prime Minister Netanyahu has been under heavy pressure from his religious allies in the Knesset and who played a major role in his win of 31 win seats in the parliament making it difficult for him to go ahead and make and deals with the Palestinians for example that could enable and help the “peace process” move right ahead.

For the Palestinians on the other hand it is quite different, since the removal of the Palestinian people and the UN mandated “State of Palestine” in 1948, politics among the Palestinians did not see the light until 1964 when the Palestinian Liberation Organization was established. Yasser Arafat who was born in the Gaza Strip, Khan Younis was elected chairman later that year making himself a lifelong representative on behalf of the Palestinian people and for the Palestinian cause. The PLO also engaged in military operations against Israel and other Arab regimes.

An important faction of the Palestinian politics is Hamas, a party that is enjoys a wide support from many Palestinian factions especially those among Palestinian who reside in refugee camps which make up the majority of the population in Gaza Strip for example. The party was founded by Sheik Ahmed Yassin who was viewed by Israel as fully peaceful and in fact Hamas was allowed and supported by Israel as Israel saw that the sole enemy of Israel was the secular nationalist party of Fatah. There are more parties that emerged throughout the Palestinian territories like the Third Way, The Future, Palestine Democratic Union, and Palestine Forum launched by Palestinian businessman Munib al-Masri. Much of the Palestinian political system only came through to the scene in the last 10 years while before it was the PLO and essentially the 1980’s were Hamas began to become Fatah’s main rival.

It is important to highlight that most of the parties involved receive support from outside parties. Hamas was supported by Israel at first then as its political agenda became to be more threatening to Israel it found support from countries that are considered enemies by Israel such as Iran and even countries like Saudi Arabia and most recently Qatar, one of the biggest donors and supporters of Hamas today. The same applies to Fatah, the primary party emerging from PLO that struggled ever since its creation by the Arab League to find a home as the organization had been forced to relocate from a number of countries either by international pressure promoted by Israel or by hosting Arab countries.

Many positive and negative changes happened since the beginning of the conflict in 1948. A major and notable change is the rise of Israeli human right groups that promote justice and peace for the Palestinian people as such groups did not appear when Israel was established for example and at the same time many Palestinian organizations that promote peace and co-existence have emerged recently as they also did not appear during war times with Israel and emerged increasingly after the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords which is so far the biggest positive change that took place between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Before 1993 Israel has always defined the PLO as one that is responsible for “terrorist attacks” against Israeli targets in Israel and outside of Israel. And for the PLO and the Palestinian the idea of signing peace agreements with Israel was never an idea to be taken with much seriousness. This is a big positive change that added many positive points to the Palestinians and the Israelis at the same time as it increased and made a new kind of hope that perhaps and despite all the complications the Palestinians and the Israelis can still find a way to make true peace and live side by side in co-existence and respect. Also relevant are the New Historians; Israeli academics challenging long held beliefs about events within the context of the conflict.

The first Palestinian elections that took place in 2005 was also a major change as it showed a strong sign of the Palestinian readiness to run state and civil institutions sending a strong and powerful message to the world that it was time to help the Palestinian gain their right of a state. Unfortunately this message was negatively received by the International community and Israel as the major winner of such elections was the organization of Hamas and eventually leading to a full isolation of the organization and any decisions made by its government. In fact many of its democratically elected officials were simply arrested by the Israeli army. This lead to a major division among the Palestinians making it more difficult for any unity that can run a state if any and more sanction imposed by Israel especially on the Gaza Strip. Also after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the assassination the of the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin by Jewish extremists was a major blow to the peace process as it set the Oslo agreements in another direction that eventually lead to its collapse and the Palestinians uprising once against the occupation in Gaza and the West Bank. The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 also played a major role in the politics among the Palestinians as the Fatah militias gradually began to lose control over the strip allowing the Hamas forces to eventually force them out of the strip and take over the governance of the Strip leaving the Palestinians under two governments one in the West Bank and one in the Gaza Strip leaving Israel as a clear winner of such division as it became easy for the Israeli propaganda to argue that Palestinian lack for ability to manage and run a state on their own.

Effect of Third Parties

Third parties have played a big role in the conflict but unfortunately so far without much effectiveness because of client-patron relationship between American and Israeli. The uncanny relationship between Israel and the United States has hampered the US’s ability to serve as a so-called neutral mediator.

The United States has mixed interest with its efforts to make peace in the Middle East making it lose credibility not only among the Palestinians but also among the Israelis. For example, the US quickly condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait while ignoring the obvious occupation of the Palestinian territories by the Israeli army. The United States played a major role in the birth of the Oslo Accords and the peace between Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. Russia and recently the European Union have played an important role in the management of the conflict but unfortunately with not much success due to the Israeli refusal of obeying international resolutions carried out by organizations such as the United Nations. Or the Russian support for the Syrian government in the vile Civil War no ongoing.

The role of mediation is essential to resolve this situation and to implement the broad package of interventions we are recommending. The superpowers have taken the role of the mediator over the years and since the 1948 war between Israel and the Arab States. It is important to understand that at least one side of the fighting groups would still find many reasons to think that the parties playing the role of mediation may have a highly biased, being biased can jeopardize any creation of an honest peace talk that aims to a lasting peace between Arabs and Jews.

To successful bring peace is not ever a matter of negotiations, but instead of the collective of the communities at war. Since elite interests in both Israel and Palestine so color this discourse we resolve that the Para-State will draw its operational strength from a variety of factions in Israel, Palestine and the Diaspora which do not feel bound to entrenched interests of the old rules of the game. They need not share ideology or end game view; instead three things hold this alliance of partnered organizations together: 1) understanding that the survival of both peoples relies on immediate resolution; 2) that state failure will be rectified with para-state tactics, and 3) to obtain the 8 core agreements and meaningful coexistence violence cessation via a Hudna and separation communities into functional administrative units is more relevant than high minded notions of peace.  

Primary Organizational Partners:

As was demonstrated in the First 1987 Intifada and the Israeli Social Justice Demonstrations of 2011 there is a great deal of internal dissent within both communities that can be mobilized outside of the major power blocs and parties. These are the groups that we would involve in the early coalition to form the terms of the network applying Para-State strategies.

Peace Now (Shalom Achshav):  is the largest Israeli SMO with the goal of promoting a viable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict utilizing mass mobilization and policy  advocacy. They believe in Jerusalem as “two-capitals for two States”, the viability of land swaps, dismantling settlements which it views the key existential long term threat to state of Israel and Palestine.

Seeds of Peace: The group was founded in 1993 and was in presence of the signing of the Oslo Accords at the White House. The main idea of Seeds of Peace is to allow the future leaders of Palestine, Israel, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cyprus, and other countries that experience conflict and ethnic disputes. It’s main program comes through the Seeds of Peace International Camp in the state of Maine, USA. Where teenagers from almost 27 countries are given a life changing experience in which they are able to interact with one another away from the conflict zone in order to provide them with a unique chance to see the world together from a coexistence point of view.

Hadash (The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality); is a Jewish and Arab socialist political party in Israel with four seats in Knesset.

Meretz is the largest of the left-wing, Zionist, social-democratic political parties with the greatest degree of electoral success (with 12 seats held b/t 1992-1996 and 6 seats currently). It was the result of 1992 merger of leftist Ratz, Mapam, and Shinui. The party emphasizes a two-state solution, social justice, human rights, freedom of religion.

Al-Haq: is an independent Palestinian human-rights organization founded in 1979 and based in Ramallah. Its main purpose and mission is to monitor and document human-rights violations by all parties involved in the conflict, it also provides regular reports on human right violations as well as research and studies the are related to the conflict.

B’Tselem: It was founded in 1989 and its main purpose is to monitor all the human rights violations that take place within the Palestinian Territories by multi-nationalizing the conflict with foreign volunteers. It also promotes for more peace efforts within the state of Israel. They have been very effective in developing a model for development coupled with non-violent resistance inside of Palestine.

International Solidarity Movement (ISM): is a Pro-Palestinian Rights organization founded by Israelis and Palestinians that works to resist the occupation peacefully and what they view as the long and unjustified oppression of the Palestinian people by what they view as the apartheid state of Israel. It was founded in 2001 and it’s main aim is to strengthen the Palestinian non-violent resistance by utilization of multi-national volunteers for development programs and non-violent resistance.

The New Israel Fund (NIF) is a U.S.-based non-profit organization established in 1979 which describes its aim as social justice and equality for all Israelis. It is credited with seed-funding “almost every significant cause-related progressive NGO in Israel”. Since its inception the fund has provided over US $250 million to more than 900 organizations. NIF states that while its position is that “Israel is and must be a Jewish and democratic state” it says it was “among the first organizations to see that civil, human and economic rights for Israeli Arabs is an issue crucial to the long-term survival of the state. Its “activist arm” Israeli NGO Shatil will be vital to this effort.

This list does not even begin to scratch the surface of the opposition movements in both communities, merely to provide a departure point from the Hamas/Fatah & Likud/Avodah leadership “consensus”.

Section Four

A process for Monitoring and Evaluating the success of the intervention.

We will plan to utilize an advanced hybrid conflict monitoring tool to track our work in Israel Palestine. Via the cumulative work of three coordinated, multi-nationalized teams; a “FAST” monitoring team, a “Harm/Benefit” intervention team advising interventions on the ground, and a “MSTC” research team in a secure location removed from conflict directing policy advocacy toward outside stakeholders and manipulating the public via the media; we will apply M&E to our interventions.

All three sections of this team are vital to comprehensive and meaningful analysis guiding targeted intervention. M&E operatives are to be non-politically aligned, human rights oriented coordinating directly with local staffs in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Cyprus. There will not be a centralized base of country operations except in Greece. A policy advocacy office will be established in Washington D.C.

Swiss “FAST” will be used for predictive trending, CARE “Benefits/Harm Handbook” to rationalize intervention and “Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts” (MSTC) for long term contextual planning.  Rather than identify one and invalidate others for approach we seek to make a base line conflict analysis using a fusion of three. None of them are complete enough for field level practitioners to comprehensively offer meaningful intervention solutions. But each offers possibility in hybrid for definitive action to interdict mass violence.

All Interventions supported with Information & Intelligence. That means that all participating partner organizations are incentivized via transparent data sharing and mutual aid based resource sharing agreements. It means that hundreds of small CBO, SMO, NGO, trade unions, religious groups and parties are cooperating and coordinating action on the same network. Events are interpreted using FAST and interventions are recommended via BHH. All interventions are monitored using universal human rights and supported with hard data.

Tool: FAST

“Rapid Interpretation of Meaningful Data”

Application purpose of FAST: An office staff is set up in Greece to monitor the following communications data coming out of the region. Their objective is to acquire qualitative data to determine “root, proximate, and intervening factors that can lead to the outbreak of a violent conflict or shape an existing conflict” and acquire quantitative data based on daily event indicators.

The tool allows a trained bi-national data collection team to selectively analyze big data trending from a) internet reports from factional monitoring groups, b) news/social media content from institutions of influence by faction c) monitor civilian radio communications in zones, d) collate incoming first hand field reports to flag indicators based on conflict variables.

  Qualitative data methods: Arabic/Hebrew/Farsi language news/social media; reports from leading CBO monitoring groups; Benetech open source reports; data triangulation via UN and NGO reports; Palestinian & Israeli governmental data.

Primary Root: Physical integrity of bi-national territory.

Quantitative factors measurements: the following are primary tracking indicators. # Instances of mass violence reflected via hospitalizations/ reported casualties. # Instances of arrest. Weekly prison population. # of demonstrations/ funeral processions in approximate participating numbers. # targeted assassinations quarterly. # exchanges of fire with casualties. # Suicide attacks/Rocket attacks. Settlement expansion by m3. $ US aid/remittances to both sides civilian/ military per quarter. Quantity # of multinationals present in occupied territories. Quarterly demographic reviews.

Assumptions: Presence of bi-lingual, bi-national data analysis team. Operational relationship with understood mutual aid agreements with monitoring agencies based in Gaza, Israel, West Bank and United States. Open channels of communication with all major factions. Aggregate software to recommend daily threat levels and trend annual data in means that as politically useful for the peace process. All operational imperatives meet two decisive bottom lines; a) violence cessation and b) the right of both peoples to exist within the territory of Palestine within three administrative units; Gaza, Israel and West Bank as a confederated entity.

Resource Implications/ Availability: Office staff of 24 staff/ 24 volunteers to utilize tool 24/7 based in Greece. Regional administrative bases in Gaza, Jerusalem, & Nablus. Strategic Autonomous Partner Action Organizations in every population center above population 25,000 capable of monitoring and actionable effect.

Conflict intervention recommendations: The FAST team in Greece will issue daily reports to all allied Partner Organizations; make weekly ‘process threat’ advisories; hold monthly web briefings on findings and trends, and issue quarterly summaries directly to the communications/ diplomatic representatives of all Israeli/Palestinian/American Jewish factions. It will issue twitter and text message alerts in the event of imminent hostilities to all subscribers. It will maintain clear line of communication open between a) Hamas leadership, b) Fatah leadership, c) the Israeli party in power/ the 2^nd and 3^rd largest Israeli parties by seat in Knesset d) AIPAC e) U.S. State Department.    

Intervention recommendations will proceed via three levels. A) Public Address via mass advisories, b) Partnership Network Alliance and 3) External Factions of influence. All will embrace free association, autonomous action, explicit non-violence and human rights based approach via Benefit/Harms Handbook (BHH) Tool.

Tool: BHH

Application of Benefits/Harms Handbook (BHH) in “Approximate benefit/harm of threat & intervention:

Application purpose is to “to help actors take responsibility for the impact of their work on people’s human rights. It offers a set of simple interrogative tools that help staff think more deeply and effectively about the impacts of their work, and taking responsibility for both positive and negative impacts. It also provides a framework for monitoring potential negative or unintended impacts, as well as ways to mitigate these.”(Action Alert, 2004).

BHH is centered on weighing the impact of ones interventions though three delineated categories of existing human rights: Security Rights (RR), Civil/Political Rights (CPR), and Economic/Social/Cultural Rights (ESCR) along with their indicators, impacts and logical framework outcomes.

The Tool applies a Human Rights Based Approach to the logical framework model. It best used in local operations and not well suited for conflict management at large short term.

Assumptions: Participation of organized Palestinian and Israeli NGOs with indigenous bases of support to accurately conduct Human Rights centered DME of recommended interventions is imperative. Each is operating autonomously in our network with daily operations, budgeting, and operational protocols independent of central authority. Symmetric Indicators agreed to by all parties in conflict utilized throughout engagement. Demographic disaggregation of quantitative data based on religion, ethnicity, political faction utilized in FAST are withheld as this system centers on overall human rights implications.

A focused BHH application to an intervention is up to discretion of the faction or operational body recommended too. Non-discrimination/ protected categories are selectively applied as needed. Broad Segment data is used to guide operational discretion on intervention usage. For our system we will have provided training to each of our allies to apply a Logical Framework Approach algorithm to assess use of an intervention based of level of potential war violation (harm) with level of peaceful rights advancement (benefit). The fundamental process revolves around ‘Symmetric Indicators’ being agreed to within the analytical process.

“The practice of human rights actors in development reveals little consistency in the formulation of indicators. A bewildering diversity prevails, whether actors are focusing on duty-bearer compliance at the macro-level or on performance of planned development change at the micro-level. One overriding challenge is therefore how to establish greater consistency in the design of indicators to facilitate horizontal comparisons between countries or between state parties” (Human Rights Indicators, WB p.15)

Analytical Framework: Main Steps and Suggested process

BHH contains “tools for situation analysis (profile tools), impact assessment (impact tools), and project (re)design (decision tools)” (Action Alert, 2004). Profile tools allow us to achieve a human rights centered, balanced assessment of the perceived impact an intervention will achieve. The objective supply of data to aid the best practice implementation of the tool will be supplied by the FAST team making the intervention recommendation. BHH will allow the local operational leadership to act.

Consultation with local contacts in community, organizational review of the FAST data and individual partner organizations’ information & intelligence capacities will ultimately guide the decision to select the intervention.

 Guiding Questions / Pre-Arranged Indicators

Two quotes serve to illustrate the challenge and dilemma. In the OHCHR Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction, from 2003, it was argued that “most of the indicators proposed in these Guidelines are standard indicators of socioeconomic progress, although it should be observed that some human rights indicators, especially those relating to civil and political rights, do not usually figure in measures of socio- economic progress. Essentially, what distinguishes a human rights indicator from a standard disaggregated indicator of socio-economic progress is less its substance than (a) its explicit derivation from a human rights norm and (b) the purpose to which it is put, namely human rights monitoring with a view to holding duty-bearers to account. (OHCHR Indicators Draft)

The Profile, Impact and Decision sub-tools are each organized according to the three categories of human rights:

Security Rights (SR):

Right to a) life b) liberty c) security of person d) Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Civil/Political Rights (CPR):

Right to a) participate in public affairs, b) freedom of opinion/expression c) a fair trial

Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ESCR):

Right to a) the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health b) to adequate food c) to adequate housing d) to education e) to social security f) to work with paid leave & ability to form trade unions.

Special Protective Categories: a) women, b) children, c) migrant workers, d) demographic minorities.

The tool addresses the full action impact of rights holders/ duty bearers and the underlying causes of the potential harm or benefit via action. Actions, Attitudes and Artifices are the focus of the tool.

Human rights-based approach to relief and development presupposes that all people are entitled to certain minimum conditions of living with dignity (human rights). Relief and development organizations aim to help people achieve these conditions, thereby acknowledging their human responsibility to do so. This implies they take responsibility for the human rights impact of their work –whether positive or negative. Human rights are therefore the central criteria for analyzing the overall impact of a project.” (Action Alert, 2004.)

Quantitative/ Quantitative data measurements: Agreed to “Symmetric Indicators for Separation & Economic Development in Israel Palestine 2020.”  

Resource Implications/ Availability: Utilizing DME/BHH trained staff regional leadership assesses a threat and intervention response via 3 categories of benefit/harm to rights (Security, CPR, ESCR) posed by threat/event/action looking at its history-nature via PROFILE. That threat/event/action data is plugged into IMPACT TOOL algorithm which weighs the Benefit/Harm Level (potential rights violation) on a scale of 58. Each increment has corresponding intervention recommendations made via the DECISION. The 3 rights categories via benefits/harms are then again re-assessed and intervention is selected.

Conflict Intervention Recommendations: The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a multi-dimensional, ongoing low-intensity mass human rights violation that directly aids in fueling the instability of the region at large. One of the least understood aspects of the occupation and conflict has been the role of non-Israeli/ non-Palestinian multinational volunteers. Although comparatively low in overall casualty count compared to other global conflicts since the 1991 Palestinian Uprising a steady cohort of European, Latin American, American and Iranian volunteers have changed the overall strategic calculus.

Military intelligence officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps have highly enhanced Palestinian capacity for military action and terrorism since the first intifada. Multi-nationalization actions via the International Solidarity Movement have smuggled thousands of Euro-American volunteers to serve in Palestinian development capacities as well as human shields in the occupied territories. The combination of capacity to inflict harm, European non-violent foreign volunteers embracing the BDS movement, the Israeli embrace of structural apartheid via the Security Wall and take over Gaza by Hamas have all worked to reduce the levels of violence that peaked in the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Surely track 1, 2, 3, & 4 peace work has contributed as well.  

Our intervention recommendations involve measured, scalable responses in the following categories based on threat levels corresponding to rights violations in the 3 categories.

All interventions are reviewed once implemented via BHH Human Rights implications, impacts, and outcomes. Each side should adopt a 1 for 1 approach. Harm for Harm & Benefit for Benefit.  

Application of “Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts” (MSTC) to “place the intervention in a wider context of outcomes that secure rights obligations and make complex ethno-political phenomena understandable to outside parties.” Most of the problem/ provocation data was detailed in section one.

Primary Purpose: The MSTC Tool’s primary purpose is to render highly complicated, protracted ethnic conflicts understandable to internal and external actors.

Conceptual Assumptions

“Turbulent Contexts” refers to “Situations of Chronic Political Instability (SCPI).” This term expands the notion of ‘complex humanitarian emergency’ to reflect the long-term, cyclical and political nature of many of these contexts. It covers phenomena such as cyclical conflict, violence against civilians, political unrest, extreme polarization of wealth, natural disasters over a number of years, population displacement, and the need for humanitarian assistance. The emphasis is on the chronic and political nature of these contexts. (Action Alert, 2004) The goals is to analyze greed/ grievance as well as historic and current perceptions in light of complicated political science/ identity driven variables.

Conclusion

We do not possess the arrogance to assume that all or many of these specific tactical or policy suggestions will result in coexistence or peace in the immediate future. We shall no longer be beholden to the European constructed state system, to international law forced upon us from the outside or the so-called norms of diplomacy and state building. To advocate for a Para-State is a revolutionary act as it inherently rejects the salvation of either people lies in a government imposed solution. It also conquers the means to attain human rights from those that perpetually violate them.

This blueprint, like the ones we wish to see emerge in every nation where governments and elites trample on the rights of humanity is an emerging vision. One subject to the free association and consensus of those it effects; to be led by social movement organizations that do not believe in the particularism of national origin or identity or the exclusionary determinism forced upon them by either history or an outside party.   

A people without a land retuned to a land that still had people. This land has changed hands via blood and fire throughout the centuries and while “holy” to some and “strategic” to many; it is now the home of over 13 million people, Jews and Palestinians who respectively seek a solution that is based on Justice. That barrier to peace is never common people. It is always in the interests of those that rule to perpetuate war. The Parallel State’s aim is not one state, two state, three state; or to redraw a map that never reflected anyone’s wishes to begin with. Our aim is simple. Without violence or political office our aim is to seize control of those things that were our states obligation; freedom, security and development thus safe guarding our collective human rights without waiting for those that have trampled upon them of centuries to negotiate responsibly for their attainment.

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Appendix 1

Conflicts since 1950 with over 10,000 Fatalities (all figures rounded)*

1	40,000,000	Communist China, 1949-76 (outright killing, man-made famine, Gulag)
2	10,000,000	Soviet Bloc: late Stalinism, 1950-53; post-Stalinism, to 1987 (mostly Gulag)
3	4,000,000	Ethiopia, 1962-92: Communists, artificial hunger, genocides
4	5,400,000	Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa): 1967-68; 1977-78; 1992-95; 1998-present
5	2,800,000	Korean war, 1950-53
6	1,900,000	Sudan, 1955-72; 1983-2006 (civil wars, genocides)
7	1,870,000	Cambodia: Khmer Rouge 1975-79; civil war 1978-91
8	1,800,000	Vietnam War, 1954-75
9	1,800,000	Afghanistan: Soviet and internecine killings, Taliban 1980-2001
10	1,250,000	West Pakistan massacres in East Pakistan (Bangladesh 1971)
11	1,100,000	Nigeria, 1966-79 (Biafra); 1993-present
12	1,100,000	Mozambique, 1964-70 (30,000) + after retreat of Portugal 1976-92
13	1,000,000	Iran-Iraq-War, 1980-88
14	900,000	Rwanda genocide, 1994
15	875,000	Algeria: against France 1954-62 (675,000); between Islamists and the government 1991-2006 (200,000)
16	850,000	Uganda, 1971-79; 1981-85; 1994-present
17	650,000	Indonesia: Marxists 1965-66 (450,000); East Timor, Papua, Aceh etc, 1969-present (200,000)
18	580,000	Angola: war against Portugal 1961-72 (80,000); after Portugal’s retreat (1972-2002)
19	500,000	Brazil against its Indians, up to 1999
20	430,000	Vietnam, after the war ended in 1975 (own people; boat refugees)
21	400,000	Indochina: against France, 1945-54
22	400,000	Burundi, 1959-present (Tutsi/Hutu)
23	400,000	Somalia, 1991-present
24	400,000	North Korea up to 2006 (own people)
25	300,000	Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, 1980s-1990s
26	300,000	Iraq, 1970-2003 (Saddam against minorities)
27	240,000	Colombia, 1946-58; 1964-present
28	200,000	Yugoslavia, Tito regime, 1944-80
29	200,000	Guatemala, 1960-96
30	190,000	Laos, 1975-90
31	175,000	Serbia against Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, 1991-1999
32	150,000	Romania, 1949-99 (own people)
33	150,000	Liberia, 1989-97
34	140,000	Russia against Chechnya, 1994-present
35	150,000	Lebanon civil war, 1975-90
36	140,000	Kuwait War, 1990-91
37	130,000	Philippines: 1946-54 (10,000); 1972-present (120,000)
38	130,000	Burma/Myanmar, 1948-present
39	100,000	North Yemen, 1962-70
40	100,000	Sierra Leone, 1991-present
41	100,000	Albania, 1945-91 (own people)
42	80,000	Iran, 1978-79 (revolution)
43	75,000	Iraq, 2003-present (domestic)
44	75,000	El Salvador, 1975-92
45	70,000	Eritrea against Ethiopia, 1998-2000
46	68,000	Sri Lanka, 1997-present
47	60,000	Zimbabwe, 1966-79; 1980-present
48	60,000	Nicaragua, 1972-91 (Marxists/natives etc,)
49	51,000	Arab-Israeli conflict 1950-present
50	50,000	North Vietnam, 1954-75 (own people)
51	50,000	Tajikistan, 1992-96 (secularists against Islamists)
52	50,000	Equatorial Guinea, 1969-79
53	50,000	Peru, 1980-2000
54	50,000	Guinea, 1958-84
55	40,000	Chad, 1982-90
56	30,000	Bulgaria, 1948-89 (own people)
57	30,000	Rhodesia, 1972-79
58	30,000	Argentina, 1976-83 (own people)
59	27,000	Hungary, 1948-89 (own people)
60	26,000	Kashmir independence, 1989-present
61	25,000	Jordan government vs. Palestinians, 1970-71 (Black September)
62	22,000	Poland, 1948-89 (own people)
63	20,000	Syria, 1982 (against Islamists in Hama)
64	20,000	Chinese-Vietnamese war, 1979
65	19,000	Morocco: war against France, 1953-56 (3,000) and in Western Sahara, 1975-present (16,000)
66	18,000	Congo Republic, 1997-99
67	10,000	South Yemen, 1986 (civil war)

Sources: Z. Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century, 1993; S. Courtois, Le Livre Noir du Communism, 1997; G. Heinsohn, Lexikon der Völkermorde, 1999, 2^nd ed.; G. Heinsohn, Söhne und Weltmacht, 2006, 8th ed.; R. Rummel, Death by Government, 1994; M. Small and J.D. Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980, 1982; M. White, “Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century,” 2003.

Appendix 2

NINE TRACKS IN THE MULTI-TRACK SYSTEM

Track 1 – Government, or Peacemaking through Diplomacy. This is the world of official diplomacy, policy making, and peacebuilding as expressed through formal aspects of the governmental process.

Track 2 – Nongovernment/Professional, or Peacemaking through Conflict Resolution. This is the realm of professional nongovernmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by non-state actors.

Track 3 – Business, or Peacemaking through Commerce. This is the field of business and its actual and potential effects on peacebuilding through the provision of economic opportunities, international friendship and understanding, informal channels of communication, and support for other peacemaking activities.

Track 4 – Private Citizen, or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement. This includes the various ways that individual citizens become involved in peace and development activities through citizen diplomacy, exchange programs, private voluntary organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and special-interest groups.

Track 5 – Research, Training, and Education, or peacemaking through Learning. This track includes three related worlds: research, as it is connected to university programs, think tanks, and special-interest research centers; training programs that seek to provide training in practitioner skills such as negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and third-party facilitation; and education, including kindergarten through PhD programs that cover various aspects of global or cross-cultural studies, peace and world order studies, and conflict analysis, management, and resolution.

Track 6 – Activism, or Peacemaking through Advocacy. This track covers the field of peace and environmental activism on such issues as disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice, and advocacy of special-interest groups regarding specific governmental policies.

Track 7 – Religion, or Peacemaking through Faith in action. This examines the beliefs and peace-oriented actions of spiritual and religious communities and such morality-based movements as pacifism, sanctuary, and nonviolence.

Track 8 – Funding, or Peacemaking through Providing Resources. This refers to the funding community-those foundations and individual philanthropists that provide the financial support for many of the activities undertaken by the other tracks.

Track 9 – Communications and the Media, or Peacemaking through Information. This is the realm of the voice of the people: how public opinion gets shaped and expressed by the media-print, film, video, radio, electronic systems, the arts.

Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Appendix 3

Summary of Appendices

Appendix 1: Maps of Israel Palestine

Appendix 2: Hamas Attacks by Year

Appendix 3: Assassinations carried out by Israel

Appendix 4: Total civilian/military casualties in Second Intifada

Appendix 5: ‘Road Map’ highlights and benchmarks

Appendix 6: ‘Blue Print 3’ highlights and benchmarks

Appendix 7: List of Israeli political parties and factions

Appendix 8: List of Palestinian parties and factions

Appendix 6: ‘Blue Print 3’ highlights and benchmarks

Primary Structural Tenets:

PHASE ONE: Separate Populations: Jewish Settlements for Arab Towns

PHASE TWO: Purchase of Sinai from Egypt

PHASE THREE: Purchase of portions of the East Bank from Jordan

PHASE FOUR: Partition of Jerusalem-Al Quds

PHASE FIVE: Free Trade Zones in Western Sinai and Saudi Coast

PHASE SIX: Implementation of Demilitarized Zones

PHASE SEVEN: Staggered return of Diaspora

PHASE EIGHT: Resource Sharing Agreements

Primary Resource Agreements:

Joint PA/Israeli control of Galilee water resource

Joint Administration of select Hospitals and 4 Universities

Doubling Israeli-Palestinian land mass via purchase of Sinai and parts of East Bank of the Jordan

Palestinian control of Dead Sea

Security Parity (Demilitarization/ Arms transfers)

Israeli non-proliferation for Iranian non-proliferation

Demilitarized Golan (to be included in the Palestinian State)

Demilitarized Gaza Strip (to be connected to West Bank via a security corridor and train tunnel)

Demilitarization South of Litany River and North of Kishon River. (to be filled with UN Peacekeeping forces).

Return of Sheba Farms to Lebanon

Golan Heights transfer to PA control

Implementation of a 2 Child maximum per family

Extension of West Bank PA down to Gulf of Aqaba

Triple Seacoast of PA (Acco, Gaza City, and a third site build between Aqaba and Eilat)

4 Separate Courts, Civil and Religious; 2 per polity

Separate Knesset/ Palestinian Congress both based in East and West Jerusalem respectively.

Release of all Palestinian political prisoners

Right of Return respective and regulated, parity in returning numbers negotiated to return to respective zones of control.

EU to aid Palestine (infrastructure only)

US to aid Israel (infrastructure only)

Bedouin autonomous region in Sinai or population transfer to Palestinian zone.

Structural dual citizenship benefits (tax credits, work visas, healthcare, educational)

Physically strengthening the barrier wall

Reduction of Israeli arsenal in exchange for greater aid, (Aid for decommissioned weapons program).

Structural reform from Parliamentary system to representative democracy.

Selected Bibliography

Abu-Arr, Z (1993). “Hamas: A Historical and Political background”, in Journal of Palestine Studies. Volume 22, Number 4 (Summer 1993): 5-19.

Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities. Verso: London.

Arik, J. P. (2005). Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Arreguin-Toft, (2001). How the Weak Win: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. International Security, vol. 26, no. 1. Summer 2001. pp.93-128.

Azlan, R. (2009). How to Win A Cosmic War. New York: Random House.

Bregman, A. (2002). Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge.

Betts, R. K. (2002). The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no. 1. Spring 2002. pp. 19-36.

Chehab, Z. (2007). Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. Nation Books: New York.

Cleveland, W. L. (2004). A History of the Middle East: Third Edition.

Fanon, F. (1968). The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.

Gellner, E. (2006). Nation and Nationalism. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Grayzel, S. (1968). A History of the Jews. New York: Mentor Books.

Gunning, J (2007). Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. Hurst & Co: London.

Hamzeh, A. N. (2004). In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 

Harik, J. P. (2005). Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London: I.B. Tauris.

Hendal, Y. (2006). Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War. Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2006. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv.

Herzog, C. (2004). The Arab Israeli Wars. New York: Vintage.

Humpherys, R.S (2001). Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age. University of California Press: Los Angles.

Khalidi, Rashid (2006). The Iron Cage: The Story of Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Press, Boston.

Katz, S. (1996). Lone Wolf: A Biography of Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky. Barricade Books Inc: New York.

Kepel, G. (2003). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Knudsen, A. & Ezbidi, B (2009). “Hamas and Palestinian Statehood,” in Where Now for Palestine? Edited by Jamil Hilal. Zed Books: London.

La Guardia, A. (2003). War without End: Israelis, Palestinians and the Struggle for a Promised Land. St. Martin’s Press.

Laqueur, W. (2003). The History of Zionism. New York: Schocken Books.

Laquer, W. & Rubin, B. (2008). The Israel-Arab Reader. Penguin Books, New York. 

Lewis, B. (2004). From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Levitt, M. (2006). Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. Yale University Press: New Haven

Luttwak, E. (1968). Coup D’Etat: A Practical Handbook. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mearsheimer, J.J. & Walt, S.M.(2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Merom, G. (2003). How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, B. (1987).The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Cambridge University Press: New York.

Morris, B. (2009). One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict. Yale University Press: New Haven.

Mishal, S. (1986). The PLO Under Arafat: Between the Gun and Olive Branch. Yale University Press: New Haven.

Mishal, S. & Sela, A (2006).The Palestinian Hamas. Columbia University Press: New York.

Nasr, V. (2006). The Shi’a Revival.  W.W. Norton & Company: New York

Ophir, N. (2006). Look Not to the Skies: The IAF vs. Surface-to-Surface Rocket Launchers. Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2006. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv.

Qassem, N. (2005). Hezbollah: The Qassem. Saqi: London.  

Reinhart, T. (2002). Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948. Seven Stories Press: New York

Richards, A. & Waterbury, J. (1998). A Political Economy of the Middle East. West View Press: Boulder.

Rubenberg, C. (2003). The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace. Lynne Reinner Publishers: Boulder.

Sayigh, R. (2007). The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries. Zed Books: New York.

Saad-Ghorayeb, A. (2002). Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion. Pluto Press: London

Said, E. (1992). The Question of Palestine. Vintage Books:  New York

Schanzer, J (2008). Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave-Macmillan: New York.

Schweitzer, Y. (2006). Hezbollah and the Morning After: Guerrilla, Terror, and Psychological Warfare. Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 2, August 2006. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv.

Schelling, T.C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Bookcrafters Inc: Fredericksburg.

Schultz, R.H. Jr. & Dew, A.J. (2006). Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. New York: Columbia University Press.

Shalim, A.(1990). The Poltics of Partiton. Columbia Press:New York.Inteerlink Publishing Group: Northhampton.

Tamimi, A. (2007). Hamas: A History from Within. Olive Branch Press: Northhampton.

Tira, R. (2006). Breaking the Amoeba’s Bones. Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2006. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv.

Walzer, M. (1977). Just and Unjust Wars. Basic Books: New York.

Bibliography:

1. Why America? The Globalization of Civil War, Martha Crenshaw, Current History, December 2001

2. Ghosts of Our Past, Karen Armstrong, AARP Modern Maturity, January/February 2002

3. The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism, David C. Rapoport, Current History, December 2001

4. Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America’s War on Terrorism, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, Current History, December 2001

5. The Tenets of Terror, Robert Marquand, The Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2001

6. Killing Hope, William Blum, Common Courage Press, 1995

ACT I:

S T R A S T

“THE PASSION OF DARIA MACCLUSKEY”

ONE

At a hanging garden in Isle of Mann

“THE FALL OF MAN”

In Newyorkgrad it gets so evil hot in the end of Summer. The citadel of shrill billionaires and unwashed foreign masses longing to wear designer sneakers becomes a swelter box. Most people of any means flee to their dachas in Strong Island to avoid it. Dawn is now rising on a roof garden. Five friends were up and out all night. They sit atop a seventeen story print house converted to a housing cooperative. It is one of lowest lying structures left in the Financial District. A maze of towering blue and purple towers. Sebastian Vasilivich Adonaev over a bottle of Basque wine, tells old danger tales to those who will and can still mange to listen. It is the second to last weekend of Thermidor and soon summer will end. A fake gold watch dangles off his left wrist as he enunciates his wild tale with his hands. Covering his dark brown hair is a brown leather partisan cap.

On the roof garden of the old converted print house on Nassau Street, slim and enthusiastic Europeans Amelia Monteleone and Viktoria Christiana Lynch Contreras snap off photos and clink glasses bantering heavily intoxicated. Raphael Ernesto Lynch Contreras, a consumate wild man, is baby faced with flowing black hair. Salt and pepper streaks show he’s aging. Slightly poorly thanks to war and alcoholism. He is at least on green card the husband of Viktoria. Raphael sits with his dear friend Sebastian and a beautiful Russian dvotchka named Daria Andreavna. Raphael attempts a boozy mediation. Sebastian and Daria evil eye each other viciously across a low wooden table. She has big blue crazy person eyes. An affectionate rendering in Russian of Daria is ‘Dasha’, and this is what Sebastian has been calling her all night. They had been introduced several months before, but both had been way too drunk to remember. They are both regulars at the ‘Mehanata Social Club’, but he more on Thursdays and she more on Saturdays. Sebastian is telling a dangerously insensitive story. Daria is appalled. Sebastian removes his skally cap and says, “The job, and operation; call it as you want, involves calling on high end prostitutes whose numbers one acquires in the association of athletes, banker men and or those of Post or former Soviet back grounds, mostly at the Banya. Sebastian loves the way everything sounds in Russian. Fucking, fighting, and partisan songs. Though he knows under three dozen small phrases and can barely read Cyrillic. He’s an enthusiast of wanting things he cannot possibly have.

“So shortly after the girls arrive and you present some fictitious cover. You take their coats as they walk in and settle on a price that will involve no bit of touching at all. Make small talk, make big talk. Which ever you like. Then, you tell them that they’re being filmed and also recorded, but that you’re not a cop. Not some rich pervert or a Mossadnik. Or who-ever else weird and dangerous. You’re not there to entrap them for absolutely anything. You can tell them you’re an abolitionist, or keep it real apolitical.”

Puff, puff passes along this ill-conceived venture.

“You tell them to call down to the driver and say their John is layered out like Charlie Sheen.”

“Tiger-blooded,” notes Raphael Ernesto. 

“Then you make tea. You tell them a little storah. A personal tale about why you are not a dog or a pig. No troll or ghoul. Intermixed with the story are questions you plan to help answer on a cost effective timeline. How you came to fully hate this line of flesh work. Because you had loved someone forced into it. Because it is evil to trade in coerced human flesh. You convince them to take and perhaps disseminate to other persons a phone number. To arrest or eliminate traffickers and pimps. Also, how to get such trafficked and victimized people the resources they need to escape such work. With a VISA and a future. They get the job cash for nothing. We’re in an era of creating digital money and printing highly convincing hundos. What’s fucking money? We can print it easily these days faster than the Federals can secure it. A number, a simple number which is a real way out of the night life. They get that number on a card. You also ask them to put it in their phone. Eventually, the poor unfortunate soul either will pass the number along or report it directly to their pimps. But, inevitably you force a violent hand. You spread the knowledge that there is in fact a networked way to escape such slavery, are they so inclined. It’s cheaper and more effective than lobbying or the useless political routes. All the cops and half the politicians are on the take, partake anyway. We go directly to the sex slaves and assure them there is safe way out. The next stage then is to get our various operatives into the spas and brothels to feign cardiac arrest and call in ambulances and firemen in as reinforcements. Then we just burn them down.”

Her jaw basically drops.

“They will kill you for that nonsense,” Daria spits out, “Kill you and your family and people you love. For such bullshit man! For a lot less than bull shit. A number! I spit on your American number. For insulting low grade bullshit that changes nothing. You will die. They will kill those dear to you too. Kill people who owe you money. Nothing at all will be fixed about anything. Not one single girl will walk free. It is bourgeois liberal thinking,” retorts Daria.

All the regality of being born all Slavic, but outside the great dividing highway that loops the Moscow capital separating the have everything’s from the have nothings or have only little somethings. Being born so radiantly beautiful and tough and Russian after the alleged triumph of Capitalist Modernity has left her charming and capable of fight. She is quite far ‘from Russia with love’, rootless and floating in glittery fairy tales that don’t expel the daily hardships of her newly adopted country. Though her card is not green yet.

“I am not afraid to die for a thing I believe in sweetness. At the cost of all my American privileges. They say anyway that I’m hard man to make disappear,” Sebastian flatly retorts.

“But are you not afraid to endanger others,” she retorts.

“He has such dumb American beliefs blat!” she mocks, “I guess you’ve never had to work for anything. Or work to keep something you fought hard for blat. So you would give away most easily. Your life seems so very easily offered. To take, if you ask me,” she snaps at his bait.

“Hey, lady, you are insulting to my dear friend and our gracious host,” sternly interjects Raphael, “This man, you have no idea what he’s been through to back up these words. This man is a people’s hero!”

Daria could care less about the Peruvian definition of so-called ‘heroism’. She is appalled by Sebastian’s cynical little story about call girls passing, itself off as incompetent activism. So she offers to kill him. He obliges her. Thinks she’s bluffing, but doesn’t care if she’s not not.

‘I’ll kill this over privileged American hypocrite,’ she thinks. A civic duty to my new mother land and the old country too blat! ‘This shit head knows not with whom he plays,’ she thinks. Mostly, she maintains a mighty level of the not giving of a single shit. Not one fuck of a fuck, of a shit. She’s an off day. She’s totally blacked out. She won’t remember anything. She only remembers every other night out when she drinks. The rest of them form an intractable blur. A black haze punctuated with irregular black and blue marks. “From falling down stairs.” If she really kills him, the tragedy, as far as a memory, will really belong to no one.

Rafael implores her to be more, “Suave, Suave!” To be more calm and “Tranquillo.” The once infamous Peruvian revolutionist, now moonlighting as a Newyorkgrad low key digital disk jockey and designer jeans mender. He cannot even barely modulate Sebastian’s posturing ego and Dasha’s swaggerous, murderous taunting. Now they’re waving invisible pistols at each others’ faces like wild Middle Easterners.

“You think like a niggle!” she yells at him.

The job of any and all men as far as she is concerned is please her by makings sure her drink is never empty and that life is a series of taken care of attractions, to make her life easier. He has failed at both in his utter self-serving arrogance.

“So you’re gonna kill me? Or just fucking threaten on about it?” says Sebastian in her face.“Absofuckinglutely,” she replies, “your life is bullshit, thus your death is certain blat.” 

Before Rafael can talk them down they’re going up a ladder. Up to the 18^th level deck. It’s more of an easterly platform atop the roof garden with the massive blue glass Geary Building towering just an alley ways distance away. Thousands of expensive little cubicles for the lower upper class. Sports players, fancy pied a terres to stuff a mistress and city homes for the lower ranks of the financial class. But all the lights are out. A great setting for a hastily arranged assisted suicide.

Now, they’re bare knuckled boxing! Daria is in a boxing school in Brighton. She strikes at him hard. But it isn’t his first rodeo. 

“Die you shit! You fucking Amerikansky! You wasted one blat,” she spits at him.

Rafael is actually too drunk to get up the ladder to intervene. Amelia and Victoria have stopped their camera phone art making over white wine and look up with moderate concern, moderate care. Actually, only Rafael knows Daria and Sebastian intimately enough to really care. As he is in love with both of them. Rafael knows a lot about Sebastian’s other life aboard as ‘Kawa Zivistan’, a wanted rebel throughout the peripheral colonies. A  partisan leader in the American guerrilla. Not spooks nor the police forces had taken him so far, or gotten very close to making him die. A beautiful woman might now get close enough. They are boxing pretty close to the ledge. But to be honest, Amelia fucked him twice and it was mediocre. Viktoria only uses him for hints about Rafael’s infidelity. Rafael, has drank too much. His brain is just too wet to get him up that ladder.  

  “You don’t want to live here forever?!” Daria taunts him.

Their boxing and taunting has them perilously near the edge of the roof. She is striking hits and he is just taking her hits and then, then it comes. Thwack. She cracks his jaw hard. He grins at her with a little blood on the lip.

“Hit me to kill me! Just knock me into that fucking pit! Make a good inglorious end to it. It’s all bullshit you know. I’ll just come back,” Sebastian declares in Russian.

The most beautiful woman he has ever seen is just a side story in his own mind. His own much larger tragedy propels him to make questionable life choices, such as this one. “Kill me blat!” he beckons. Then, she tries to really kill him. She’s moves so fucking fast, like she’s basically trained in the ‘School of Alcoholism’. Daria cocks back and doesn’t even blink. She hits him in the throat with the right and then with the left, crack! He topples backwards off the roof. As Sebastian plummets back, he grabs out instinctively. Yanks her along with him. They tumble together off the ledge. They plummet to the alley way below. The flesh snaps apart. Two souls leave their bodies from a pile of bloody pointless death.

Nuclear electromagnetic pulse

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to navigationJump to searchThis article is about nuclear-generated EMP. For other types, see Electromagnetic pulse

A nuclear electromagnetic pulse (commonly abbreviated as nuclear EMP, or NEMP) is a burst of electromagnetic radiation created by a nuclear explosion. The resulting rapidly varying electric and magnetic fields may couple with electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. The specific characteristics of a particular nuclear EMP event vary according to a number of factors, the most important of which is the altitude of the detonation.

The term “electromagnetic pulse” generally excludes optical (infrared, visible, ultraviolet) and ionizing (such as X-ray and gamma radiation) ranges. In military terminology, a nuclear warhead detonated tens to hundreds of kilometers above the Earth’s surface is known as a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) device. Effects of a HEMP device depend on factors including the altitude of the detonation, energy yield, gamma ray output, interactions with the Earth’s magnetic field and electromagnetic shielding of targets.

Contents

• 1History
  • 1.1Starfish Prime
  • 1.2Soviet Test 184
• 2Characteristics
  • 2.1E1
  • 2.2E2
  • 2.3E3
• 3Generation
  • 3.1Weapon altitude
  • 3.2Weapon yield
  • 3.3Target distance
• 4Effects
  • 4.1Vacuum tube vs. solid state electronics
  • 4.2Electronics in operation vs. inactive
  • 4.3On aircraft
  • 4.4On cars
  • 4.5On small electronics
  • 4.6On humans and animals
• 5Post-Cold War attack scenarios
• 6Protecting infrastructure
• 7In fiction and popular culture
• 8See also
• 9References
• 10Sources
• 11Further reading
• 12External links

History[edit]

The fact that an electromagnetic pulse is produced by a nuclear explosion was known in the earliest days of nuclear weapons testing. The magnitude of the EMP and the significance of its effects, however, were not immediately realized.^[1]

During the first United States nuclear test on 16 July 1945, electronic equipment was shielded because Enrico Fermi expected the electromagnetic pulse. The official technical history for that first nuclear test states, “All signal lines were completely shielded, in many cases doubly shielded. In spite of this many records were lost because of spurious pickup at the time of the explosion that paralyzed the recording equipment.”^[2] During British nuclear testing in 1952–1953, instrumentation failures were attributed to “radioflash“, which was their term for EMP.^[3][4]

The first openly reported observation of the unique aspects of high-altitude nuclear EMP occurred during the helium balloon-lofted Yucca nuclear test of the Hardtack I series on 28 April 1958. In that test, the electric field measurements from the 1.7 kiloton weapon went off the scale of the test instruments and was estimated to be about five times the oscilloscope limits. The Yucca EMP was initially positive-going, whereas low-altitude bursts were negative pulses. Also, the polarization of the Yucca EMP signal was horizontal, whereas low-altitude nuclear EMP was vertically polarized. In spite of these many differences, the unique EMP results were dismissed as a possible wave propagation anomaly.^[5]

The high-altitude nuclear tests of 1962, as discussed below, confirmed the unique results of the Yucca high-altitude test and increased the awareness of high-altitude nuclear EMP beyond the original group of defense scientists. The larger scientific community became aware of the significance of the EMP problem after a three-article series on nuclear EMP was published in 1981 by William J. Broad in Science.^[1][6][7]

Starfish Prime[edit]

Main article: Starfish Prime

In July 1962, the US carried out the Starfish Prime test, exploding a 1.44 megaton bomb 400 kilometres (250 mi; 1,300,000 ft) above the mid-Pacific Ocean. This demonstrated that the effects of a high-altitude nuclear explosion were much larger than had been previously calculated. Starfish Prime made those effects known to the public by causing electrical damage in Hawaii, about 1,445 kilometres (898 mi) away from the detonation point, knocking out about 300 streetlights, setting off numerous burglar alarms and damaging a microwave link.^[8]

Starfish Prime was the first success in the series of United States high-altitude nuclear tests in 1962 known as Operation Fishbowl. Subsequent tests gathered more data on the high-altitude EMP phenomenon.

The Bluegill Triple Prime and Kingfish high-altitude nuclear tests of October and November 1962 in Operation Fishbowl provided data that was clear enough to enable physicists to accurately identify the physical mechanisms behind the electromagnetic pulses.^[9]

The EMP damage of the Starfish Prime test was quickly repaired due, in part, to the fact that the EMP over Hawaii was relatively weak compared to what could be produced with a more intense pulse, and in part due to the relative ruggedness (compared to today)^[10] of Hawaii’s electrical and electronic infrastructure in 1962.^[11]

The relatively small magnitude of the Starfish Prime EMP in Hawaii (about 5.6 kilovolts/metre) and the relatively small amount of damage (for example, only one to three percent of streetlights extinguished)^[12] led some scientists to believe, in the early days of EMP research, that the problem might not be significant. Later calculations^[11] showed that if the Starfish Prime warhead had been detonated over the northern continental United States, the magnitude of the EMP would have been much larger (22 to 30 kV/m) because of the greater strength of the Earth’s magnetic field over the United States, as well as its different orientation at high latitudes. These calculations, combined with the accelerating reliance on EMP-sensitive microelectronics, heightened awareness that EMP could be a significant problem.^[13]

Soviet Test 184[edit]

Main article: Soviet Project K nuclear tests

In 1962, the Soviet Union also performed three EMP-producing nuclear tests in space over Kazakhstan, the last in the “Soviet Project K nuclear tests“.^[14] Although these weapons were much smaller (300 kiloton) than the Starfish Prime test, they were over a populated, large land mass and at a location where the Earth’s magnetic field was greater; the damage caused by the resulting EMP was reportedly much greater than in Starfish Prime. The geomagnetic storm–like E3 pulse from Test 184 induced a current surge in a long underground power line that caused a fire in the power plant in the city of Karaganda.^{[citation needed]}

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of this damage was communicated informally to US scientists.^[15] For a few years US and Russian scientists collaborated on the HEMP phenomenon. Funding was secured to enable Russian scientists to report on some of the Soviet EMP results in international scientific journals.^[16] As a result, formal documentation of some of the EMP damage in Kazakhstan exists^[17][18] but is still sparse in the open scientific literature.^{[citation needed]}

For one of the K Project tests, Soviet scientists instrumented a 570-kilometer (350 mi) section of telephone line in the area that they expected to be affected by the pulse. The monitored telephone line was divided into sub-lines of 40 to 80 kilometres (25 to 50 mi) in length, separated by repeaters. Each sub-line was protected by fuses and by gas-filled overvoltage protectors. The EMP from the 22 October (K-3) nuclear test (also known as Test 184) blew all of the fuses and fired all of the overvoltage protectors in all of the sub-lines.^[17]

Published reports, including a 1998 IEEE article,^[17] have stated that there were significant problems with ceramic insulators on overhead electrical power lines during the tests. A 2010 technical report written for Oak Ridge National Laboratory stated that “Power line insulators were damaged, resulting in a short circuit on the line and some lines detaching from the poles and falling to the ground.”^[19]

Characteristics[edit]

Nuclear EMP is a complex multi-pulse, usually described in terms of three components, as defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).^[20]

The three components of nuclear EMP, as defined by the IEC, are called “E1”, “E2” and “E3”.^[21][20]

E1[edit]

The E1 pulse is the very fast component of nuclear EMP. E1 is a brief but intense electromagnetic field that induces high voltages in electrical conductors. E1 causes most of its damage by causing electrical breakdown voltages to be exceeded. E1 can destroy computers and communications equipment and it changes too quickly (nanoseconds) for ordinary surge protectors to provide effective protection from it. Fast-acting surge protectors (such as those using TVS diodes) will block the E1 pulse.The mechanism for a 400-kilometre-high (250 mi; 1,300,000 ft) burst EMP: gamma rays hit the atmosphere between 20–40 km (66,000–131,000 ft) altitude, ejecting electrons which are then deflected sideways by the Earth’s magnetic field. This makes the electrons radiate EMP over a large area. Because of the curvature and downward tilt of Earth’s magnetic field over the USA, the maximum EMP occurs south of the detonation and the minimum occurs to the north.^[22]

E1 is produced when gamma radiation from the nuclear detonation ionizes (strips electrons from) atoms in the upper atmosphere. This is known as the Compton effect and the resulting current is called the “Compton current”. The electrons travel in a generally downward direction at relativistic speeds (more than 90 percent of the speed of light). In the absence of a magnetic field, this would produce a large, radial pulse of electric current propagating outward from the burst location confined to the source region (the region over which the gamma photons are attenuated). The Earth’s magnetic field exerts a force on the electron flow at a right angle to both the field and the particles’ original vector, which deflects the electrons and leads to synchrotron radiation. Because the outward traveling gamma pulse is propagating at the speed of light, the synchrotron radiation of the Compton electrons adds coherently, leading to a radiated electromagnetic signal. This interaction produces a large, brief, pulse.^[23]

Several physicists worked on the problem of identifying the mechanism of the HEMP E1 pulse. The mechanism was finally identified by Conrad Longmire of Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1963.^[9]

Longmire gives numerical values for a typical case of E1 pulse produced by a second-generation nuclear weapon such as those of Operation Fishbowl. The typical gamma rays given off by the weapon have an energy of about 2 MeV (mega-electron volts). The gamma rays transfer about half of their energy to the ejected free electrons, giving an energy of about 1 MeV.^[23]

In a vacuum and absent a magnetic field, the electrons would travel with a current density of tens of amperes per square metre.^[23] Because of the downward tilt of the Earth’s magnetic field at high latitudes, the area of peak field strength is a U-shaped region to the equatorial side of the detonation. As shown in the diagram, for nuclear detonations in the Northern Hemisphere, this U-shaped region is south of the detonation point. Near the equator, where the Earth’s magnetic field is more nearly horizontal, the E1 field strength is more nearly symmetrical around the burst location.^{[citation needed]}

At geomagnetic field strengths typical of the mid latitudes, these initial electrons spiral around the magnetic field lines with a typical radius of about 85 metres (280 ft). These initial electrons are stopped by collisions with air molecules at an average distance of about 170 metres (560 ft). This means that most of the electrons are stopped by collisions with air molecules before completing a full spiral around the field lines.^[23]

This interaction of the negatively charged electrons with the magnetic field radiates a pulse of electromagnetic energy. The pulse typically rises to its peak value in some five nanoseconds. Its magnitude typically decays by half within 200 nanoseconds. (By the IEC definition, this E1 pulse ends 1000 nanoseconds after it begins.) This process occurs simultaneously on about 10²⁵ electrons.^[23] The simultaneous action of the electrons causes the resulting pulse from each electron to radiate coherently, adding to produce a single large amplitude, but narrow, radiated pulse.^{[citation needed]}

Secondary collisions cause subsequent electrons to lose energy before they reach ground level. The electrons generated by these subsequent collisions have so little energy that they do not contribute significantly to the E1 pulse.^[23]

These 2 MeV gamma rays typically produce an E1 pulse near ground level at moderately high latitudes that peaks at about 50,000 volts per metre. The ionization process in the mid-stratosphere causes this region to become an electrical conductor, a process that blocks the production of further electromagnetic signals and causes the field strength to saturate at about 50,000 volts per metre. The strength of the E1 pulse depends upon the number and intensity of the gamma rays and upon the rapidity of the gamma ray burst. Strength is also somewhat dependent upon altitude.^{[citation needed]}

There are reports of “super-EMP” nuclear weapons that are able to exceed the 50,000 volt per metre limit by unspecified mechanisms. The reality and possible construction details of these weapons are classified and are, therefore, unconfirmed in the open scientific literature^[24]:3

E2[edit]

The E2 component is generated by scattered gamma rays and inelastic gammas produced by neutrons. This E2 component is an “intermediate time” pulse that, by IEC definition, lasts from about one microsecond to one second after the explosion. E2 has many similarities to lightning, although lightning-induced E2 may be considerably larger than a nuclear E2. Because of the similarities and the widespread use of lightning protection technology, E2 is generally considered to be the easiest to protect against.^[21]

According to the United States EMP Commission, the main problem with E2 is that it immediately follows E1, which may have damaged the devices that would normally protect against E2.

The EMP Commission Executive Report of 2004 states, “In general, it would not be an issue for critical infrastructure systems since they have existing protective measures for defense against occasional lightning strikes. The most significant risk is synergistic, because the E2 component follows a small fraction of a second after the first component’s insult, which has the ability to impair or destroy many protective and control features. The energy associated with the second component thus may be allowed to pass into and damage systems.”^[25]

E3[edit]

Main article: Geomagnetically induced currentSee also: Coronal mass ejection and Solar flare

The E3 component is different from E1 and E2. E3 is a much slower pulse, lasting tens to hundreds of seconds. It is caused by the nuclear detonation’s temporary distortion of the Earth’s magnetic field. The E3 component has similarities to a geomagnetic storm caused by a solar flare.^[26][27] Like a geomagnetic storm, E3 can produce geomagnetically induced currents in long electrical conductors, damaging components such as power line transformers.^[28]

Because of the similarity between solar-induced geomagnetic storms and nuclear E3, it has become common to refer to solar-induced geomagnetic storms as “Solar EMP”.^[29] “Solar EMP” does not include E1 or E2 components.^[30]

Generation[edit]

Factors that control weapon effectiveness include altitude, yield, construction details, target distance, intervening geographical features, and local strength of the Earth’s magnetic field.

Weapon altitude[edit]

How the peak EMP on the ground varies with the weapon yield and burst altitude. The yield here is the prompt gamma ray output measured in kilotons. This varies from 0.115–0.5% of the total weapon yield, depending on weapon design. The 1.4 Mt total yield 1962 Starfish Prime test had a gamma output of 0.1%, hence 1.4 kt of prompt gamma rays. (The blue ‘pre-ionisation‘ curve applies to certain types of thermonuclear weapons, for which gamma and x-rays from the primary fission stage ionise the atmosphere and make it electrically conductive before the main pulse from the thermonuclear stage. The pre-ionisation in some situations can literally short out part of the final EMP, by allowing a conduction current to immediately oppose the Compton current of electrons.)^[31][32]

According to an internet primer published by the Federation of American Scientists^[33]A high-altitude nuclear detonation produces an immediate flux of gamma rays from the nuclear reactions within the device. These photons in turn produce high energy free electrons by Compton scattering at altitudes between (roughly) 20 and 40 km. These electrons are then trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field, giving rise to an oscillating electric current. This current is asymmetric in general and gives rise to a rapidly rising radiated electromagnetic field called an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Because the electrons are trapped essentially simultaneously, a very large electromagnetic source radiates coherently.The pulse can easily span continent-sized areas, and this radiation can affect systems on land, sea, and air. … A large device detonated at 400–500 km (250 to 312 miles) over Kansas would affect all of the continental U.S. The signal from such an event extends to the visual horizon as seen from the burst point.

Thus, for equipment to be affected, the weapon needs to be above the visual horizon.^[33]

The altitude indicated above is greater than that of the International Space Station and many low Earth orbit satellites. Large weapons could have a dramatic impact on satellite operations and communications such as occurred during Operation Fishbowl. The damaging effects on orbiting satellites are usually due to factors other than EMP. In the Starfish Prime nuclear test, most damage was to the satellites’ solar panels while passing through radiation belts created by the explosion.^[34]

For detonations within the atmosphere, the situation is more complex. Within the range of gamma ray deposition, simple laws no longer hold as the air is ionised and there are other EMP effects, such as a radial electric field due to the separation of Compton electrons from air molecules, together with other complex phenomena. For a surface burst, absorption of gamma rays by air would limit the range of gamma ray deposition to approximately 16 kilometres (10 mi), while for a burst in the lower-density air at high altitudes, the range of deposition would be far greater.^{[citation needed]}

Weapon yield[edit]

Typical nuclear weapon yields used during Cold War planning for EMP attacks were in the range of 1 to 10 megatons^[35] This is roughly 50 to 500 times the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Physicists have testified at United States Congressional hearings that weapons with yields of 10 kilotons or less can produce a large EMP.^[36]

The EMP at a fixed distance from an explosion increases at most as the square root of the yield (see the illustration to the right). This means that although a 10 kiloton weapon has only 0.7% of the energy release of the 1.44-megaton Starfish Prime test, the EMP will be at least 8% as powerful. Since the E1 component of nuclear EMP depends on the prompt gamma ray output, which was only 0.1% of yield in Starfish Prime but can be 0.5% of yield in low yield pure nuclear fission weapons, a 10 kiloton bomb can easily be 5 x 8% = 40% as powerful as the 1.44 megaton Starfish Prime at producing EMP.^[37]

The total prompt gamma ray energy in a fission explosion is 3.5% of the yield, but in a 10 kiloton detonation the triggering explosive around the bomb core absorbs about 85% of the prompt gamma rays, so the output is only about 0.5% of the yield. In the thermonuclear Starfish Prime the fission yield was less than 100% and the thicker outer casing absorbed about 95% of the prompt gamma rays from the pusher around the fusion stage. Thermonuclear weapons are also less efficient at producing EMP because the first stage can pre-ionize the air^[37] which becomes conductive and hence rapidly shorts out the Compton currents generated by the fusion stage. Hence, small pure fission weapons with thin cases are far more efficient at causing EMP than most megaton bombs.^{[citation needed]}

This analysis, however, only applies to the fast E1 and E2 components of nuclear EMP. The geomagnetic storm-like E3 component of nuclear EMP is more closely proportional to the total energy yield of the weapon.^[38]

Target distance[edit]

In nuclear EMP all of the components of the electromagnetic pulse are generated outside of the weapon.^[33]

For high-altitude nuclear explosions, much of the EMP is generated far from the detonation (where the gamma radiation from the explosion hits the upper atmosphere). This electric field from the EMP is remarkably uniform over the large area affected.^[39]

According to the standard reference text on nuclear weapons effects published by the U.S. Department of Defense, “The peak electric field (and its amplitude) at the Earth’s surface from a high-altitude burst will depend upon the explosion yield, the height of the burst, the location of the observer, and the orientation with respect to the geomagnetic field. As a general rule, however, the field strength may be expected to be tens of kilovolts per metre over most of the area receiving the EMP radiation.”^[39]

The text also states that, “… over most of the area affected by the EMP the electric field strength on the ground would exceed 0.5E_max. For yields of less than a few hundred kilotons, this would not necessarily be true because the field strength at the Earth’s tangent could be substantially less than 0.5E_max.”^[39]

(E_max refers to the maximum electric field strength in the affected area.)

In other words, the electric field strength in the entire area that is affected by the EMP will be fairly uniform for weapons with a large gamma ray output. For smaller weapons, the electric field may fall at a faster rate as distance increases.^[39]

Effects[edit]

An energetic EMP can temporarily upset or permanently damage electronic equipment by generating high voltage and high current surges; semiconductor components are particularly at risk. The effects of damage can range from imperceptible to the eye, to devices literally blowing apart. Cables, even if short, can act as antennas to transmit pulse energy to equipment.^[40]

Vacuum tube vs. solid state electronics[edit]

Older, vacuum tube (valve) based equipment is generally much less vulnerable to nuclear EMP than solid state equipment, which is much more susceptible to damage by large, brief voltage and current surges. Soviet Cold War-era military aircraft often had avionics based on vacuum tubes because solid-state capabilities were limited and vacuum-tube gear was believed to be more likely to survive.^[1]

Other components in vacuum tube circuitry can be damaged by EMP. Vacuum tube equipment was damaged in the 1962 testing.^[18] The solid state PRC-77 VHF manpackable two-way radio survived extensive EMP testing.^[41] The earlier PRC-25, nearly identical except for a vacuum tube final amplification stage, was tested in EMP simulators, but was not certified to remain fully functional.^{[citation needed]}

Electronics in operation vs. inactive[edit]

Equipment that is running at the time of an EMP is more vulnerable. Even a low-energy pulse has access to the power source, and all parts of the system are illuminated by the pulse. For example, a high-current arcing path may be created across the power supply, burning out some device along that path. Such effects are hard to predict, and require testing to assess potential vulnerabilities.^[40]

On aircraft[edit]

Many nuclear detonations have taken place using aerial bombs. The B-29 aircraft that delivered the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not lose power from electrical damage, because electrons (ejected from the air by gamma rays) are stopped quickly in normal air for bursts below roughly 10 kilometres (33,000 ft), so they are not significantly deflected by the Earth’s magnetic field.^[42]

If the aircraft carrying the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had been within the intense nuclear radiation zone when the bombs exploded over those cities, then they would have suffered effects from the charge separation (radial) EMP. But this only occurs within the severe blast radius for detonations below about 10 km altitude.^{[citation needed]}

During Operation Fishbowl, EMP disruptions were suffered aboard a KC-135 photographic aircraft flying 300 km (190 mi) from the 410 kt (1,700 TJ) detonations at 48 and 95 km (157,000 and 312,000 ft) burst altitudes.^[37] The vital electronics were less sophisticated than today’s and the aircraft was able to land safely.^{[citation needed]}

On cars[edit]

An EMP would probably not affect most cars, despite modern cars’ heavy use of electronics, because cars’ electronic circuits and cabling are likely too short to be affected. In addition, cars’ metallic frames provide some protection. However, even a small percentage of cars breaking down due to an electronic malfunction would cause temporary traffic jams.^[40]

On small electronics[edit]

An EMP has a smaller effect the shorter the length of an electrical conductor; though other factors affect the vulnerability of electronics as well, so no cutoff length determines whether some piece of equipment will survive. However, small electronic devices, such as wristwatches and cell phones, would most likely withstand an EMP.^[40]

On humans and animals[edit]

Though voltages can accumulate in electrical conductors after an EMP, it will generally not flow out into human or animal bodies, and thus contact is safe.^[40]

Post-Cold War attack scenarios[edit]

The United States EMP Commission was created by the United States Congress in 2001. The commission is formally known as the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.^[43]

The Commission brought together notable scientists and technologists to compile several reports. In 2008, the Commission released the “Critical National Infrastructures Report”.^[38] This report describes the likely consequences of a nuclear EMP on civilian infrastructure. Although this report covered the United States, most of the information is applicable to other industrialized countries. The 2008 report was a followup to a more generalized report issued by the commission in 2004.^[27][21]

In written testimony delivered to the United States Senate in 2005, an EMP Commission staff member reported:

“

The EMP Commission sponsored a worldwide survey of foreign scientific and military literature to evaluate the knowledge, and possibly the intentions, of foreign states with respect to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. The survey found that the physics of EMP phenomenon and the military potential of EMP attack are widely understood in the international community, as reflected in official and unofficial writings and statements. The survey of open sources over the past decade finds that knowledge about EMP and EMP attack is evidenced in at least Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Egypt, Taiwan, Sweden, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran, North Korea, China and Russia.Many foreign analysts – particularly in Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia – view the United States as a potential aggressor that would be willing to use its entire panoply of weapons, including nuclear weapons, in a first strike. They perceive the United States as having contingency plans to make a nuclear EMP attack, and as being willing to execute those plans under a broad range of circumstances.Russian and Chinese military scientists in open source writings describe the basic principles of nuclear weapons designed specifically to generate an enhanced-EMP effect, that they term “Super-EMP” weapons. “Super-EMP” weapons, according to these foreign open source writings, can destroy even the best protected U.S. military and civilian electronic systems.[24]

”

The United States EMP Commission determined that long-known protections are almost completely absent in the civilian infrastructure of the United States and that large parts of US military services were less-protected against EMP than during the Cold War. In public statements, the Commission recommended making electronic equipment and electrical components resistant to EMP – and maintaining spare parts inventories that would enable prompt repairs.^[27][38][44] The United States EMP Commission did not look at other nations.^{[citation needed]}

In 2011 the Defense Science Board published a report about the ongoing efforts to defend critical military and civilian systems against EMP and other nuclear weapons effects.^[45]

The United States military services developed, and in some cases published, hypothetical EMP attack scenarios.^[46]

In 2016 the Los Alamos Laboratory started phase 0 of a multi-year study (through to phase 3) to investigate EMP’s which prepared the strategy to be followed for the rest of the study.^[47]

In 2017 the US department of energy published the “DOE Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan”^[48], Edwin Boston published a dissertation on the topic^[49] and the EMP Commission published “Assessing the threat from electromagnetic pulse (EMP)”^[50]. The EMP commission was closed in summer 2017^[51]. They found that earlier reports had underestimated the effects of an EMP attack on the national infrastructure and highlighted issues with communications from the DoD due to the classified nature of the material and recommended that the DHS instead of going to the DOE for guidance and direction should directly cooperate with the more knowledgeable parts of the DOE. Several reports are in process of being released to the general public.^[52].

Protecting infrastructure[edit]

The problem of protecting civilian infrastructure from electromagnetic pulse has been intensively studied throughout the European Union, and in particular by the United Kingdom.^[53][54]

As of 2017, several power utility companies in the United States had been involved in a three-year research program on the impact of HEMP to the United States power grid led by an industry non-profit organization, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).^[55][56]

In fiction and popular culture[edit]

Main article: Electromagnetic pulse in fiction and popular culture

Especially since the 1980s, nuclear EMP weapons have gained a significant presence in fiction and popular culture.

The popular media often depict EMP effects incorrectly, causing misunderstandings among the public and even professionals, and official efforts have been made in the United States to set the record straight.^[40] The United States Space Command commissioned science educator Bill Nye to produce a video called “Hollywood vs. EMP” so that inaccurate Hollywood fiction would not confuse those who must deal with real EMP events.^[57] The video is not available to the general public.

See also[edit]

• Directed-energy weapon (DEW)
• Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
• Electromagnetic environment
• Electromagnetic hypersensitivity
• Electromagnetic pulse in fiction and popular culture
• Electromagnetism
• Electronic warfare
• Explosively pumped flux compression generator
• Faraday’s law of induction
• Gamma ray burst
• Geomagnetic storm
• High-altitude nuclear explosion
• High-power microwave
• Marx generator
• Operation Fishbowl
• Pulsed power
• Soviet Project K nuclear tests
• Starfish Prime
• Ultrashort pulse
• Nuclear terrorism

References[edit]

1. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Broad, William J. “Nuclear Pulse (I): Awakening to the Chaos Factor”, Science. 29 May 1981 212: 1009–1012
2. ^ Bainbridge, K.T., (Report LA-6300-H), Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. May 1976. p. 53 Trinity
3. ^ Baum, Carl E., IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility. Vol. 49, No. 2. pp. 211–218. May 2007. Reminiscences of High-Power Electromagnetics
4. ^ Baum, Carl E., Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 80, No. 6, pp. 789–817. June 1992 “From the Electromagnetic Pulse to High-Power Electromagnetics”
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10. ^ Reardon, Patrick J. (2014). “Case Study: Operation Starfish Prime Introduction & EMP analysis”. The Effect of an Electromagnetic Pulse Strike on the Transportation Infrastructure of Kansas City (Master’s Thesis). Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. p. 53. Retrieved 2019-07-26.
11. ^ Jump up to:^a b Theoretical Notes – Note 353, March 1985, “EMP on Honolulu from the Starfish Event” Conrad L. Longmire – Mission Research Corporation
12. ^ Rabinowitz, Mario (1987) “Effect of the Fast Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse on the Electric Power Grid Nationwide: A Different View”. IEEE Trans. Power Delivery, PWRD-2, 1199–1222 arXiv:physics/0307127
13. ^ Cancian, Mark, ed. (2018). Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2017 Conference Series & Nuclear Scholars Initiative (CSIS Reports). Center for Strategic & International Studies. p. 24. ISBN 978-1442280557. Retrieved 2019-07-26.
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18. ^ Jump up to:^a b Loborev, Vladimir M. “Up to Date State of the NEMP Problems and Topical Research Directions”, Electromagnetic Environments and Consequences: Proceedings of the EUROEM 94 International Symposium, Bordeaux, France, 30 May – 3 June 1994, pp. 15–21
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20. ^ Jump up to:^a b Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), Part 2: Environment, Section 9: Description of HEMP environment – Radiated disturbance. Basic EMC publication, IEC 61000-2-9
21. ^ Jump up to:^a b c “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack” Volume 1: Executive Report 2004
22. ^ U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range, Nuclear Environment Survivability. Report ADA278230. p. D-7. 15 April 1994.
23. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Longmire, Conrad L. LLNL-9323905, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. June 1986 “Justification and Verification of High-Altitude EMP Theory, Part 1” (Retrieved 2010-15-12)
24. ^ Jump up to:^a b March 8, 2005 “Statement, Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, EMP Commission Staff, before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security“
25. ^ Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. Volume 1. Executive Report. 2004. p. 6.
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27. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack
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29. ^ “EMPACT America, Inc. – Solar EMP”. 2011-07-26. Archived from the original on July 26, 2011. Retrieved 2013-05-21.
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32. ^ Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J., [1] ‘The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.] Chapter 11. 1977. United States Department of Defense.
33. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Federation of American Scientists. “Nuclear Weapon EMP Effects”
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35. ^ U.S. Congressional hearing Transcript H.S.N.C No. 105–18, p. 39
36. ^ U.S. Congressional hearing Transcript H.A.S.C. No. 106–31, p. 48
37. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Glasstone, Samuel (March 29, 2006). “EMP radiation from nuclear space bursts in 1962”. Subsequent tests with lower yield devices [410 kt Kingfish at 95 km altitude, 410 kt Bluegill at 48 km altitude, and 7 kt Checkmate at 147 km] produced electronic upsets on an instrumentation aircraft [presumably the KC-135 that filmed the tests from above the clouds?] that was approximately 300 kilometers away from the detonations.
38. ^ Jump up to:^a b c “EMP Commission Critical National Infrastructures Report”.
39. ^ Jump up to:^a b c d Glasstone & Dolan 1977, Chapter 11, section 11.73.
40. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Report Meta-R-320: “The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power Grid” January 2010. Written by Metatech Corporation for Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Appendix: E1 HEMP Myths
41. ^ Seregelyi, J.S, et al. Report ADA266412 “EMP Hardening Investigation of the PRC-77 Radio Set” Retrieved 2009-25-11
42. ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, Chapter 11, section 11.09.
43. ^ “Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack”. web.archive.org. September 8, 2017.
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45. ^ “Survivability of Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)” (PDF).
46. ^ Miller, Colin R., Major, USAF “Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010” Air War College, Air University, United States Air Force, November 2005
47. ^ Rivera, M.K., Backhaus, S.N., Woodroffe, J.R., Henderson, M.G., Bos, R.J., Nelson, E.M. and Kelic, A., 2016. EMP/GMD Phase 0 Report, A Review of EMP Hazard Environments and Impacts(No. LA-UR-16-28380). Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
48. ^ DOE and partners “DOE Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan” DOE, January, 2017
49. ^ Boston Jr, E.J., 2017. Critical Infrastructure Protection: EMP Impacts on the US Electric Grid (Doctoral dissertation, Utica College).
50. ^ Assessing the threat from electromagnetic pulse (EMP), the EMP Commission. 2017
51. ^ Peter Vincent Pry, Report to the commission to assess the threat to the united states from electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack life without electricity: storm-induced blackouts and implications for emp attack
52. ^ William Graham, “Trump’s actions have been critical to defending the US against an EMP attack”, the Hill, May 2018
53. ^ House of Commons Defence Committee, Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses (EMP) Tenth Report of Session 2010–12.
54. ^ Extreme Electromagnetics – The Triple Threat to Infrastructure, 14 January 2013 (Proceedings of a seminar)
55. ^ “America’s utilities prepare for a nuclear threat to the grid”. The Economist. Retrieved 2017-09-21.
56. ^ “Hearing of the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee”. http://www.energy.senate.gov. May 4, 2017. Archived from the original on 2017-05-06. Retrieved Sep 20, 2017.
57. ^ “Winners – Telly Awards”.

Sources[edit]

•  This article incorporates public domain material from the General Services Administration document “Federal Standard 1037C” (in support of MIL-STD-188).
• Vladimir Gurevich “Cyber and Electromagnetic Threats in Modern Relay Protection” – CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group), Boca Raton – New York – London, 2014, 222 p.
• Vladimir Gurevich “Protection of Substation Critical Equipment Against Intentional Electromagnetic Threats” – Wiley, London, 2016, 300 p.
• Vladimir Gurevich “Protecting Electrical Equipment: Good Practices for Preventing High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Impacts” – De Gruyter, Berlin, 2019, 400 p.

Further reading[edit]

• COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK (July 2017). “Assessing the Threat From EMP Attack – Executive Report” (PDF). http://www.dtic.mil.
• ISBN 978-1-59-248389-1 A 21st Century Complete Guide to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack Threats, Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic … High-Altitude Nuclear Weapon EMP Attacks (CD-ROM)
• ISBN 978-0-16-056127-6 Threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to U.S. military systems and civil infrastructure: Hearing before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee – first session, hearing held July 16, 1997 (Unknown Binding)
• ISBN 978-0-471-01403-4 Electromagnetic Pulse Radiation and Protective Techniques
• ISBN 978-0-16-080927-9 Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack

External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Electromagnetic pulse.

Look up nuclear electromagnetic pulse in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

• Glasstone, Samuel; Dolan, Philip J. (1977). “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons”. United States Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 2009-08-21.
• GlobalSecurity.org – Electromagnetic Pulse: From chaos to a manageable solution
• Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Tempest Protection for Facilities – U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
• EMP data from Starfish nuclear test measured by Richard Wakefield of LANL, and review of evidence pertaining to the effects 1,300 km away in Hawaii, also review of Russian EMP tests of 1962
• Read Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding HEMP
• MIL-STD-188-125-1
• How E-Bombs Work
• Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack
• NEMP and Nuclear plant
• U.S. Presidential Executive Order concerning EMP
• Protecting Electrical Equipment: good practice for preventing high altitude electromagnetic pulse impacts, De Gruyter, 2019

Dead Sea Scrolls

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to navigationJump to searchFor the travelling exhibition, see Dead Sea Scrolls: Life and Faith in Ancient Times.

The Dead Sea Scrolls
The Psalms Scroll (11Q5), one of the 981 texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls, with a partial Hebrew transcription.
Material	Papyrus, parchment and bronze
Writing	Mostly Hebrew; Aramaic, Greek, and Nabataean-Aramaic
Created	Est. 408 BCE to 318 CE
Discovered	1946/47–1956
Present location	Various

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The Dead Sea Scrolls (also Qumran Caves Scrolls) are ancient Jewish religious manuscripts found in the Qumran Caves in the Judaean Desert, near Ein Feshkha on the northern shore of the Dead Sea.^[1] Scholarly consensus dates these scrolls from the last three centuries BCE and the first century CE.^[2] The texts have great historical, religious, and linguistic significance because they include the second-oldest known surviving manuscripts of works later included in the Hebrew Bible canon, along with deuterocanonical and extra-biblical manuscripts which preserve evidence of the diversity of religious thought in late Second Temple Judaism. Almost all of the Dead Sea Scrolls are currently in the collection of the Government of the State of Israel, with ownership disputed with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, and they are housed in the Shrine of the Book on the grounds of the Israel Museum.

Many thousands of written fragments have been discovered in the Dead Sea area. They represent the remnants of larger manuscripts damaged by natural causes or through human interference, with the vast majority holding only small scraps of text. However, a small number of well-preserved, almost intact manuscripts have survived – fewer than a dozen among those from the Qumran Caves.^[2] Researchers have assembled a collection of 981 different manuscripts – discovered in 1946/47 and in 1956 – from 11 caves.^[3] The 11 Qumran Caves lie in the immediate vicinity of the Hellenistic-period Jewish settlement at Khirbet Qumran in the eastern Judaean Desert, in the West Bank.^[4] The caves are located about one mile (1.6 kilometres) west of the northwest shore of the Dead Sea, whence they derive their name. Scholarly consensus dates the Qumran Caves Scrolls from the last three centuries BCE and the first century CE.^[2] Bronze coins found at the same sites form a series beginning with John Hyrcanus (in office 135–104 BCE) and continuing until the period of the First Jewish–Roman War (66–73 CE), supporting the radiocarbon and paleographic dating of the scrolls.^[5]

In the larger sense, the Dead Sea Scrolls include manuscripts from additional Judaean Desert sites, dated as early as the 8th century BCE and as late as the 11th century CE.^[1]

Biblical texts older than the Dead Sea Scrolls have been discovered only in two silver scroll-shaped amulets containing portions of the Priestly Blessing from the Book of Numbers, excavated in Jerusalem at Ketef Hinnom and dated c. 600 BCE; some scholars also include the controversial Shapira Scroll. The third-oldest surviving known piece of the Torah, the En-Gedi Scroll, consists of a portion of Leviticus found in the Ein Gedi synagogue, burnt in the 6th century CE and analyzed in 2015. Research has dated it palaeographically to the 1st or 2nd century CE, and using the C14 method to sometime between the 2nd and 4th centuries CE.^[6]

Most of the texts use Hebrew, with some written in Aramaic (for example the Son of God text; in different regional dialects, including Nabataean), and a few in Greek.^[7] Discoveries from the Judaean Desert add Latin (from Masada) and Arabic (from Khirbet al-Mird) texts.^[8] Most of the texts are written on parchment, some on papyrus, and one on copper.^[9]

Archaeologists have long associated the scrolls with the ancient Jewish sect called the Essenes, although some recent interpretations have challenged this connection and argue that priests in Jerusalem, or Zadokites, or other unknown Jewish groups wrote the scrolls.^[10][11]

Owing to the poor condition of some of the scrolls, scholars have not identified all of their texts. The identified texts fall into three general groups:

1. About 40% are copies of texts from the Hebrew Scriptures.
2. Approximately another 30% are texts from the Second Temple Period which ultimately were not canonized in the Hebrew Bible, like the Book of Enoch, the Book of Jubilees, the Book of Tobit, the Wisdom of Sirach, Psalms 152–155, etc.
3. The remainder (roughly 30%) are sectarian manuscripts of previously unknown documents that shed light on the rules and beliefs of a particular group (sect) or groups within greater Judaism, like the Community Rule, the War Scroll, the Pesher on Habakkuk, and The Rule of the Blessing.^{[12][need quotation to verify]}

Contents

• 1Discovery
  • 1.1Initial discovery (1946–1947)
  • 1.2Search for the Qumran caves (1948–1949)
  • 1.3Qumran caves rediscovery and new scroll discoveries (1949–1951)
  • 1.4Excavations of Qumran and new cave discoveries (1951–1956, 2017)
• 2Scrolls and fragments
  • 2.1Cave 1
  • 2.2Cave 2
  • 2.3Cave 3
  • 2.4Caves 4a and 4b
  • 2.5Cave 5
  • 2.6Cave 6
  • 2.7Cave 7
  • 2.8Cave 8
  • 2.9Cave 9
  • 2.10Cave 10
  • 2.11Cave 11
  • 2.12Cave 12
  • 2.13Fragments with unknown provenance
  • 2.14Gallery
• 3Origin
  • 3.1Qumran–Essene theory
  • 3.2Qumran–Sectarian theory
  • 3.3Christian origin theory
  • 3.4Jerusalem origin theory
• 4Physical characteristics
  • 4.1Radiocarbon dating
  • 4.2Paleographic dating
  • 4.3Ink and parchment
  • 4.4Preservation
• 5Photography and assembly
  • 5.1First photographs by the American Schools of Oriental Research (1948)
  • 5.2Infrared photography and plate assembly by the Palestine Archaeological Museum (1952–1967)
  • 5.3Israel Antiquities Authority and NASA digital infrared imaging (1993–2012)
  • 5.4Israel Antiquities Authority and DNA scroll assembly (2006–2012)
  • 5.5Israel Museum of Jerusalem and Google digitization project (2011–2016)
• 6Scholarly examination
• 7Publication
  • 7.1Physical publication and controversy
  • 7.2Digital publication
• 8Biblical significance
  • 8.1Biblical books found
  • 8.2Non-biblical books
• 9Museum exhibitions and displays
• 10Ownership
  • 10.1Past ownership
  • 10.2Current ownership
  • 10.3Ownership disputes
  • 10.4Copyright disputes
• 11See also
• 12Notes
• 13References
  • 13.1Citations
  • 13.2Sources
• 14Further reading
• 15External links

Discovery[edit]

Caves at QumranSee also: QumranQumran cave 4, where ninety percent of the scrolls were found

The Dead Sea Scrolls were discovered in a series of twelve caves around the site originally known as the “Ein Feshkha Caves” near the Dead Sea in the West Bank (then part of Jordan) between 1946 and 1956 by Bedouin shepherds and a team of archeologists.^[13] The practice of storing worn-out sacred manuscripts in earthenware vessels buried in the earth or within caves is related to the ancient Jewish custom of Genizah.

Initial discovery (1946–1947)[edit]

The initial discovery by Bedouin shepherd Muhammed edh-Dhib, his cousin Jum’a Muhammed, and Khalil Musa, took place between November 1946 and February 1947.^[14][15] The shepherds discovered seven scrolls (See Scrolls and fragments) housed in jars in a cave near what is now known as the Qumran site. John C. Trever reconstructed the story of the scrolls from several interviews with the Bedouin. Edh-Dhib’s cousin noticed the caves, but edh-Dhib himself was the first to actually fall into one (the cave now called Cave 1). He retrieved a handful of scrolls, which Trever identifies as the Isaiah Scroll, Habakkuk Commentary, and the Community Rule, and took them back to the camp to show to his family. None of the scrolls were destroyed in this process.^[16] The Bedouin kept the scrolls hanging on a tent pole while they figured out what to do with them, periodically taking them out to show to their people. At some point during this time, the Community Rule was split in two. The Bedouin first took the scrolls to a dealer named Ibrahim ‘Ijha in Bethlehem. ‘Ijha returned them, saying they were worthless, after being warned that they might have been stolen from a synagogue. Undaunted, the Bedouin went to a nearby market, where a Syrian Christian offered to buy them. A sheikh joined their conversation and suggested they take the scrolls to Khalil Eskander Shahin, “Kando”, a cobbler and part-time antiques dealer. The Bedouin and the dealers returned to the site, leaving one scroll with Kando and selling three others to a dealer for 7 Jordanian pounds (approximately $28, or $321 in 2019 dollars).^[16][17] The original scrolls continued to change hands after the Bedouin left them in the possession of a third party until a sale could be arranged. (See Ownership.)

In 1947 the original seven scrolls caught the attention of Dr. John C. Trever, of the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR), who compared the script in the scrolls to that of The Nash Papyrus, the oldest biblical manuscript then known, and found similarities between them. In March the 1948 Arab–Israeli War prompted the move of some of the scrolls to Beirut, Lebanon, for safekeeping. On 11 April 1948, Millar Burrows, head of the ASOR, announced the discovery of the scrolls in a general press release.

Search for the Qumran caves (1948–1949)[edit]

Early in September 1948, Metropolitan bishop Mar Samuel brought some additional scroll fragments that he had acquired to Professor Ovid R. Sellers, the new Director of ASOR. By the end of 1948, nearly two years after their discovery, scholars had yet to locate the original cave where the fragments had been found. With unrest in the country at that time, no large-scale search could be undertaken safely. Sellers tried to get the Syrians to assist in the search for the cave, but he was unable to pay their price. In early 1949, the government of Jordan gave permission to the Arab Legion to search the area where the original Qumran cave was thought to be. Consequently, Cave 1 was rediscovered on 28 January 1949, by Belgian United Nations observer Captain Phillipe Lippens and Arab Legion Captain Akkash el-Zebn.^[18]

Qumran caves rediscovery and new scroll discoveries (1949–1951)[edit]

A view of the Dead Sea from a cave at Qumran in which some of the Dead Sea Scrolls were discovered.

The rediscovery of what became known as “Cave 1” at Qumran prompted the initial excavation of the site from 15 February to 5 March 1949 by the Jordanian Department of Antiquities led by Gerald Lankester Harding and Roland de Vaux.^[19] The Cave 1 site yielded discoveries of additional Dead Sea Scroll fragments, linen cloth, jars, and other artifacts.^[20]

Excavations of Qumran and new cave discoveries (1951–1956, 2017)[edit]

In November 1951, Roland de Vaux and his team from the ASOR began a full excavation of Qumran.^[21] By February 1952, the Bedouin had discovered 30 fragments in what was to be designated Cave 2.^[22] The discovery of a second cave eventually yielded 300 fragments from 33 manuscripts, including fragments of Jubilees and the Wisdom of Sirach written in Hebrew.^[20][21] The following month, on 14 March 1952, the ASOR team discovered a third cave with fragments of Jubilees and the Copper Scroll.^[22] Between September and December 1952 the fragments and scrolls of Caves 4, 5, and 6 were subsequently discovered by the ASOR teams.^[21]

With the monetary value of the scrolls rising as their historical significance was made more public, the Bedouins and the ASOR archaeologists accelerated their search for the scrolls separately in the same general area of Qumran, which was over 1 kilometer in length. Between 1953 and 1956, Roland de Vaux led four more archaeological expeditions in the area to uncover scrolls and artifacts.^[20] Cave 11 was discovered in 1956 and yielded the last fragments to be found in the vicinity of Qumran.^[23]

Caves 4–10 are clustered in an area lying in relative proximity 160 yards (ca. 150 metres) from Khirbet Qumran, while caves 1, 2, 3 and 11 are located 1 mile (1–2 kilometres) North, with Cave 3 being the most remote.^[24][25]

In February 2017, Hebrew University archaeologists announced the discovery of a new, 12th cave.^[26] There was one blank parchment found in a jar; however, broken and empty scroll jars and pickaxes suggest that the cave was looted in the 1950s.^[27]

Scrolls and fragments[edit]

See also: List of the Dead Sea Scrolls

This section needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (May 2012)

The Isaiah scroll (1QIsa^a) contains almost the whole Book of Isaiah.

The 972 manuscripts found at Qumran were found primarily in two separate formats: as scrolls and as fragments of previous scrolls and texts. In the fourth cave the fragments were torn into up to 15,000 pieces. These small fragments created somewhat of a problem for scholars. G.L. Harding, director of the Jordanian Department of Antiquities, began working on piecing the fragments together but did not finish this before his death in 1979.^[28]

Cave 1[edit]

The original seven scrolls from Cave 1 at Qumran are the Great Isaiah Scroll (1QIsa^a), a second copy of Isaiah (1QIsa^b), the Community Rule Scroll (1QS), the Pesher Habakkuk (1QpHab), the War Scroll (1QM), the Thanksgiving Hymns (1QH), and the Genesis Apocryphon (1QapGen).^[29]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 1
1QIsaa	Great Isaiah Scroll		Isaiah 1:1–31; 2:1–22; 3:1–5:30; 6:1–13; 7:1–25; 8:1–23; 9:1–20; 10:1–34; 11:1–45:25; 46:1–66:24	Hebrew	356–103 BCE/150–100 BCE	Contains all 66 chapters with occasional lacunae and some missing words at the bottom of some columns	[30][31]
1QIsab	Isaiah	cf. 1Q8	The Book of Isaiah	Hebrew	Hasmonean/Herodian	A second copy of portions of the Book of Isaiah	[32][33]
1QS	Serekh ha-Yahad or “Community Rule“			Hebrew		cf. 4QSa-j = 4Q255–64, 5Q11	[34]
1QpHab	Pesher on Habakkuk		Habakkuk 1 -2	Hebrew	Later half of the 1st century BC	Commentary on Habakkuk 1:2–17; 2:1–20	[35][36]
1QM	Milhamah or War Scroll			Hebrew		cf. 4Q491, 4Q493; 11Q14?
1QHa	Hodayot or Thanksgiving Hymns			Hebrew		Some parts are also preserved in 1QHb and 4QHa-f	[37]
1QapGen	Genesis Apocryphon		Genesis 12:18–15:4	Aramaic	25 BCE–50 CE		[38]
CTLevi	Cairo Geniza or Testament of Levi			Aramaic
1QGen	Genesis	1Q1	Genesis 1:18–21; 3:11–14; 22:13–15; 23:17–19; 24:22–24	Hebrew	Herodian		[39]
1QExod	Exodus	1Q2	Exodus 16:12–16; 19:24–20:2, 20:5–6; 20:25–21:1; 21:4–5	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[40]
1QpaleoLev	Leviticus – Numbers	1Q3	Leviticus 11:10–11; 19:30–34; 20:20–24; 21:24–22:6; 23:4–8 and Numbers 1:48–50	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman; Palaeo-Hebrew script		[41]
1QDeuta	Deuteronomy	1Q4	Deuteronomy 1:22–25; 4:47–49; 8:18–19; 9:27–28; 11:27–30; 13:1–6, 13–14; 14:21, 24–25; 16:4, 6–7	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[42][43]
1QDeutb	1Q5	Deuteronomy 1:9–13; 8:8–9; 9:10; 11:30–31; 15:14–15; 17:16; 21:8–9; 24:10–16; 25:13–18; 28:44–48; 29:9–20; 30:19–20; 31:1–10, 12–13; 32:17–29; 33:12–24	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[42][44]
1QJudg	Judges	1Q6	Judges 6:20–22; 8:1(?); 9:2–6, 28–31, 40–43, 48–49	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[45]
1QSam	Samuel	1Q7	2 Samuel 18:17–18; 2 Samuel 20:6–10; 21:16–18; 23:9–12	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[46]
IQIsab	Isaiah	Parts of 1QIsab as 1Q8	Isaiah 7:22–25; 8:1; 10:17–19; 12:3–6; 13:1–8, 16–19; 15:3–9; 16:1–2, 7–11; 19:7–17, 20–25; 20:1; 22:11–18, 24–25; 23:1–4; 24:18–23; 25:1–8; 26:1–5; 28:15–20; 29:1–8; 30:10–14, 21–26; 35:4–5; 37:8–12; 38:12–22; 39:1–8; 40:2–3; 41:3–23; 43:1–13, 23–27; 44:21–28; 45:1–13; 46:3–13; 47:1–14; 48:17–22; 49:1–15; 50:7–11; 51:1–10; 52:7–15; 53:1–12; 54:1–6; 55:2–13; 56:1–12; 57:1–4, 17–21; 58:1–14; 59:1–8, 20–21; 60:1–22; 61:1–2; 62:2–12; 63:1–19; 64:1, 6–8; 65:17–25; 66:1–24	Hebrew	Herodian		[32]
1QEzek	Ezekiel	Parts of 1QIsab as 1Q9	Ezekiel 4:16–17; 5:1	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[47]
1QPsa	Psalms	1Q10	Psalm 86:5–8; 92:12–14; 94:16; 95:11–96:2; 119:31–34, 43–48, 77–79	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[48]
1QPsb	1Q11	Psalm 126:6; 127:1–5; 128:3	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[49]
1QPsc	1Q12	Psalm 44:3–5, 7, 9, 23–25	Hebrew	Herodian		[50]
1QPhyl	Phylactery	1Q13	Deuteronomy 5:23–27; 11:8–11	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	58 fragments from a Phylactery	[42][51]
1QpMic	Pesher on Micah	1Q14		Hebrew	Herodian		[52]
1QpZeph	Pesher on Zephaniah	1Q15		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[53]
1QpPs	Pesher on Psalms	1Q16		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[54]
1QJuba	Jubilees	1Q17		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Jubilees	[55]
1QJubb	1Q18		Hebrew	Hasmonean	Jubilees	[56]
1QNoah	Book of Noah	1Q19		Hebrew	Herodian	Parts of the lost Book of Noah	[57]
1QapGen	Fragments of the “Genesis Apocryphon“	1Q20		Aramaic	Herodian		[58]
1QTLevi / 1QALD	Testament of Levi	1Q21		Aramaic	Hasmonean	Aramaic Levi Document	[59]
1QDM	“Dibrê Moshe” or “Words of Moses”	1Q22		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[60]
1QEnGiantsa	Book of Giants	1Q23		Aramaic	Hasmonean	Enoch	[61]
1QEnGiantsb	Book of Giants	1Q24		Aramaic	Hellenistic-Roman	Enoch	[62]
1Q Apocr.Prophecy	“Apocryphal Prophecy”	1Q25		Hebrew	Herodian		[63]
1Q Instruction	“Instruction”	1Q26		Hebrew	Hasmonean		[64]
1QMyst	“The Book of Mysteries“	1Q27		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[65]
1QS or 1QSa	“Rule of the Congregation“	1Q28 (1Q28a)		Hebrew	Hasmonean	Fragment from “Community Rule“	[66]
1QSb	“Rule of the Blessing” or “Rule of the Benedictions“	1Q28b		Hebrew	Hasmonean	[67]
1QapocrMoses B	Apocryphon of Moses	1Q29		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	“Liturgy of the Three Tongues of Fire”	[68]
1Q Liturgical Text(?) A	“Liturgical Text 1”	1Q30		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[69]
1Q Liturgical Text(?) B	“Liturgical Text 2”	1Q31		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[70]
1QNJ(?)	“New Jerusalem”	1Q32		Aramaic	Herodian	cf. 11Q18	[71]
1QM	Fragment of the 1QM or “War Scroll” or “Milhamah”	1Q33	Deuteronomy 20:2–5; Numbers 10:9, 24:17–19; Isaiah 31:8	Hebrew	30–1 BCEEarly Herodian		[42]
1QPrFetes / 1QLitPr	“Liturgical Prayers” or “Festival Prayers”	1Q34		Hebrew	Herodian		[72]
1QHb	“Hodayot” or “Thanksgiving Hymns“	1Q35		Hebrew	Herodian		[73]
1Q Hymns	“Hymns”	1Q36		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[74]
1Q Hymnic Composition(?)	“Hymnic Composition”	1Q37		Hebrew	Herodian		[75]
1Q Hymnic Composition(?)	“Hymnic Composition”	1Q38		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[76]
1Q Hymnic Composition(?)	“Hymnic Composition”	1Q39		Hebrew	Herodian		[77]
1Q Hymnic Composition(?)	“Hymnic Composition”	1Q40		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[78]
1Q41–70		1Q41–70		Hebrew		Unclassified Fragments	[79]
1QDana	Daniel	1Q71	Daniel 1:10–17; 2:2–6	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[80]
1QDanb	1Q72	Daniel 3:22–30	Aramaic	Hellenistic-Roman		[81]

Cave 2[edit]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 2
2QGen	Genesis	2Q1	Genesis 19:27–28; 36:6, 35–37	Hebrew	Herodian		[82][83]
2QExoda	Exodus	2Q2	Exodus 1:11–14; 7:1–4; 9:27–29; 11:3–7; 12:32–41; 21:18–20(?); 26:11–13; 30:21(?), 23–25; 32:32–34		[82][84]
2QExodb	2Q3	Exodus 4:31; 12:26–27(?); 18:21–22; 21:37–22:2, 15–19; 27:17–19; 31:16–17; 19:9; 34:10		[82][85]
2QExodc	2Q4	Exodus 5:3–5	Hellenistic-Roman		[82][86]
2QpaleoLev	Leviticus	2Q5	Leviticus 11:22-29	Hasmonean; Palaeo-Hebrew script		[82][87]
2QNuma	Numbers	2Q6	Numbers 3:38–41, 51– 4:3	Hebrew	Herodian		[82][88]
2QNumb	2Q7	Numbers 33:47–53		[82][89]
2QNumc	2Q8	Numbers 7:88		[82][90]
2QNumd?	2Q9	Numbers 18:8–9	Hellenistic-Roman	This fragment may belong to 2Q7; possibly = Leviticus 23:1–3	[82][91]
2QDeuta	Deuteronomy	2Q10	Deuteronomy 1:7–9	Hebrew	50–25 BCELate Hasmonean or Early Herodian		[82][42]
2QDeutb	2Q11	Deuteronomy 17:12–15	Hebrew	30 BCE – 68 CEHerodian		[82][42]
2QDeutc	2Q12	Deuteronomy 10:8–12	Hebrew	1–68 CELate Herodian		[82][42]
2QJer	Jeremiah	2Q13	Jeremiah 42:7–11, 14; 43:8–11; 44:1–3, 12–14; 46:27–47:7; 48:7, 25–39, 43–45; 49:10	Hebrew	Herodian	Doubtfully identified fragments: 13:22; 32:24–25; 48:2–4, 41–42	[92][93]
2QPs	Psalms	2Q14	Psalm 103:2–11; 104:6–11		[92][94]
2QJob	Job	2Q15	Job 33:28–30		[92][95]
2QRutha	Ruth	2Q16	Ruth 2:13–23; 3:1–8; 4:3–4	Hebrew	Herodian		[92][96]
2QRuthb	2Q17	Ruth 3:13–18	Hasmonean		[92][97]
2QSir	“Wisdom of Sirach” or “Ecclesiasticus“	2Q18	Sir 6:14–15 (or 1:19–20); 6:20–31	Hebrew	Herodian	Ben Sira	[92][98]
2QJuba	Book of Jubilees	2Q19	Genesis 25:7–9	Hebrew	Herodian	Jub 23:7–8	[92][99]
2QJubb	Book of Jubilees	2Q20	Exodus 1:7; Genesis 50:26, 22 (different order)	Jub 46:1–3	[100]
2QapMoses /2QapocrMoses(?)	“Apocryphon of Moses“	2Q21		Hebrew	Herodian	Apocryphal writing about Moses	[92][101]
2QapDavid /2QapocrDavid	“Apocryphon of David“	2Q22		Hebrew	Herodian	Apocryphal writing about David	[102][103]
2QapProph /2Qapocr.Prophecy	“Apocryphal Prophecy”	2Q23		Hebrew	Herodian	Apocryphal prophetic text in six tiny fragments.	[104][105]
2QNJ	“New Jerusalem”	2Q24		Aramaic	Herodian	Description of the New Jerusalem. cf. 1Q32 ar, 11Q18 ar	[104][106]
2Q Juridical Text	“Juridical Text”	2Q25		Hebrew	Herodian	A juridical text	[104][107]
2QEnGiants	“Book of Giants” from “Enoch“	2Q26		Aramaic	Herodian	Now known as part of the “Book of Giants”. cf. 6Q8	[108]
2Q272Q28 2Q292Q30 2Q312Q32 2Q33		2Q272Q28 2Q292Q30 2Q312Q32 2Q33				Unidentified Texts	[79][104]
2QX1		2QX1				Debris in a box	[104]

Cave 3[edit]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 3
3QEzek	Ezekiel	3Q1	Ezekiel 16:31–33	Hebrew	Herodian		[104][109]
3QPs	Psalms	3Q2	Psalm 2:6–7	Hebrew		[110][111]
3QLam	Lamentations	3Q3	Lamentations 1:10–12; 3:53–62	Hebrew		[110][112]
3QpIsa	Pesher on Isaiah	3Q4	Isaiah 1:1	Hebrew	Herodian		[110][113]
3QJub	Jubilees	3Q5		Hebrew	Herodian	Jubilees 23:6–7, 12–13, 23	[110][114]
3QHymn	Unidentified Hymn	3Q6		Hebrew	Herodian	Hymn of Praise	[110][115]
3QTJud(?)	Testament of Judah(?)	3Q7		Hebrew	Herodian	cf. 4Q484, 4Q538	[110][116]
3Q Text Mentioning Angel of Peace		3Q8		Hebrew	Herodian	Text about an Angel of Peace	[110][117]
3QSectarian text		3Q9		Hebrew	Herodian	Possible unidentified Sectarian text	[110][118]
3QUnc	Unidentified	3Q103Q11		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Unclassified fragments	[110]
3QUncA-B	Unclassified fragments	3Q123Q13		Aramaic	Hellenistic-Roman	Unclassified fragments	[119]
3QUncC	Unidentified	3Q14		Hebrew?	Hellenistic-Roman	21 unclassified fragments	[120][121]
3QCopScr	The Copper Scroll	3Q15		Hebrew	Roman	Copper plaque mentioning buried treasures	[120][122]

Caves 4a and 4b[edit]

The Damascus Document Scroll, 4Q271D^f, found in Cave 4

Cave 4 was discovered in August 1952, and was excavated on 22–29 September 1952 by Gerald Lankester Harding, Roland de Vaux, and Józef Milik.^[22][123] Cave 4 is actually two hand-cut caves (4a and 4b), but since the fragments were mixed, they are labeled as 4Q. Cave 4 is the most famous of Qumran caves both because of its visibility from the Qumran plateau and its productivity. It is visible from the plateau to the south of the Qumran settlement. It is by far the most productive of all Qumran caves, producing ninety percent of the Dead Sea Scrolls and scroll fragments (approx. 15,000 fragments from 500 different texts), including 9–10 copies of Jubilees, along with 21 tefillin and 7 mezuzot.

showFragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference

Cave 5[edit]

Cave 5 was discovered alongside Cave 6 in 1952, shortly after the discovery of Cave 4. Cave 5 produced approximately 25 manuscripts.^[22]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 5
5QDeut	Deuteronomy	5Q1	Deuteronomy 7:15–24; 8:5–9:2	Hebrew	Early Hellenistic		[42][352][353]
5QKgs	Kings	5Q2	1 Kings 1:1,16–17,27–37	Hebrew	Hasmonean		[354][355]
5QIsa	Isaiah	5Q3	Isaiah 40:16,18–19	Hebrew	Herodian		[354][356]
5QAmos	Amos	5Q4	Amos 1:2–5	Hebrew			[354]
5QPs	Psalms	5Q5	Psalm 119:99–101,104,113–20,138–42	Hebrew	Herodian		[354][357]
5QLama	Lamentations	5Q6	Lamentations 4:5–8,11–16,19–22; 5:1–13,16–17	Hebrew	Herodian		[354][358]
5QLamb	5Q7	Lamentations 4:17–20	Hebrew	Herodian		[354][359]
5QPhyl	Phylactery	5Q8		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Phylactery in its unopened case	[354][360]
5QapocrJosh or 5QToponyms	Toponyms	5Q9		Hebrew	Herodian	Seven fragments with names of places	[354][361]
5QapocrMal	Apocryphon of Malachi	5Q10		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Apocryphon of Malachi	[354][362]
5QS	Rule of Community (Serek ha-Yahad)	5Q11		Hebrew	Herodian		[354][363]
5QD	Damascus Document	5Q12		Hebrew	Herodian	Damascus Document	[354][364]
5QRule or 5QRégle	Rule of Community	5Q13		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Fragments related to 1QS	[365][366]
5QCurses	Curses	5Q14		Hebrew	Herodian	Liturgical compositions with curses	[365][367]
5QNJ	New Jerusalem Scroll	5Q15		Aramaic	Hellenistic-Roman	Description of the New Jerusalem	[365][368]
5QUnid	Unidentified	5Q16–5Q24		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Unidentified fragments	[365]
5QUnc	Unclassified	5Q25		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Unclassified fragments	[365][369]

Cave 6[edit]

Cave 6 was discovered alongside Cave 5 in 1952, shortly after the discovery of Cave 4. Cave 6 contained fragments of about 31 manuscripts.^[22]

List of groups of fragments collected from Wadi Qumran Cave 6:^[370][371]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 6
6QpaleoGen	Genesis	6Q1	Genesis 6:13–21	Hebrew	Early Hellenistic; Palaeo-Hebrew script		[372][373]
6QpaleoLev	Leviticus	6Q2	Leviticus 8:12–13	Hebrew	Early Hellenistic; Palaeo-Hebrew script		[372][374]
pap6QDeut or 6QpapDeut(?)	Deuteronomy	6Q3	Deuteronomy 26:19	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	A few letters of Deuteronomy 26:19 on papyrus	[372][42][375]
6QpapKgs	Kings	6Q4	1 Kings 3:12–14; 12:28–31; 22:28–31; 2 Kings 5:26; 6:32; 7:8–10,20; 8:1–5; 9:1–2; 10:19–21	Hebrew	Hasmonean	Made up of 94 Fragments.	[372][376]
pap6QPs or 6QpapPs(?)	Psalms	6Q5	Psalm 78:36–37	Hebrew	Herodian		[377][378]
6QCant	Song of Songs	6Q6	Song of Songs 1:1–7	Hebrew	Herodian		[377][379]
6QpapDan	Daniel	6Q7	Daniel 8:20–21; 10:8–16; 11:33–36,38; 8:16–17	Hebrew	Herodian	13 papyrus fragments.	[377][380]
6QpapGiants or pap6QEnGiants	Book of Giants from Enoch	6Q8		Aramaic	Herodian	Part of the “Book of Giants”	[377][381]
6Qpap apocrSam-Kgs or pap6QapocrSam/Kgs	Apocryphon on Samuel–Kings	6Q9		Hebrew	Hasmonean	Samuel–Kings apocryphon. Written on papyrus.	[377][382]
6QpapaProph or pap6QProph	Unidentified prophetic fragment	6Q10		Hebrew	Hasmonean	Prophetic text. Written in papyrus	[377][383]
6QAllegory	Allegory of the Vine	6Q11		Hebrew	Herodian	Fragment containing an Allegory mentioning a vine	[377][384]
6QapProph	An apocryphal prophecy	6Q12		Herodian		[377][385]
6QPriestProph	Priestly Prophecy	6Q13		Herodian	A priestly prophecy	[377][386]
6Q Apocalypse	Apocalyptic text	6Q14		Aramaic	Herodian	Two fragments with apocalyptic text	[377][387]
6QD	Damascus Document	6Q15		Hebrew	Herodian	Damascus Document 4:19–21; 5:13–14,18–21; 6:1–2,20–21; 7:1	[377][388]
6QpapBened or pap6QBen	papBenediction	6Q16		Herodian	Blessings related 1QSb. On papyrus	[389][390]
6QCalDoc	Calendrical Document	6Q17		Herodian	Calendric fragment	[389][391]
pap6QHymn	Hymn	6Q18		Herodian	Fragment of a hymn, related to 1QM	[389][392]
6Q Text Related to Genesis	Genesis	6Q19	Possibly from Genesis	Aramaic	Herodian	Related to Genesis 10:6,20	[389][393]
6QDeut(?)	Deuteronomy	6Q20	Possibly from Deuteronomy	Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	Related to Deuteronomy 11:10	[389][394]
6QfrgProph or 6Q Prophetic Text	Possibly prophetic text	6Q21		Hebrew	Herodian	Prophetic fragment containing 5 words.	[389][395]
pap6QUnidA	Unclassified fragments	6Q22		Hebrew	Herodian		[389][396]
pap6QUnidA ar	Unclassified fragments	6Q23		Aramaic	Herodian	Related to “Words of the Book of Michael”	[389][397]
6QUnidB	Unclassified fragments	6Q24		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[389][398]
6QUnidB	Unclassified fragments	6Q25		Aramaic	Herodian		[389][399]
6QUnidB or 6QpapAccount or Contract	Accounts or contracts	6Q26		Aramaic	Hellenistic-Roman		[389][400]
6QUnidB	Unclassified fragments	6Q27–6Q28		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman		[389]
6QpapProv	Proverbs	6Q30	Proverbs 11:4b–7a,10b	Hebrew	Roman	Single six-line fragment	[389][401]
6QUnidB	Unclassified fragments	6Q31		Aramaic	Herodian		[389][402]

Cave 7[edit]

Dead Sea Scroll fragments 7Q4, 7Q5, and 7Q8 from Cave 7 in Qumran, written on papyrus.

Cave 7 yielded fewer than 20 fragments of Greek documents, including 7Q2 (the “Letter of Jeremiah” = Baruch 6), 7Q5 (which became the subject of much speculation in later decades), and a Greek copy of a scroll of Enoch.^{[403][404][405]} Cave 7 also produced several inscribed potsherds and jars.^[406]

Lists of groups of fragments collected from Wadi Qumran Cave 7:^[370][371]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 7
7QpapLXXExod	Exodus	7Q1	Exodus 28:4–7	Greek	Hasmonean	Greek fragment of Exodus	[407]
7QpapEpJer	Letter of Jeremiah	7Q2	Letter of Jeremiah verses 43–44	Greek	Hasmonean	Epistle of Jeremiah. On papyrus.	[408]
7Q3	Unidentified	7Q3		Greek	Herodian	Unknown biblical text	[409]
7Q4	Unidentified	7Q4		Greek	Hasmonean	Unknown biblical text	[410]
7Q5	Unidentified	7Q5		Greek	Herodian	Unknown biblical text. Believed by some to be Mark 6:52–53	[411]
7Q6–18	Unidentified	7Q6–18		Greek	Hellenistic-Roman; Herodian	Very tiny unidentified fragments written on papyrus	[79]
7Q papImprint	Unidentified	7Q19		Greek	Herodian	Unidentified papyrus imprint. Very tiny fragments written on papyrus	[412]

Cave 8[edit]

Cave 8, along with caves 7 and 9, was one of the only caves that are accessible by passing through the settlement at Qumran. Carved into the southern end of the Qumran plateau, cave 8 was excavated by archaeologists in 1957.

Cave 8 produced five fragments: Genesis (8QGen), Psalms (8QPs), a tefillin fragment (8QPhyl), a mezuzah (8QMez), and a hymn (8QHymn).^[413] Cave 8 also produced several tefillin cases, a box of leather objects, tons of lamps, jars, and the sole of a leather shoe.^[406]

List of groups of fragments collected from Wadi Qumran Cave 8:^[370][371]

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 8
8QGen	Genesis	8Q1	Genesis 17:12–13, 15, 18–19; 18:20–22, 24–25	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
8QPs	Psalms	8Q2	Psalm 17:5–9, 14; 18:5–12	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
8QPhyl	Phylacteries	8Q3	Exodus 13:1–16; 12:43–51; 20:11Deuteronomy 6:4–5; 6:1–3; 10:20–22; 10:12–19; 5:1–14; 10:13; 11:2–3; 10:21–22; 11:1; 11:6–12	Hebrew	1–100 CEHerodian	Fragments from a “Phylactery”	[42]
8QMez	Mezuzah	8Q4	Deuteronomy 10:1–11:21	Hebrew	30 BCE–68 CEHerodian		[42]
8QHymn	Unidentified hymn	8Q5		Hebrew	Herodian	Non-biblical composition.	[79]

Cave 9[edit]

Cave 9, along with caves 7 and 8, was one of the only caves that are accessible by passing through the settlement at Qumran. Carved into the southern end of the Qumran plateau, Cave 9 was excavated by archaeologists in 1957. There was only one fragment found in Cave 9.

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 9
9Qpap	Unidentified	9Q1		Hebrew	Roman	Written on papyrus.	[414]

Cave 10[edit]

In Cave 10 archaeologists found two ostraca with writing on them, along with an unknown symbol on a grey stone slab.

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 10
10QOstracon	Ostracon	10Q1		Hebrew		Two letters written on a piece of pottery.	[15]

Cave 11[edit]

A view of part of the Temple Scroll that was found in Qumran Cave 11.

Cave 11 was discovered in 1956 and yielded 21 texts, some of which were quite long. The Temple Scroll, so called because more than half of it pertains to the construction of the Temple of Jerusalem, was found in Cave 11, and is by far the longest scroll. It is now 26.7 feet (8.15 m) long. Its original length may have been over 28 feet (8.75 m). The Temple Scroll was regarded by Yigael Yadin as “The Torah According to the Essenes”. On the other hand, Hartmut Stegemann, a contemporary and friend of Yadin, believed the scroll was not to be regarded as such, but was a document without exceptional significance. Stegemann notes that it is not mentioned or cited in any known Essene writing.^[415]

Also in Cave 11, an eschatological fragment about the biblical figure Melchizedek (11Q13) was found. Cave 11 also produced a copy of Jubilees, and a proto-Masoteric text of the Torah scroll (only a fragment of the Book of Leviticus surviving), known as the Paleo-Hebrew Leviticus scroll.

According to former chief editor of the DSS editorial team John Strugnell, there are at least four privately owned scrolls from Cave 11, that have not yet been made available for scholars. Among them is a complete Aramaic manuscript of the Book of Enoch.^[416]

List of groups of fragments collected from Wadi Qumran Cave 11:

Fragment or Scroll Identifier	Fragment or Scroll Name	Alternative Identifier	English Bible Association	Language	Date/Script	Description	Reference
Qumran Cave 11
11QpaleoLeva	Paleo-Leviticusa	11Q1	Leviticus 4:24–26; 10:4–7; 11:27–32; 13:3–9; 13:39–43; 14:16–21; 14:52–15:5; 16:2–4; 16:34–17:5; 18:27–19:4; 20:1–6; 21:6–11; 22:21–27; 23:22–29; 24:9–14; 25:28–36; 26:17–26; 27:11–19	Hebrew	Herodian/palaeo-Hebrew script		[79]
11QLevb	Leviticusb	11Q2	Leviticus	Hebrew	Herodian/palaeo-Hebrew script		[79]
11QDeut	Deuteronomy	11Q3	Deuteronomy 1:4–5; 2:28–30	Hebrew	50 CELate Herodian		[42]
11QEzek	Ezekiel	11Q4	Ezekiel	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QPs	The Great Psalms Scroll	11Q5	Psalms	Hebrew	Herodian	A unique Psalms scroll with only about a quarter of the Masoretic psalms (in atypical order), three Syriac psalms, one from Ben Sira, and the only known copies of three more unique psalms—Plea for Deliverance, Apostrophe to Zion, and Hymn to the Creator—all of which are unattested by other sources, as well as the short text of David’s Compositions.	[79]
11QPsa	Psalms	11Q5		Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QPsb	11Q6	Psalm 77:18–21; 78:1; 109:3–4; 118:1; 118:15–16; 119:163–165; 133:1–3; 141:10; 144:1–2	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QPsc	11Q7	Psalm 2:1–8; 9:3–7; 12:5–9; 13:1–6; 14:1–6; 17:9–15; 18:1–12; 19:4–8; 25:2–7	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QPsd	11Q8	Psalm 6:2–4; 9:3–6; 18:26–29; 18:39–42; 36:13; 37:1–4; 39:13–14; 40:1; 43:1–3; 45:6–8; 59:5–8; 68:1–5; 68:14–18; 78:5–12; 81:4–9; 86:11–14; 115:16–18; 116:1	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QPse	11Q9	Psalm 50:3–7	Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QtgJob	Targum Job	11Q10	Job	Aramaic	Herodian	A unique Aramaic translation of the Book of Job; presents Job somewhat more favourably.	[79]
11QapocrPs	Apocryphal Psalms	11Q11	Psalm 91	Hebrew	Herodian	Apocryphal paraphrase of Psalms 91	[79]
11QJub	Jubilees	11Q12		Hebrew	Herodian	Ethiopic text of Jubilees 4:6–11; 4:13–14; 4:16–17; 4:29–31; 5:1–2; 12:15–17; 12:28–29	[79]
11QMelch	Melchizedek	11Q13	Contains Pesher/commentary on Leviticus 25:13; Deuteronomy 15:2; Psalm 7:8–9; 82:2; Isaiah 52:7; Daniel 9:25; Leviticus 25:9	Hebrew	50–25 BCE or 75–50 BCELate Hasmonean or Early Herodian	Describes a tenth jubilee and portrays Melchizedek as a messianic agent of salvation, using similar language to that used for Jesus in Hebrews, such as “Heavenly Prince Melchizedek”	[79][42]
11Q Sefer ha-Milmah	Sefer ha-Milmah (“The Book of War”)	11Q14		Hebrew	Herodian	An account of the final eschatological battle of the Israelites and the Kittim (Romans), including a messianic figure named the “Prince of the Congregation.”	[79]
11QHymnsa	Hymns	11Q15		Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QHymnsb	11Q16		Hebrew	Herodian		[79]
11QShirShabb	Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice	11Q17		Hebrew	Herodian	Collection of 13 hymns describing a heavenly temple service.	[79]
11QNJ	New Jerusalem	11Q18		Aramaic	Herodian	Appears to be an apocalyptic vision, including some architectural details of a very large city (cf. Ezekiel and Revelation)	[79]
11QTa	Temple Scroll	11Q19		Hebrew	Herodian	Rephrases the Pentateuch laws in the spirit of Deuteronomy, seeks to resolve biblical legal conflicts and expand ritual laws.	[79]
11QTb	Temple Scroll	11Q20		Hebrew	Herodian	[79]
11QTc	11Q21		Hebrew	Herodian	[79]
11Q Unidentified	Unidentified	11Q22		Hebrew	Hasmonean	Unidentified fragments.	[79]
11Q23		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	[79]
11Q24		Aramaic	Hasmonean	[79]
11Q25		Hebrew	Herodian	[79]
11Q26		Hebrew	Herodian	[79]
11Q27		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	[79]
11Q28		Hebrew	Hellenistic-Roman	[79]
		11Q29				Serekh ha-Yahad related
11Q Unidentified	Unidentified	11Q30		Hebrew	Herodian	Unidentified fragments.	[79]
11Q Unidentified	Unidentified	11Q31				Unidentified wads	[417]
11Q9999	Unidentified				Hellenistic-Roman		[79]

Cave 12[edit]

Cave 12 was discovered in February 2017 on cliffs west of Qumran, near the northwestern shore of the Dead Sea.^[26] Archaeological examination found pickaxes and empty broken scroll jars, indicating that the cave had been discovered and looted in the 1950s. One of the joint Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Liberty University of Virginia project’s lead researchers, Dr. Oren Gutfeld, stated, “Although at the end of the day no scroll was found, and instead we ‘only’ found a piece of parchment rolled up in a jug that was being processed for writing, the findings indicate beyond any doubt that the cave contained scrolls that were stolen.”^[27]

Fragments with unknown provenance[edit]

Some fragments of scrolls have neither significant archaeological provenance nor records that reveal in which designated Qumran cave area they were found. They are believed to have come from Wadi Qumran caves, but are just as likely to have come from other archaeological sites in the Judaean Desert area.^[418] These fragments have therefore been designated to the temporary “X” series.

Fragment/Scroll #	Fragment/Scroll Name	KJV Bible Association	Description
XQ1-3	“Tefillin from Qumran”	Deuteronomy 5:1 – 6:3; 10:12 – 11:12.[418]	First published in 1969; Phylacteries
XQ4	“Tefillin from Qumran”		Phylacteries
XQ5a	Jubilees 7:4–5
XQ5b	Hymn
XQ6	Offering		Small fragment with only one word in Aramaic.
XQ7	Unidentified fragment		Strong possibility that it is part of 4QInstruction.
XQpapEn	Book of Enoch 9:1		One small fragment written in Hebrew. = XQ8

Gallery[edit]

• The War Scroll, found in Qumran Cave 1.
• A portion of the second discovered copy of the Isaiah scroll, 1QIsa^b.
• Part of Dead Sea Scroll 28a from Qumran Cave 1. The Jordan Museum, Amman
• Dead Sea Scroll, Pesher Isaiah, from Qumran Cave 4. The Jordan Museum, Amman
• Dead Sea Scroll 175, Testimonia, from Qumran Cave 4. The Jordan Museum, Amman
• Dead Sea Scroll 109, Qohelet or Ecclesiastes, from Qumran Cave 4. The Jordan Museum, Amman

Origin[edit]

There has been much debate about the origin of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The dominant theory remains that the scrolls were the product of a sect of Jews living at nearby Qumran called the Essenes, but this theory has come to be challenged by several modern scholars.^[419]

Qumran–Essene theory[edit]

Main article: Qumran § Qumran-Essene hypothesis

The view among scholars, almost universally held until the 1990s, is the “Qumran–Essene” hypothesis originally posited by Roland Guérin de Vaux^[420] and Józef Tadeusz Milik,^[421] though independently both Eliezer Sukenik and Butrus Sowmy of St Mark’s Monastery connected scrolls with the Essenes well before any excavations at Qumran.^[422] The Qumran–Essene theory holds that the scrolls were written by the Essenes, or by another Jewish sectarian group, residing at Khirbet Qumran. They composed the scrolls and ultimately hid them in the nearby caves during the Jewish Revolt sometime between 66 and 68 CE. The site of Qumran was destroyed and the scrolls never recovered. A number of arguments are used to support this theory.

• There are striking similarities between the description of an initiation ceremony of new members in the Community Rule and descriptions of the Essene initiation ceremony mentioned in the works of Flavius Josephus – a Jewish–Roman historian of the Second Temple Period.
• Josephus mentions the Essenes as sharing property among the members of the community, as does the Community Rule.
• During the excavation of Khirbet Qumran, two inkwells and plastered elements thought to be tables were found, offering evidence that some form of writing was done there. More inkwells were discovered nearby. De Vaux called this area the “scriptorium” based upon this discovery.
• Several Jewish ritual baths (Hebrew: miqvah = מקוה) were discovered at Qumran, offering evidence of an observant Jewish presence at the site.
• Pliny the Elder (a geographer writing after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE) describes a group of Essenes living in a desert community on the northwest shore of the Dead Sea near the ruined town of ‘Ein Gedi.

Qumran–Sectarian theory[edit]

Qumran–Sectarian theories are variations on the Qumran–Essene theory. The main point of departure from the Qumran–Essene theory is hesitation to link the Dead Sea Scrolls specifically with the Essenes. Most proponents of the Qumran–Sectarian theory understand a group of Jews living in or near Qumran to be responsible for the Dead Sea Scrolls, but do not necessarily conclude that the sectarians are Essenes.

A specific variation on the Qumran–Sectarian theory that has gained much recent popularity is the work of Lawrence H. Schiffman, who proposes that the community was led by a group of Zadokite priests (Sadducees).^[423] The most important document in support of this view is the “Miqsat Ma’ase Ha-Torah” (4QMMT), which cites purity laws (such as the transfer of impurities) identical to those attributed in rabbinic writings to the Sadducees. 4QMMT also reproduces a festival calendar that follows Sadducee principles for the dating of certain festival days.

Christian origin theory[edit]

Spanish Jesuit José O’Callaghan Martínez argued in the 1960s that one fragment (7Q5) preserves a portion of text from the New Testament Gospel of Mark 6:52–53.^[424] This theory was falsified in the year 2000 by paleographic analysis of the particular fragment.^[425]

Robert Eisenman has advanced the theory that some scrolls describe the early Christian community. Eisenman also argued that the careers of James the Just and Paul the Apostle correspond to events recorded in some of these documents.^[426]

Jerusalem origin theory[edit]

Some scholars have argued that the scrolls were the product of Jews living in Jerusalem, who hid the scrolls in the caves near Qumran while fleeing from the Romans during the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE.^[427] Karl Heinrich Rengstorf first proposed that the Dead Sea Scrolls originated at the library of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem.^[428] Later, Norman Golb suggested that the scrolls were the product of multiple libraries in Jerusalem, and not necessarily the Jerusalem Temple library.^[429][430] Proponents of the Jerusalem Origin theory point to the diversity of thought and handwriting among the scrolls as evidence against a Qumran origin of the scrolls. Several archaeologists have also accepted an origin of the scrolls other than Qumran, including Yizhar Hirschfeld^[431] and more recently Yizhak Magen and Yuval Peleg,^[432] who all understand the remains of Qumran to be those of a Hasmonean fort that was reused during later periods.

Physical characteristics[edit]

Fragments 1 and 2 of ‘7Q6’ from Cave 7 are written on papyrus.

Radiocarbon dating[edit]

Main article: Carbon dating the Dead Sea Scrolls

Parchment from a number of the Dead Sea Scrolls has been carbon dated. The initial test performed in 1950 was on a piece of linen from one of the caves. This test gave an indicative dating of 33 CE plus or minus 200 years, eliminating early hypotheses relating the scrolls to the medieval period.^[433] Since then two large series of tests have been performed on the scrolls themselves. The results were summarized by VanderKam and Flint, who said the tests give “strong reason for thinking that most of the Qumran manuscripts belong to the last two centuries BCE and the first century CE.”^[17]:32

Paleographic dating[edit]

Analysis of letter forms, or palaeography, was applied to the texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls by a variety of scholars in the field. Major linguistic analysis by Cross and Avigad dates fragments from 225 BCE to 50 CE.^[434] These dates were determined by examining the size, variability, and style of the text.^[435] The same fragments were later analyzed using radiocarbon dating and were dated to an estimated range of 385 BCE to 82 CE with a 68% accuracy rate.^[434]

Ink and parchment[edit]

The scrolls were analyzed using a cyclotron at the University of California, Davis, where it was found that all black ink was carbon black.^[436] The red ink on the scrolls was found to be made with cinnabar (HgS, mercury sulfide).^[437] There are only four uses of this red ink in the entire collection of Dead Sea Scroll fragments.^[437] The black inks found on the scrolls that are made up of carbon soot were found to be from olive oil lamps.^[438] Honey, oil, vinegar, and water were often added to the mixture to thin the ink to a proper consistency for writing.^[438] In order to apply the ink to the scrolls, its writers used reed pens.^[439]

The Dead Sea scrolls were written on parchment made of processed animal hide known as vellum (approximately 85.5–90.5% of the scrolls), papyrus (estimated at 8.0–13.0% of the scrolls), and sheets of bronze composed of about 99.0% copper and 1.0% tin (approximately 1.5% of the scrolls).^[439][440] For those scrolls written on animal hides, scholars with the Israeli Antiquities Authority, by use of DNA testing for assembly purposes, believe that there may be a hierarchy in the religious importance of the texts based on which type of animal was used to create the hide. Scrolls written on goat and calf hides are considered by scholars to be more significant in nature, while those written on gazelle or ibex are considered to be less religiously significant in nature.^[441]

In addition, tests by the National Institute of Nuclear Physics in Sicily, Italy, have suggested that the origin of parchment of select Dead Sea Scroll fragments is from the Qumran area itself, by using X-ray and Particle Induced X-ray emission testing of the water used to make the parchment that were compared with the water from the area around the Qumran site.^[442]

Preservation[edit]

Two of the pottery jars that held some of the Dead Sea Scrolls found at Qumran.Two Dead Sea Scrolls jars at the Jordan Museum, Amman

The Dead Sea Scrolls that were found were originally preserved by the dry, arid, and low humidity conditions present within the Qumran area adjoining the Dead Sea.^[443] In addition, the lack of the use of tanning materials on the parchment of the Dead Sea Scrolls and the very low airflow in the Qumran caves also contributed significantly to their preservation.^[444] Some of the scrolls were found stored in clay jars within the Qumran caves, further helping to preserve them from deterioration. The original handling of the scrolls by archaeologists and scholars was done inappropriately, and, along with their storage in an uncontrolled environment, they began a process of more rapid deterioration than they had experienced at Qumran.^[445] During the first few years in the late 1940s and early 1950s, adhesive tape used to join fragments and seal cracks caused significant damage to the documents.^[445] The Government of Jordan had recognized the urgency of protecting the scrolls from deterioration and the presence of the deterioration among the scrolls.^[446] However, the government did not have adequate funds to purchase all the scrolls for their protection and agreed to have foreign institutions purchase the scrolls and have them held at their museum in Jerusalem until they could be “adequately studied”.^[446]

In early 1953, they were moved to the Palestine Archaeological Museum (commonly called the Rockefeller Museum)^[447] in East Jerusalem and through their transportation suffered more deterioration and damage.^[17]:63–65 The museum was underfunded and had limited resources with which to examine the scrolls, and, as a result, conditions of the “scrollery” and storage area were left relatively uncontrolled by modern standards.^[17] The museum had left most of the fragments and scrolls lying between window glass, trapping the moisture in with them, causing an acceleration in the deterioration process. During a portion of the conflict during the 1956 war waged by Israel, Britain and France against Egypt, the scrolls collection of the Palestine Archaeological Museum was stored in the vault of the Ottoman Bank in Amman, Jordan.^[448] Damp conditions from temporary storage of the scrolls in the Ottoman Bank vault from 1956 to the Spring of 1957 led to a more rapid rate of deterioration of the scrolls. The conditions caused mildew to develop on the scrolls and fragments, and some fragments were partially destroyed or made illegible by the glue and paper of the manila envelopes in which they were stored while in the vault.^[448] By 1958 it was noted that up to 5% of some of the scrolls had completely deteriorated.^[446] Many of the texts had become illegible and many of the parchments had darkened considerably.^[17][445]

Until the 1970s, the scrolls continued to deteriorate because of poor storage arrangements, exposure to different adhesives, and being trapped in moist environments.^[445] Fragments written on parchment (rather than papyrus or bronze) in the hands of private collectors and scholars suffered an even worse fate than those in the hands of the museum, with large portions of fragments being reported to have disappeared by 1966.^[449] In the late 1960s, the deterioration was becoming a major concern with scholars and museum officials alike. Scholars John Allegro and Sir Francis Frank were among the first to strongly advocate for better preservation techniques.^[17] Early attempts made by both the British and Israel Museums to remove the adhesive tape ended up exposing the parchment to an array of chemicals, including “British Leather Dressing,” and darkening some of them significantly.^[17] In the 1970s and 1980s, other preservation attempts were made that included removing the glass plates and replacing them with cardboard and removing pressure against the plates that held the scrolls in storage; however, the fragments and scrolls continued to rapidly deteriorate during this time.^[445]

In 1991, the Israeli Antiquities Authority established a temperature-controlled laboratory for the storage and preservation of the scrolls. The actions and preservation methods of Rockefeller Museum staff were concentrated on the removal of tape, oils, metals, salt, and other contaminants.^[445] The fragments and scrolls are preserved using acid-free cardboard and stored in solander boxes in the climate-controlled storage area.^[445]

Nine tiny phylactery slips were rediscovered by the Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA) in 2014, after they had been stored unopened for six decades following their excavation in 1952. The IAA is preparing to unroll the phylacteries or tefillin once a safe procedure has been decided upon.^[450][451]

Photography and assembly[edit]

Since the Dead Sea Scrolls were initially held by different parties during and after the excavation process, they were not all photographed by the same organization.

First photographs by the American Schools of Oriental Research (1948)[edit]

The first individual person to photograph a portion of the collection was John C. Trever (1916–2006), a Biblical scholar and archaeologist, who was a resident for the American Schools of Oriental Research.^[17]:68 He photographed three of the scrolls discovered in Cave 1 on 21 February 1948, both on black-and-white and standard color film.^{[17]:26[452][453]} Although an amateur photographer, the quality of his photographs often exceeded the visibility of the scrolls themselves as, over the years, the ink of the texts quickly deteriorated after they were removed from their linen wrappings.

Infrared photography and plate assembly by the Palestine Archaeological Museum (1952–1967)[edit]

A majority of the collection from the Qumran caves was acquired by the Palestine Archaeological Museum. The Museum had the scrolls photographed by Najib Albina, a local Arab photographer trained by Lewis Larsson of the American Colony in Jerusalem,^[454] Between 1952 and 1967, Albina documented the five-stage process of the sorting and assembly of the scrolls, done by the curator and staff of the Palestine Archaeological Museum, using infrared photography. Using a process known today as broadband fluorescence infrared photography, or NIR photography, Najib and the team at the Museum produced over 1,750 photographic plates of the scrolls and fragments.^{[17]:68[455][456][457]} The photographs were taken with the scrolls laid out on animal skin, using large format film, which caused the text to stand out, making the plates especially useful for assembling fragments.^[17]:68 These are the earliest photographs of the museum’s collection, which was the most complete in the world at the time, and they recorded the fragments and scrolls before their further decay in storage, so they are often considered the best recorded copies of the scrolls.^[458]

Israel Antiquities Authority and NASA digital infrared imaging (1993–2012)[edit]

A previously unreadable fragment of the Dead Sea Scrolls photographed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory using digital infrared technology. Translated into English it reads: “He wrote the words of Noah.”

Beginning in 1993, the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration used digital infrared imaging technology to produce photographs of Dead Sea Scrolls fragments.^[459] In partnership with the Ancient Biblical Manuscript Center and West Semitic Research, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory successfully worked to expand on the use of infrared photography previously used to evaluate ancient manuscripts by expanding the range of spectra at which images are photographed.^[460] NASA used this multi-spectral imaging technique, adapted from its remote sensing and planetary probes, in order to reveal previously illegible text on fragments of the Dead Sea Scrolls.^[460] The process uses a liquid crystal tunable filter in order to photograph the scrolls at specific wavelengths of light and, as a result, image distortion is significantly diminished.^[459] This method was used with select fragments of the Dead Sea Scrolls to reveal text and details that cameras that take photographs using a larger light spectrum could not reveal.^[459] The camera and digital imaging assembly was developed specifically for the purpose of photographing illegible ancient texts.^[461]

On 18 December 2012^[462] the first output of this project was launched together with Google on the dedicated site Deadseascrolls.org.il.^[463] The site contains both digitizations of old images taken in the 1950s and about 1000 new images taken with the new NASA technology.^[464]

Israel Antiquities Authority and DNA scroll assembly (2006–2012)[edit]

Scientists with the Israeli Antiquities Authority have used DNA from the parchment on which the Dead Sea Scrolls fragments were written, in concert with infrared digital photography, to assist in the reassembly of the scrolls. For scrolls written on parchment made from animal hide and papyrus, scientists with the museum are using DNA code to associate fragments with different scrolls and to help scholars determine which scrolls may hold greater significance based on the type of material that was used.^[441]

Israel Museum of Jerusalem and Google digitization project (2011–2016)[edit]

In partnership with Google, the Museum of Jerusalem is working to photograph the Dead Sea Scrolls and make them available to the public digitally, although not placing the images in the public domain.^[465] The lead photographer of the project, Ardon Bar-Hama, and his team are utilizing the Alpa 12 MAX camera accompanied with a Leaf Aptus-II back in order to produce ultra-high resolution digital images of the scrolls and fragments.^[466] With photos taken at 1,200 megapixels, the results are digital images that can be used to distinguish details that are invisible to the naked eye. In order to minimize damage to the scrolls and fragments, photographers are using a 1/4000th of a second exposure time and UV-protected flash tubes.^[465] The digital photography project was estimated in 2011 to cost approximately 3.5 million U.S. dollars.^[466]

Scholarly examination[edit]

Eleazar Sukenik examining one of the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1951.

After most of the scrolls and fragments were moved to the Palestine Archaeological Museum in 1953, scholars began to assemble them and log them for translation and study in a room that became known as the “Scrollery”.^[467]

The text of the Dead Sea Scrolls is written in four different languages: Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and Nabataean.

Language	Script	Percentage of Documents	Centuries of Known Use
Hebrew	Assyrian block script[468]	Estimated 76.0–79.0%	3rd century BCE to present
Hebrew	Cryptic scripts “A” “B” and “C”[469][470][471]	Estimated 0.9–1.0%[472]	Unknown
Biblical Hebrew	Paleo-Hebrew script[473]	Estimated 1.0–1.5%[471]	10th century BCE to the 2nd century CE
Biblical Hebrew	Paleo-Hebrew scribal script[473]
Aramaic	Aramaic square script	Estimated 16.0–17.0%[474]	8th century BCE to present
Greek	Greek uncial script[473]	Estimated 3.0%[471]	3rd century CE to 8th centuries CE
Nabataean	Nabataean script[475]	Estimated 0.2%[475]	2nd century BCE to the 4th century CE

Publication[edit]

Physical publication and controversy[edit]

Scholars assembling Dead Sea Scrolls fragments at the Rockefeller Museum (formerly the Palestine Archaeological Museum).

Some of the fragments and scrolls were published early. Most of the longer, more complete scrolls were published soon after their discovery. All the writings in Cave 1 appeared in print between 1950 and 1956; those from eight other caves were released in 1963; and 1965 saw the publication of the Psalms Scroll from Cave 11. Their translations into English soon followed.

Controversy[edit]

Publication of the scrolls has taken many decades, and delays have been a source of academic controversy. The scrolls were controlled by a small group of scholars headed by John Strugnell, while a majority of scholars had access neither to the scrolls nor even to photographs of the text. Scholars such as Hershel Shanks, Norman Golb, and many others argued for decades for publishing the texts, so that they become available to researchers. This controversy only ended in 1991, when the Biblical Archaeology Society was able to publish the “Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls”, after an intervention of the Israeli government and the Israeli Antiquities Authority (IAA).^[476] In 1991 Emanuel Tov was appointed as the chairman of the Dead Sea Scrolls Foundation, and publication of the scrolls followed in the same year.

Physical description[edit]

The majority of the scrolls consist of tiny, brittle fragments, which were published at a pace considered by many to be excessively slow. During early assembly and translation work by scholars through the Rockefeller Museum from the 1950s through the 1960s, access to the unpublished documents was limited to the editorial committee.^{[citation needed]}

Discoveries in the Judaean Desert (1955–2009)[edit]

Emanuel Tov, who was Editor-in-Chief of the Dead Sea Scrolls Publication Project and, as a result, responsible for the publication of 32 volumes of the Discoveries in the Judaean Desert series. He also worked to publish a six-volume printed edition with a majority of the non-Biblical Dead Sea Scrolls and make the same volumes available electronically on CD in a collection titled “The Dead Sea Scrolls Reader”.

The content of the scrolls was published in a 40 volume series by Oxford University Press published between 1955 and 2009 known as Discoveries in the Judaean Desert.^[477] In 1952 the Jordanian Department of Antiquities assembled a team of scholars to begin examining, assembling, and translating the scrolls with the intent of publishing them.^[478] The initial publication, assembled by Dominique Barthélemy and Józef Milik, was published as Qumran Cave 1 in 1955.^[477] After a series of other publications in the late 1980s and early 1990s and with the appointment of the respected Dutch–Israeli textual scholar Emanuel Tov as Editor-in-Chief of the Dead Sea Scrolls Publication Project in 1990 publication of the scrolls accelerated. Tov’s team had published five volumes covering the Cave 4 documents by 1995. Between 1990 and 2009, Tov helped the team produce 32 volumes. The final volume, Volume XL, was published in 2009.

A Preliminary Edition of the Unpublished Dead Sea Scrolls (1991)[edit]

In 1991, researchers at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio, Ben Zion Wacholder and Martin Abegg, announced the creation of a computer program that used previously published scrolls to reconstruct the unpublished texts.^[479] Officials at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California, led by Head Librarian William Andrew Moffett, announced that they would allow researchers unrestricted access to the library’s complete set of photographs of the scrolls. In the fall of that year, Wacholder published 17 documents that had been reconstructed in 1988 from a concordance and had come into the hands of scholars outside of the International Team; in the same month, there occurred the discovery and publication of a complete set of facsimiles of the Cave 4 materials at the Huntington Library. Thereafter, the officials of the Israel Antiquities Authority agreed to lift their long-standing restrictions on the use of the scrolls.^[480]

A Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls (1991)[edit]

After further delays, attorney William John Cox undertook representation of an “undisclosed client”, who had provided a complete set of the unpublished photographs, and contracted for their publication. Professors Robert Eisenman and James Robinson indexed the photographs and wrote an introduction to A Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls, which was published by the Biblical Archaeology Society in 1991.^[481] Following the publication of the Facsimile Edition, Professor Elisha Qimron sued Hershel Shanks, Eisenman, Robinson and the Biblical Archaeology Society for copyright infringement for publishing, without authorization or attribution, his decipherment of one of the scrolls, MMT. The District Court of Jerusalem found in favor of Qimron in September 1993.^[482] The Court issued a restraining order, which prohibited the publication of the deciphered text, and ordered defendants to pay Qimron NIS 100,000 for infringing his copyright and the right of attribution. Defendants appealed the Supreme Court of Israel, which approved the District Court’s decision, in August 2000. The Supreme Court further ordered that the defendants hand over to Qimron all the infringing copies.^[483] The decision met Israeli and international criticism from copyright law scholars.^{[484][485][486][487][488]}

The Facsimile Edition by Facsimile Editions Ltd, London, England (2007–2008)[edit]

In November 2007 the Dead Sea Scrolls Foundation commissioned the London publisher, Facsimile Editions Limited, to produce a facsimile edition of The Great Isaiah Scroll (1QIs^a), The Order of the Community (1QS), and The Pesher to Habakkuk (1QpHab).^[489][490] The facsimile was produced from 1948 photographs, and so more faithfully represents the condition of the Isaiah scroll at the time of its discovery than does the current condition of the real Isaiah scroll.^[489]

Of the first three facsimile sets, one was exhibited at the Early Christianity and the Dead Sea Scrolls exhibition in Seoul, South Korea, and a second set was purchased by the British Library in London. A further 46 sets including facsimiles of three fragments from Cave 4 (now in the collection of the National Archaeological Museum in Amman, Jordan) Testimonia (4Q175), Pesher Isaiah^b (4Q162) and Qohelet (4Q109) were announced in May 2009. The edition is strictly limited to 49 numbered sets of these reproductions on either specially prepared parchment paper or real parchment. The complete facsimile set (three scrolls including the Isaiah scroll and the three Jordanian fragments) can be purchased for $60,000.^[489]

The facsimiles have since been exhibited in Qumrân. Le secret des manuscrits de la mer Morte at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, France (2010)^[491] and Verbum Domini at the Vatican, Rome, Italy (2012).^[492]

Digital publication[edit]

Olive Tree Bible Software (2000–2011)[edit]

The text of nearly all of the non-biblical scrolls has been recorded and tagged for morphology by Dr. Martin Abegg, Jr., the Ben Zion Wacholder Professor of Dead Sea Scroll Studies at Trinity Western University located in Langley, British Columbia, Canada.^[493] It is available on handheld devices through Olive Tree Bible Software – BibleReader, on Macs and Windows via emulator through Accordance with a comprehensive set of cross references, and on Windows through Logos Bible Software and BibleWorks.

The Dead Sea Scrolls Reader (2005)[edit]

The text of almost all of the non-Biblical texts from the Dead Sea Scrolls was released on CD-ROM by publisher E.J. Brill in 2005.^[494] The 2400 page, 6 volume series, was assembled by an editorial team led by Donald W. Parry and Emanuel Tov.^[495] Unlike the text translations in the physical publication, Discoveries in the Judaean Desert, the texts are sorted by genres that include religious law, parabiblical texts, calendrical and sapiental texts, and poetic and liturgical works.^[494]

Israel Antiquities Authority and Google digitization project (2010–2016)[edit]

High-resolution images, including infrared photographs, of some of the Dead Sea scrolls are now available online on two dedicated websites.

On 19 October 2010, it was announced^[496] that Israeli Antiquities Authority (IAA) would scan the documents using multi-spectral imaging technology developed by NASA to produce high-resolution images of the texts, and then, through a partnership with Google, make them available online free of charge,^[497] on a searchable database and complemented by translation and other scholarly tools. The project is scheduled for completion within five years.

On 25 September 2011 the Israel Museum Digital Dead Sea Scrolls site went online.^[498][499] It gives users access to searchable, high-resolution images of the scrolls, as well as short explanatory videos and background information on the texts and their history. As of May 2012, five complete scrolls from the Israel Museum have been digitized for the project and are now accessible online: the Great Isaiah Scroll, the Community Rule Scroll, the Commentary on Habakkuk Scroll, the Temple Scroll, and the War Scroll.

Biblical significance[edit]

See also: Biblical canon and Biblical manuscript

Before the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the oldest Hebrew-language manuscripts of the Bible were Masoretic texts dating to the 10th century CE, such as the Aleppo Codex.^[500] Today, the oldest known extant manuscripts of the Masoretic Text date from approximately the 9th century. The biblical manuscripts found among the Dead Sea Scrolls push that date back a full thousand years, to the 2nd century BCE.^[501] This was a significant discovery for Old Testament scholars who anticipated that the Dead Sea Scrolls would either affirm or repudiate the reliability of textual transmission from the original texts to the oldest Masoretic texts at hand. The discovery demonstrated the unusual accuracy of transmission over a thousand-year period, rendering it reasonable to believe that current Old Testament texts are reliable copies of the original works.

According to The Dead Sea Scrolls by Hebrew scholar Millar Burrows,

Of the 166 words in Isaiah 53, there are only seventeen letters in question. Ten of these letters are simply a matter of spelling, which does not affect the sense. Four more letters are minor stylistic changes, such as conjunctions. The remaining three letters comprise the word “light,” which is added in verse 11, and does not affect the meaning greatly.^[502]

It is important to note that differences were found among fragments of texts. According to The Oxford Companion to Archaeology:

While some of the Qumran biblical manuscripts are nearly identical to the Masoretic, or traditional, Hebrew text of the Old Testament, some manuscripts of the books of Exodus and Samuel found in Cave Four exhibit dramatic differences in both language and content. In their astonishing range of textual variants, the Qumran biblical discoveries have prompted scholars to reconsider the once-accepted theories of the development of the modern biblical text from only three manuscript families: of the Masoretic text, of the Hebrew original of the Septuagint, and of the Samaritan Pentateuch. It is now becoming increasingly clear that the Old Testament scripture was extremely fluid until its canonization around A.D. 100.^[503]

The conclusion, then, is that the Dead Sea scrolls have taken Biblical scholarship to a new era where much of what was previously believed can now be confirmed, and some of what was accepted as fact should now be reexamined so Biblical texts can correspond precisely with what was originally written. To quote Gleason Archer’s A Survey of Old Testament Introduction:

In conclusion, we should accord to the Masoretes the highest praise for their meticulous care in preserving so sedulously the consonantal text of the Sopherim which had been entrusted to them. They, together with the Sopherim themselves, gave the most diligent attention to the accurate preservation of the Hebrew Scriptures that has ever been devoted to any ancient literature, secular or religious, in the history of human civilization…

Because of their faithfulness, we have today a form of the Hebrew text which in all essentials duplicates the recension which was considered authoritative in the days of Christ and the apostles, if not a century earlier. And this in turn, judging from Qumran evidence, goes back to an authoritative revision of the Old Testament text which was drawn up on the basis of the most reliable manuscripts available for collation from previous centuries. These bring us very close in all essentials to the original autographs themselves, and furnish us with an authentic record of God’s revelation. As W. F. Albright has said, “We may rest assured that the consonantal text of the Hebrew Bible, though not infallible has been preserved with an accuracy perhaps unparalleled in any other Near Eastern literature.”^[504]

Biblical books found[edit]

There are 225 Biblical texts included in the Dead Sea Scroll documents, or around 22% of the total, and with deuterocanonical books the number increases to 235.^[505][506] The Dead Sea Scrolls contain parts of all but one of the books of the Tanakh of the Hebrew Bible and the Old Testament protocanon. They also include four of the deuterocanonical books included in Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Bibles: Tobit, Ben Sirach, Baruch 6 (also known as the Letter or Epistle of Jeremiah), and Psalm 151.^[505] The Book of Esther has not yet been found and scholars believe Esther is missing because, as a Jew, her marriage to a Persian king may have been looked down upon by the inhabitants of Qumran,^[507] or because the book has the Purim festival which is not included in the Qumran calendar.^[17]:180 Listed below are the most represented books, along with the deuterocanonicals, of the Bible found among the Dead Sea Scrolls, including the number of translatable Dead Sea texts that represent a copy of scripture from each Biblical book:^[508][509]

Book	Number found
Psalms	39
Deuteronomy	33
1 Enoch	25
Genesis	24
Isaiah	22
Jubilees	21
Exodus	18
Leviticus	17
Numbers	11
Minor Prophets	10[note 1]
Daniel	8
Jeremiah	6
Ezekiel	6
Job	6
Tobit	5[note 2]
1 & 2 Kings	4
1 & 2 Samuel	4
Judges	4[512]
Song of Songs (Canticles)	4
Ruth	4
Lamentations	4
Sirach	3
Ecclesiastes	2
Joshua	2

Non-biblical books[edit]

The majority of the texts found among the Dead Sea Scrolls are non-biblical in nature and were thought to be insignificant for understanding the composition or canonization of the Biblical books, but a different consensus has emerged which sees many of these works as being collected by the Essene community instead of being composed by them.^[513] Scholars now recognize that some of these works were composed earlier than the Essene period, when some of the Biblical books were still being written or redacted into their final form.^[513]

Museum exhibitions and displays[edit]

Visitors examining Dead Sea Scrolls displayed at the Shrine of the Book in Jerusalem.Strip of the Copper Scroll from Qumran Cave 3 written in the Hebrew Mishnaic dialect, on display at the Jordan Museum, Amman

Small portions of the Dead Sea Scrolls collections have been put on temporary display in exhibitions at museums and public venues around the world. The majority of these exhibitions took place in 1965 in the United States and the United Kingdom and from 1993 to 2011 in locations around the world. Many of the exhibitions were co-sponsored by either the Jordanian government (pre-1967) or the Israeli government (post-1967). Exhibitions were discontinued after 1965 due to the Six-days War conflicts and have slowed down in post-2011 as the Israeli Antiquities Authority works to digitize the scrolls and place them in permanent cold storage.

The majority of the Dead Sea Scrolls collection was moved to Jerusalem’s Shrine of the Book (a part of the Israel Museum) after the building’s completion in April 1965.^[514] The museum falls under the auspices of the Israel Antiquities Authority, an official agency of the Israeli government. The permanent Dead Sea Scrolls exhibition at the museum features a reproduction of the Great Isaiah Scroll, surrounded by reproductions of other famous fragments that include Community Rule, the War Scroll, and the Thanksgiving Psalms Scroll.^[515][516]

Some of the Dead Sea Scrolls collection held by the Jordanian government prior to 1967 was stored in Amman rather than at the Palestine Archaeological Museum in East Jerusalem. As a consequence, that part of the collection remained in Jordanian hands under their Department of Antiquities. In 2013 parts of this collection have been put on display at The Jordan Museum in Amman, to which they were moved from the Jordan Archaeological Museum.^[517] Among the display items are artifacts from the Qumran site and the Copper Scroll.^[518]

Ownership[edit]

Past ownership[edit]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (May 2012)

Advertisement in the Wall Street Journal dated 1 June 1954 for four of the “Dead Sea Scrolls.”

Arrangements with the Bedouin left the scrolls in the hands of a third party until a profitable sale of them could be negotiated. That third party, George Isha’ya, was a member of the Syriac Orthodox Church, who soon contacted St Mark’s Monastery in the hope of getting an appraisal of the nature of the texts. News of the find then reached Metropolitan Athanasius Yeshue Samuel, better known as Mar Samuel. After examining the scrolls and suspecting their antiquity, Mar Samuel expressed an interest in purchasing them. Four scrolls found their way into his hands: the now famous Isaiah Scroll (1QIsa^a), the Community Rule, the Habakkuk Pesher (a commentary on the book of Habakkuk), and the Genesis Apocryphon. More scrolls soon surfaced in the antiquities market, and Professor Eleazer Sukenik and Professor Benjamin Mazar, Israeli archaeologists at Hebrew University, soon found themselves in possession of three, The War Scroll, Thanksgiving Hymns, and another, more fragmented, Isaiah scroll (1QIsa^b).

Four of the Dead Sea Scrolls eventually went up for sale in an advertisement in the 1 June 1954, Wall Street Journal.^[519] On 1 July 1954, the scrolls, after delicate negotiations and accompanied by three people including the Metropolitan, arrived at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. They were purchased by Professor Mazar and the son of Professor Sukenik, Yigael Yadin, for $250,000 (approximately $2,400,000 in 2019 dollars^[520]), and brought to Jerusalem.^[521] Since 2002, forgeries of alleged Dead Sea Scrolls have appeared on black markets.^[522]

Current ownership[edit]

Almost all of the Dead Sea Scrolls collection is currently under the ownership of the Government of the state of Israel, and housed in the Shrine of the Book on the grounds of the Israel Museum. This ownership is contested by both Jordan and by the Palestinian Authority.

A list of known ownership of Dead Sea Scroll fragments:

Claimed Owner	Year Acquired	Number of Fragments/Scrolls Owned
Azusa Pacific University[523]	2009	5
Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago[524]	1956	1
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary[525]	2009; 2010; 2012	8
Rockefeller Museum – Government of Israel[526][527]	1967	> 15,000
The Schøyen Collection owned by Martin Schøyen[528]	1980; 1994; 1995	115[529]
The Jordan Museum – Government of Jordan[517]	1947–1956	> 25
Museum of the Bible aka Green Collection – Green Family[530]	2009–2014[529][531]	11
Syrian Orthodox Church’s eastern U.S. archdiocese[532]		1
Ashland Theological Seminary[532]		1
Lanier Theological Library[532]		1
Pasadena Private Collection[532]		1

Ownership disputes[edit]

The official ownership of the Dead Sea Scrolls is disputed among the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. The debate over the Dead Sea Scrolls stems from a more general Israeli–Palestinian conflict over land and state recognition.

Parties Involved	Party Role	Explanation of Role
Jordan	Disputant; Minority Owner	Alleges that the Dead Sea Scrolls were stolen from the Palestine Archaeological Museum (now the Rockefeller Museum) operated by Jordan from 1966 until the Six-Day War when advancing Israeli forces took control of the Museum, and that therefore they fall under the rules of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.[533] Jordan regularly demands their return and petitions third-party countries that host the scrolls to return them to Jordan instead of to Israel, claiming they have legal documents that prove Jordanian ownership of the scrolls.[534]
Israel	Disputant; Current Majority Owner	After the Six-Day War Israel seized the scrolls and moved them to the Shrine of the Book in the Israel Museum. Israel disputes Jordan’s claim and states that Jordan never lawfully possessed the scrolls since it was an unlawful occupier of the museum and region.[535][536][537]
Palestinian Authority	Disputant	The Palestinian Authority also holds a claim to the scrolls.[538]
Canada	Neutral Exhibition Host	In 2009, a part of the Dead Sea Scrolls collection held by the Israeli Antiquities Authority was moved and displayed at the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto, Canada. Both the Palestinian Authority and Jordan petitioned the international community, including the United Nations,[539] for the scrolls to be seized under disputed international law. Ottawa dismissed the demands and the exhibit continued, with the scrolls returning to Israel upon its conclusion.[540]A planned exhibition in Germany was cancelled, as the German government could not guarantee a return of the scrolls to Israel [1]

Copyright disputes[edit]

This section needs attention from an expert in Law. The specific problem is: Complexity of copyright law surrounding historical documents in the United States and other nations. WikiProject Law may be able to help recruit an expert. (June 2012)

There are three types of documents relating to the Dead Sea Scrolls in which copyright status can be considered ambiguous; the documents themselves, images taken of the documents, and reproductions of the documents. This ambiguity arises from differences in copyright law across different countries and the variable interpretation of such law.

In 1992 a copyright case Qimron v. Shanks was brought before the Israeli District court by scholar Elisha Qimron against Hershel Shanks of the Biblical Archaeology Society for violations of United States copyright law regarding his publishing of reconstructions of Dead Sea Scroll texts done by Qimron in A Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls which were included without his permission. Qimron’s suit against the Biblical Archaeology Society was done on the grounds that the research they had published was his intellectual property as he had reconstructed about 40% of the published text. In 1993, the district court Judge Dalia Dorner ruled for the plaintiff, Elisha Qimron, in context of both United States and Israeli copyright law and granted the highest compensation allowed by law for aggravation in compensation against Hershel Shanks and others.^[541] In an appeal in 2000 in front of Judge Aharon Barak, the verdict was upheld in Israeli Supreme Court in Qimron’s favor.^[542] The court case established the two main principles from which facsimiles are examined under copyright law of the United States and Israel: authorship and originality.

The court’s ruling not only affirms that the “deciphered text” of the scrolls can fall under copyright of individuals or groups, but makes it clear that the Dead Sea Scrolls themselves do not fall under this copyright law and scholars have a degree of, in the words of U.S. copyright law professor David Nimmer, “freedom” in access. Nimmer has shown how this freedom was in the theory of law applicable, but how it did not exist in reality as the Israeli Antiquities Authority tightly controlled access to the scrolls and photographs of the scrolls.^[541]

See also[edit]

• Ancient Hebrew writings
• Cairo Geniza
• Jordan Lead Codices
• Nag Hammadi library
• Oxyrhynchus Papyri
• Teacher of Righteousness
• The Book of Mysteries

Notes[edit]

1. ^ 10 Scrolls containing fragments of all 12 of the “Minor Prophets” were found in Cave 4, although no fragment contains portions of more than three prophets.^[510]
2. ^ There are four Aramaic fragmentary texts of Tobit, and one Hebrew text.^[511]

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

1. ^ Jump up to:^a b “The Digital Library: Introduction”. Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library. Archived from the original on 13 October 2014. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
2. ^ Jump up to:^a b c “The Digital Dead Sea Scrolls: Nature and Significance”. Israel Museum Jerusalem. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
3. ^ “Hebrew University Archaeologists Find 12th Dead Sea Scrolls Cave”. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Retrieved 7 June2017.
4. ^ Donahue, Michelle Z. (10 February 2017). “New Dead Sea Scroll Find May Help Detect Forgeries”. nationalgeographic.com.
5. ^ Leaney, A. R. C. From Judaean Caves: The Story of the Dead Sea Scrolls. p.27, Religious Education Press, 1961.
6. ^ Michael Segal, Emanuel Tov, William Brent Seales, Clifford Seth Parker, Pnina Shor, Yosef Porath; with an Appendix by Ada Yardeni (2016). “An Early Leviticus Scroll from En-Gedi: Preliminary Publication” (PDF). Textus. 26: 1–29. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 September 2016. Retrieved 22 January2017.
7. ^ Vermes, Geza (1977). The Dead Sea Scrolls. Qumran in Perspective. London: Collins. p. 15. ISBN 978-0-00-216142-8.
8. ^ “Languages and Scripts”. Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
9. ^ McCarthy, Rory (27 August 2008). “From papyrus to cyberspace”. The Guardian.
10. ^ Ofri, Ilani (13 March 2009). “Scholar: The Essenes, Dead Sea Scroll ‘authors,’ never existed”. Ha’aretz. Archived from the original on 6 January 2018. Retrieved 26 May 2017.
11. ^ Golb, Norman (5 June 2009). “On the Jerusalem Origin of the Dead Sea Scrolls” (PDF). University of Chicago Oriental Institute.
12. ^ Abegg, Jr., Martin, Peter Flint, and Eugene Ulrich, The Dead Sea Scrolls Bible: The Oldest Known Bible Translated for the First Time into English, San Francisco: Harper, 2002.
13. ^ “Dead Sea Scrolls”. virtualreligion.net.
14. ^ Humphries, Mark. Early Christianity. 2006. (PDF)
15. ^ Jump up to:^a b Evans, Craig. Guide to the Dead Sea Scrolls. 2010.
16. ^ Jump up to:^a b Trever, John C. The Dead Sea Scrolls. Gorgias Press LLC, 2003.
17. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l} VanderKam, James; Flint, Peter (2005). The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls: Their Significance For Understanding the Bible, Judaism, Jesus, and Christianity. A&C Black. p. 5. ISBN 978-0-567-08468-2. Retrieved 15 March 2013.
18. ^ Trstensky, Frantisek. “The Archaeological Site of Qumran and the Personality Of Roland De Vaux” (PDF). Retrieved 22 May 2012.
19. ^ VanderKam, James C., The Dead Sea Scrolls Today, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. p. 9.
20. ^ Jump up to:^a b c S.S.L. Frantisek Trstensky. “The Archaeological Site Of Qumran and the Personality Of Roland De Vaux” (PDF). Retrieved 22 May 2012.
21. ^ Jump up to:^a b c “Dead Sea Scrolls: Timetable”. The Gnostic Society Library. Retrieved 23 May 2012.
22. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e} VanderKam, James C., The Dead Sea Scrolls Today, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. pp. 10–11.
23. ^ “Digital Dead Sea Scrolls at the Israel Museum, Jerusalem – Discovery”. imj.org.il.
24. ^ Yizhar Hirschfeld (2002). “Qumran in the Second Temple Period: Reassessing the Archaeological Evidence” (PDF). Liber Annuus. 52: 279–81. Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 May 2006. Retrieved 23 January 2016. Some of these caves, such as 4 and 5, are located ca. 160 yd from the site, while others, such as 1, 2, 3 and 11, are at a distance of 1 mile to its north (Fig. 12)
25. ^ Martinez/Tigchelaar (1999). The Dead Sea Scrolls Edition, Caves 1 to 11 & more (Enoch Aramaic fragments and translation by Milik: Hénoc au pays des aromates, pp. 413, 425, 430)
26. ^ Jump up to:^a b “Hebrew University Archaeologists Find 12th Dead Sea Scrolls Cave” (Press release). Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 8 February 2017.
27. ^ Jump up to:^a b McKernan, Bethan (2017). “New Dead Sea Scrolls cave filled with ancient artefacts discovered for first time in 60 years”. The Independent=.
28. ^ Wise, Michael; Abegg Jr., Martin; Cook, Edward (2005). The Dead Sea Scrolls. New York: Harper San Francisco. pp. 5, 6. ISBN 978-0-06-076662-7. | Les manuscrits de la Mer Morte avec textes originaux traduits en français par I. Fortunato)
29. ^ Vermes, Geza, The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English, London: Penguin, 1998. ISBN 0-14-024501-4.
30. ^ The Great Isaiah Scroll at The Digital Dead Sea Scrolls. The Israel Museum, Jerusalem.
31. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 14–15.
32. ^ Jump up to:^a b 1Q8 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
33. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 15–16.
34. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, p. 18.
35. ^ Bruce, F.F.,“The Dead Sea Habakkuk Scroll,” The Annual of Leeds University Oriental Society I (1958/59): 5–24.
36. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, p. 16.
37. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 16–18.
38. ^ Schiffman, Lawrence H. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
39. ^ 1Q1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
40. ^ 1Q2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
41. ^ 1Q3 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
42. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah aiaj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc} OakTree Software, Inc. Accordance 10: Bible Software. 2008.
43. ^ 1Q4 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
44. ^ 1Q5 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
45. ^ 1Q6 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
46. ^ 1Q7 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
47. ^ 1Q9 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
48. ^ 1Q10 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
49. ^ 1Q11 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
50. ^ 1Q12 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
51. ^ 1Q13 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
52. ^ 1Q14 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
53. ^ 1Q15 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
54. ^ 1Q16 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
55. ^ 1Q17 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
56. ^ 1Q18 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
57. ^ 1Q19 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
58. ^ 1Q20 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
59. ^ 1Q21 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
60. ^ 1Q22 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
61. ^ 1Q23 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
62. ^ 1Q24 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
63. ^ 1Q25 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
64. ^ 1Q26 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
65. ^ 1Q27 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
66. ^ 1Q28 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
67. ^ 1Q28 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
68. ^ 1Q29 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
69. ^ 1Q30 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
70. ^ 1Q31 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
71. ^ 1Q32 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
72. ^ 1Q34 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
73. ^ 1Q35 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
74. ^ 1Q36 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
75. ^ 1Q37 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
76. ^ 1Q38 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
77. ^ 1Q39 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
78. ^ 1Q40 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
79. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah aiaj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as} “Leon Levy Collection”. Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library. Israel Antiquities Authority. Retrieved 22 January 2015.
80. ^ 1Q71 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
81. ^ 1Q72 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
82. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 25.
83. ^ 2Q1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
84. ^ 2Q2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
85. ^ 2Q3 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
86. ^ 2Q4 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
87. ^ 2Q5 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
88. ^ 2Q6 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
89. ^ 2Q7 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
90. ^ 2Q8 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
91. ^ 2Q9 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
92. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 26.
93. ^ 2Q13 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
94. ^ 2Q14 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
95. ^ 2Q15 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
96. ^ 2Q16 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
97. ^ 2Q17 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
98. ^ 2Q18 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
99. ^ 2Q19 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
100. ^ 2Q20 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
101. ^ 2Q21 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
102. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 26–27.
103. ^ 2Q22 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
104. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 27.
105. ^ 2Q23 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
106. ^ 2Q24 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
107. ^ 2Q25 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
108. ^ 2Q26 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
109. ^ 3Q1 at Leon Levy Collection
110. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 28.
111. ^ 3Q2 at Leon Levy Collection
112. ^ 3Q3 at Leon Levy Collection
113. ^ 3Q4 at Leon Levy Collection
114. ^ 3Q5 at Leon Levy Collection
115. ^ 3Q6 at Leon Levy Collection
116. ^ 3Q7 at Leon Levy Collection
117. ^ 3Q8 at Leon Levy Collection
118. ^ 3Q9 at Leon Levy Collection
119. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 28–29.
120. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 29.
121. ^ 3Q14 at Leon Levy Collection
122. ^ 3Q15 at Leon Levy Collection
123. ^ Milik (1957). Dix ans de découverte dans le désert de Juda | Discoveries in the Judaean Desert; Milik (1976). The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments Qumran Cave 4 with the collaboration of Black M.
124. ^ 4Q1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
125. ^ 4Q2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
126. ^ 4Q3 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
127. ^ 4Q4 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
128. ^ 4Q5 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
129. ^ 4Q6 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
130. ^ 4Q7 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
131. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 30.
132. ^ 4Q8 4QGen h1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
133. ^ 4Q8 4QGen h2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
134. ^ 4Q8 4QGen h-para at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
135. ^ 4Q8 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
136. ^ 4Q9 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
137. ^ 4Q10 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
138. ^ 4Q11 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
139. ^ 4Q12 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
140. ^ 4Q13 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
141. ^ 4Q14 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
142. ^ 4Q15 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
143. ^ Martinez and Tigchelaar, The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition(Brill 1997): page 246
144. ^ 4Q14 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
145. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 31.
146. ^ 4Q17 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
147. ^ 4Q18 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
148. ^ 4Q19 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
149. ^ 4Q20 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
150. ^ 4Q21 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
151. ^ 4Q22 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
152. ^ 4Q23 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
153. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 31–32.
154. ^ 4Q24 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
155. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 32.
156. ^ 4Q25 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
157. ^ 4Q26 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
158. ^ 4Q27 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
159. ^ 4Q28 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
160. ^ 4Q29 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
161. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 32–33.
162. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 33.
163. ^ Jump up to:^a b c 4Q38 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library. Accessed 20 May 2013
164. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 34.
165. ^ 4Q47 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
166. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 34–35.
167. ^ 4Q48 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
168. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 35.
169. ^ 4Q49 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
170. ^ 4Q50 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
171. ^ 4Q51 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
172. ^ 4Q52 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
173. ^ 4Q53 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
174. ^ 4Q54 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
175. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 36.
176. ^ 4Q55 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
177. ^ 4Q56 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
178. ^ 4Q57 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
179. ^ 4Q58 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
180. ^ 4Q59 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
181. ^ 4Q60 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
182. ^ 4Q61 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
183. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 37.
184. ^ 4Q62 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
185. ^ 4Q63 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
186. ^ 4Q64 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
187. ^ 4Q65 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
188. ^ 4Q66 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
189. ^ 4Q67 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
190. ^ 4Q68 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
191. ^ 4Q69 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
192. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Martinez and Tigchelaar, The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition(Brill 1997): page 270
193. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e} Schiffman, Lawrence; VanderKam, James (2008). Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195084504.
194. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e} Flint, Peter (2013). The Dead Sea Scrolls. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press. p. 68. ISBN 9780687494491.
195. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 38.
196. ^ 4Q73 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
197. ^ 4Q74 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
198. ^ Sanderson 1997. DJD 15: 215–218.
199. ^ 4Q75 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
200. ^ 4Q76 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
201. ^ 4Q77 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
202. ^ 4Q78 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
203. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 39.
204. ^ 4Q79 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
205. ^ 4Q80 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
206. ^ 4Q81 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
207. ^ 4Q82 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
208. ^ 4Q83 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
209. ^ 4Q84 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
210. ^ 4Q85 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
211. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 40.
212. ^ 4Q86 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
213. ^ 4Q87 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
214. ^ 4Q88 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
215. ^ 4Q89 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
216. ^ 4Q90 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
217. ^ 4Q91 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
218. ^ 4Q92 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
219. ^ 4Q93 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
220. ^ 4Q94 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
221. ^ 4Q95 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
222. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 41.
223. ^ 4Q96 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
224. ^ 4Q97 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
225. ^ 4Q98 4QPs^r at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
226. ^ 4Q99 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
227. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 42.
228. ^ 4Q100 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
229. ^ 4Q101 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
230. ^ 4Q102 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
231. ^ 4Q103 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
232. ^ 4Q104 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
233. ^ 4Q105 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
234. ^ 4Q106 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
235. ^ 4Q107 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
236. ^ 4Q108 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
237. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 43.
238. ^ 4Q109 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
239. ^ 4Q110 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
240. ^ 4Q111 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
241. ^ 4Q112 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
242. ^ 4Q113 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
243. ^ 4Q114 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
244. ^ 4Q115 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
245. ^ 4Q116 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
246. ^ 4Q117 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
247. ^ 4Q118 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
248. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 44.
249. ^ 4Q119 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
250. ^ 4Q120 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
251. ^ 4Q121 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
252. ^ 4Q122 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
253. ^ 4Q123 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
254. ^ 4Q127 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
255. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 44–45.
256. ^ 4Q128 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
257. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 45.
258. ^ 4Q129 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
259. ^ 4Q130 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
260. ^ 4Q131 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
261. ^ 4Q132 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
262. ^ 4Q133 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
263. ^ 4Q134 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
264. ^ 4Q135 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
265. ^ 4Q136 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
266. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 46.
267. ^ 4Q138 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
268. ^ 4Q139 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
269. ^ 4Q140 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
270. ^ 4Q141 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
271. ^ 4Q142 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
272. ^ 4Q143 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
273. ^ 4Q144 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
274. ^ 4Q145 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
275. ^ 4Q146 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
276. ^ 4Q147 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
277. ^ 4Q148 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
278. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 46–47.
279. ^ 4Q149 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
280. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 47.
281. ^ 4Q150 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
282. ^ 4Q151 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
283. ^ 4Q152 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
284. ^ 4Q153 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
285. ^ 4Q154 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
286. ^ 4Q155 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
287. ^ Jump up to:^a b Wise, Michael O.; Abegg, Martin G.; Cook, Edward M. (2005). The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. p. 577. ISBN 9780060766627.
288. ^ 4Q156 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
289. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 47–48.
290. ^ 4Q157 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
291. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e} Martinez and Tigchelaar, The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition (Brill 1997): page 305ff
292. ^ 4Q158 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
293. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Fitzmyer 2008, p. 48.
294. ^ 4Q159 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
295. ^ 4Q160 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
296. ^ 4Q161 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
297. ^ 4Q162 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
298. ^ Jump up to:^a b “The Qumran Library: Scrolls”.
299. ^ Jump up to:^a b c d Fitzmyer 2008, p. 49.
300. ^ 4Q166 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
301. ^ 4Q167 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
302. ^ 4Q168 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
303. ^ 4Q169 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
304. ^ Jump up to:^a b Fitzmyer 2008, p. 50.
305. ^ 4Q174 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
306. ^ 4Q175 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
307. ^ 4Q179 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
308. ^ 4Q186 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
309. ^ 4Q196 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
310. ^ 4Q197 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
311. ^ 4Q198 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
312. ^ 4Q199 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
313. ^ 4Q200 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
314. ^ 4Q201 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
315. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 54–55.
316. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, p. 55.
317. ^ 4Q215 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
318. ^ Gault, Brian P. (2010) “Fragments of Canticles at Qumran”. Revue de Qumran. p.352
319. ^ 4Q246 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
320. ^ Jump up to:^a b c d Fitzmyer 2008, p. 62.
321. ^ 4Q252 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
322. ^ 4Q253 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
323. ^ 4Q254 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
324. ^ 4Q254a-820 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
325. ^ 4Q258 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
326. ^ 4Q285 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
327. ^ 4Q299 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
328. ^ 4Q300 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
329. ^ 4Q301 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
330. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, p. 74.
331. ^ 4Q364 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
332. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Fitzmyer 2008, p. 75.
333. ^ 4Q365 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
334. ^ 4Q366 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
335. ^ 4Q367 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
336. ^ 4Q378 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
337. ^ 4Q379 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
338. ^ 4Q385 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
339. ^ 4Q394 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
340. ^ 4Q400 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
341. ^ 4Q434 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
342. ^ 4Q483 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
343. ^ 4Q521 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
344. ^ Buitenwerf, Rieuwerd, The Gog and Magog Tradition in Revelation 20:8, in, H. J. de Jonge, Johannes Tromp, eds., The book of Ezekiel and its influence, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007, p.172; scheduled to be published in Charlesworth’s edition, volume 9
345. ^ 4Q523 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
346. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, p. 98.
347. ^ 4Q539 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
348. ^ 4Q541 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
349. ^ 4Q542 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
350. ^ 4Q555 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
351. ^ “Uncovered in Jerusalem, 9 tiny unopened Dead Sea Scrolls”. The Times of Israel.
352. ^ Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 104–105.
353. ^ 5Q1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
354. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 105.
355. ^ 5Q2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
356. ^ 5Q3 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
357. ^ 5Q5 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
358. ^ 5Q6 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
359. ^ 5Q7 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
360. ^ 5Q8 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
361. ^ 5Q9 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
362. ^ 5Q10 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
363. ^ 5Q11 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
364. ^ 5Q12 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
365. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 106.
366. ^ 5Q13 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
367. ^ 5Q14 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
368. ^ 5Q15 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
369. ^ 5Q25 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
370. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Garcia Martinez, Florentino and Tigchelaar, Eibert. The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition. Vol. 1. 1999.
371. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Fritzmyer, Joseph. A Guide to the Dead Sea Scrolls and Related Literature. 2008.
372. ^ Jump up to:^a b c d Fitzmyer 2008, pp. 104,106.
373. ^ 6Q1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
374. ^ 6Q2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
375. ^ 6Q3 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
376. ^ 6Q4 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
377. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 107.
378. ^ 6Q5 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
379. ^ 6Q6 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
380. ^ 6Q7 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
381. ^ 6Q8 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
382. ^ 6Q9 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
383. ^ 6Q10 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
384. ^ 6Q11 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
385. ^ 6Q12 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
386. ^ 6Q13 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
387. ^ 6Q14 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
388. ^ 6Q15 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
389. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n} Fitzmyer 2008, p. 108.
390. ^ 6Q16 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
391. ^ 6Q17 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
392. ^ 6Q18 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
393. ^ 6Q19 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
394. ^ 6Q20 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
395. ^ 6Q21 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
396. ^ 6Q22 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
397. ^ 6Q23 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
398. ^ 6Q24 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
399. ^ 6Q25 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
400. ^ 6Q26 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
401. ^ 6Q30 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
402. ^ 6Q31 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
403. ^ Baillet, Maurice ed. Les ‘Petites Grottes’ de Qumrân (ed., vol. 3 of Discoveries in the Judaean Desert; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 144–45, pl. XXX.
404. ^ Muro, Ernest A., “The Greek Fragments of Enoch from Qumran Cave 7 (7Q4, 7Q8, &7Q12 = 7QEn gr = Enoch 103:3–4, 7–8),” Revue de Qumran 18 no. 70 (1997).
405. ^ Puech, Émile, “Sept fragments grecs de la Lettre d’Hénoch (1 Hén 100, 103, 105) dans la grotte 7 de Qumrân (= 7QHén gr),” Revue de Qumran 18 no. 70 (1997).
406. ^ Jump up to:^a b Humbert and Chambon, Excavations of Khirbet Qumran and Ain Feshkha, 67.
407. ^ 7Q1 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
408. ^ 7Q2 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
409. ^ 7Q3 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
410. ^ 7Q4 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
411. ^ 7Q5 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
412. ^ 7Q19 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library
413. ^ Baillet ed. Les ‘Petites Grottes’ de Qumrân (ed.), 147–62, pl. XXXIXXXV.
414. ^ “9Q1 at Leon Levy Collection”. Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library. Israel Antiquities Authority. Retrieved 13 February2019.
415. ^ Stegemann, Hartmut. “The Qumran Essenes: Local Members of the Main Jewish Union in Late Second Temple Times.” pp. 83–166 in The Madrid Qumran Congress: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Dead Sea Scrolls, Madrid, 18–21 March 1991, Edited by J. Trebolle Barrera and L. Vegas Montaner. Vol. 11 of Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
416. ^ Shanks, Hershel (July–August 1994). “An Interview with John Strugnell”. Biblical Archaeology Review. Archived from the original on 6 July 2010. Retrieved 21 October 2010.
417. ^ 11Q31 at the Leon Levy Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library.
418. ^ Jump up to:^a b Grossman, Maxine. Rediscovering the Dead Sea Scrolls. pp. 66–67. 2010.
419. ^ De-Looijer, G. A. M. (2013). The Qumran paradigm: A critical evaluation of some foundational hypotheses in the construction of the ‘Qumran Sect (Doctoral). PhD Thesis, Durham University. pp. 1–13.
420. ^ de Vaux, Roland, Archaeology and the Dead Sea Scrolls(Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1959). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
421. ^ Milik, Józef Tadeusz, Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judea, London: SCM, 1959.
422. ^ For Sowmy, see: Trever, John C., The Untold Story of Qumran, (Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1965), p. 25.
423. ^ Schiffman, Lawrence H., Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls: their True Meaning for Judaism and Christianity, Anchor Bible Reference Library (Doubleday) 1995.
424. ^ O’Callaghan–Martínez, Josep, Cartas Cristianas Griegas del Siglo V, Barcelona: E. Balmes, 1963.
425. ^ Enste, Stefan. (2000). Kein Markustext in Qumran: Eine Untersuchung der These; Qumran-Fragment 7Q5 = Mk 6, 52–53 (No Mark text: an enquiry of the thesis; Qumran fragment 7Q5 = Gospel of Mark 6: 52–53). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. ISBN 978-3-525-53945-3
426. ^ Eisenman, Robert H. James, the Brother of Jesus: The Key to Unlocking the Secrets of Early Christianity and the Dead Sea Scrolls. 1st American ed. New York: Viking, 1997.
427. ^ Chernoivanenko, Vitaly. “The Jerusalem Theory of the Dead Sea Scrolls Authorship: Origins, Evolution, and DiscussionsArchived 17 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine,” in Ukrainian Orientalistics: Special Issue on Jewish Studies, Кyiv: NaUKMA Omeljan Pritsak Center for Oriental Studies, 2011: 9–29.
428. ^ Rengstorf, Karl Heinrich. Hirbet Qumran und die Bibliothek vom Toten Meer. Translated by J. R. Wilkie. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960.
429. ^ Golb, Norman, On the Jerusalem Origin of the Dead Sea Scrolls, University of Chicago Oriental Institute, 5 June 2009.
430. ^ Golb, Norman, Who Wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls? The Search for the Secret of Qumran, New York: Scribner, 1995.
431. ^ Hirschfeld, Yizhar, Qumran in Context: Reassessing the Archaeological Evidence, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004.
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433. ^ Doudna, G. “Carbon-14 Dating”, in Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Schiffman, Lawrence, Tov, Emanuel, & VanderKam, James, eds., Vol.1 (Oxford: 2000)
434. ^ Jump up to:^a b Grossman, Maxine. “Rediscovering the Dead Sea Scrolls.” pp. 48–51. 2010.
435. ^ Schofield, Alison. “From Qumran to the Yahad.” p. 81. 2009.
436. ^ Nir-El, Yoram; Broshi, Magen (2009). “The Black Ink of the Qumran Scrolls”. Dead Sea Discoveries. 3 (2): 157–67. doi:10.1163/156851796X00183. JSTOR 4201558.
437. ^ Jump up to:^a b Nir-El, Yoram; Broshi, Magen (2007). “The Red Ink of the Dead Sea Scrolls”. Archaeometry. 38 (1): 97–102. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4754.1996.tb00763.x.
438. ^ Jump up to:^a b “Shepherds, Scholars and the Dead Sea Scrolls”. itsgila.com.
439. ^ Jump up to:^a b Magness, Jodi. The Archaeology of Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls. p. 33. 2002.
440. ^ McFarlane, Callie. A Clear Destiny. p. 126. 2011.
441. ^ Jump up to:^a b Benjamin Sommers (8 November 2006). “Scientists Decode Dead Sea Scrolls with DNA and Infrared Digital Photography”. AAAS. Archived from the original on 13 October 2009.
442. ^ “Dead Sea Scrolls Made Locally, Tests Show”. Discovery. 10 May 2017.
443. ^ “THE DEAD SEA”. Library of Congress.
444. ^http://cojs.org/cojswiki/Saving_the_Dead_Sea_Scrolls_for_the_Next_2000_Years,_Dodo_Joseph_Shenhav,_Biblical_Archaeology_Review,_Jul/Aug_1981 Archived 2 December 2013 at the Wayback Machine
445. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g} Pnina Shor. “Conservation of the Dead Sea Scrolls”. Israel Antiquities Authority. Retrieved 13 June 2012.
446. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Burrows, Millar. More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls. 1958.
447. ^ “West meets East – The Story of the Rockefeller Museum”. imj.org.il. The Israel Museum, Jerusalem. Retrieved 18 February2014.
448. ^ Jump up to:^a b Fitzmyer, Joseph A. Responses to 101 Questions on the Dead Sea Scrolls. 1992.
449. ^ Trever, John. The Dead Sea Scrolls: A Personal Account. 2003.
450. ^ “Nine unopened Dead Sea Scrolls found”. Fox News. 24 March 2015.
451. ^ “Nine manuscripts with biblical text unearthed in Qumran”. ANSAmed. 27 February 2014. Retrieved 13 March 2014.
452. ^ Evans, Craig. Guide to the Dead Sea Scrolls. p. 396. 2010.
453. ^ “Dead Sea Scrolls”. Biblical Archaeology Society. Archived from the original on 31 May 2012.
454. ^ Israel Antiquities Authority Personnel Records. Dated 1952 and 1960
455. ^ Verhoeven, G. (2008). “Imaging the invisible using modified digital still cameras for straightforward and low-cost archaeological near-infrared photography”. Journal of Archaeological Science. 35 (12): 3087–3100. doi:10.1016/j.jas.2008.06.012.
456. ^ Dorrell, Peter G. Photography in Archaeology and Conservation2nd Edition. 1994
457. ^ American Schools of Oriental Research. The Biblical Archaeologist. Volumes 55–56. 1992.
458. ^ Shanks, Hershel. Freeing the Dead Sea Scrolls: And Other Adventures of an Archaeology Outsider (2010)
459. ^ Jump up to:^a b c “Seeing Into the Past”. NASA.
460. ^ Jump up to:^a b “Multi-Spectral Digital Imaging of Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Ancient Documents” (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF)on 27 May 2010. Retrieved 31 May 2012.
461. ^ Elena Libman, Tania Bitler and Pnina Shor. “Conservation, Science and Scholarly Collaboration”. Israel Antiquities Authority.
462. ^ Miller, Eyal (18 December 2012). “Official Blog: “In the beginning”… bringing the scrolls of Genesis and the Ten Commandments online”. Googleblog.blogspot.co.il. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
463. ^ “Dead seascrolls.org/il”.
464. ^ “The Digital Library”. The Dead Sea Scrolls. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
465. ^ Jump up to:^a b “Digital Dead Sea Scrolls at the Israel Museum, Jerusalem – The Project”. imj.org.il.
466. ^ Jump up to:^a b “Welcome to nginx!”. Archived from the original on 11 January 2012.
467. ^ “Archaeology: Fragments of history”. 26 July 2009.
468. ^ “Frequently asked questions”.
469. ^ Wise, Michael et al. “A New Translation: The Dead Sea Scrolls.” p. 375. 1996.
470. ^ Day, Charles. “Those who are persecuted because of righteousness, are those who pursue righteousness: an examination of the origin and meaning Matthew 5:10” (PDF). Retrieved 18 June 2012.
471. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Elledge, C.D. The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls. p. 88. 2005.
472. ^ Reeves, John C. and Kampen, John. Pursuing the Text. pp. 111–12. 1994.
473. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Glob, Norman. Who Wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls. 2012.
474. ^ Wise, Michael et al. A New Translation: The Dead Sea Scrolls. p. 9. 1996.
475. ^ Jump up to:^a b Schiffman, Lawrence H. et al. “The Dead Sea scrolls: fifty years after their discovery: proceedings of the Jerusalem Congress, July 20–25, 1997.” 1997.
476. ^ “Copies Of Dead Sea Scrolls To Go Public – Release Would End Scholars’ Dispute'”. The Seattle Times. 22 September 1991.
477. ^ Jump up to:^a b “DJD Index”. Hebrew University.
478. ^ “The Dead Sea Scrolls”. Your Bible Quotes. 28 July 2014.
479. ^ HUC-JIR Mourns Dr. Ben Zion Wacholder, Hebrew Union College – Jewish Institute of Religion, 31 March 2011
480. ^ “Dead Sea Scrolls”. Encyclopædia Britannica.
481. ^ Eisenman, Robert H. and James Robinson, A Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls’ in two volumes (Biblical Archaeology Society of Washington, DC, Washington, DC, 1991).
482. ^ Civil Case (Jer) 41/92 Qimron v. Shanks et al. (30 March 1993) [Hebrew].
483. ^ Unofficial translation of “CA 2709/93, 2811/93 Eisenman et al v. Qimron (30 August 2000)” (PDF).
484. ^ Birnhack, Michael D. (30 May 2006). “The Dead Sea Scrolls Case: Who Is an Author?”. 23 (3) EIPR 128 (2001). SSRN 905114. Missing or empty |url= (help)
485. ^ Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul” 81 Notre Dame L. Rev.. 1945 (2006)
486. ^ David Nimmer, Authorship and Originality, 38 Houston L. Rev. 1, 159 (2001)
487. ^ Urszula Tempska, “Originality after the Dead Sea Scrolls Decision: Implications for the American Law of Copyright”, 6 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 119 (2002)
488. ^ Timothy H. Lim, “Intellectual Property and the Dead Sea Scrolls”, Dead Sea Discoveries Vol 9, No. 2 (2002) p. 187
489. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Georgson, Seth (2012). Book Digitization: a Practical and Urgent Necessity for the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod(PDF) (M.Divinity). Wisconsin Lutheran Seminary. p. 26. Retrieved 15 December 2012.^{[permanent dead link]}
490. ^ Simon Rocker (16 November 2007), The Dead Sea Scrolls…made in St John’s Wood, The Jewish Chronicle, archived from the original on 26 July 2011
491. ^ Jorg von Uthmann (18 June 2010), Exhibit offers context for Dead Sea Scrolls, HeraldTribune.com
492. ^ “”Verbum Domini” Bible Exhibit opens in Vatican”. News.va. 29 February 2012.
493. ^ “Qumran (non-biblical texts)”. olivetree.com.
494. ^ Jump up to:^a b “From Other Publishers: Dead Sea Scrolls Reader Released.” http://maxwellinstitute.byu.edu/publications/insights/?vol=25&num=2&id=423 Archived 1 July 2013 at the Wayback Machine
495. ^ “The Dead Sea Scrolls Reader (6 vols)”. brill.nl. October 2004.
496. ^ Joseph Krauss (19 October 2010). “Israel to put Dead Sea scrolls online”. Yahoo! News/AFP. Archived from the original on 23 October 2010. Retrieved 20 October 2010.
497. ^ “The Dead Sea Scrolls”. The Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Library.
498. ^ http://dss.collections.imj.org.il/ Dead Sea Scrolls Digital Project at the Israel Museum, Jerusalem
499. ^ Miller, Eyal (26 September 2011). “Official Blog: From the desert to the web: bringing the Dead Sea Scrolls online”. Googleblog.blogspot.co.il. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
500. ^ Rabinovich, Abraham (26 March 2010). “A sound in silence”. Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 1 November 2013. Retrieved 29 August 2015.
501. ^ Johannes Van Der Plitch. Radiocarbon dating and the dead sea scrolls: A comment on “REDATING” (PDF). Center for Isotope Research, Groningen University and Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 September 2014.
502. ^ Burrows, Millar (1986). The Dead Sea Scrolls. Chicago: Moody Press. p. 304.
503. ^ Fagan, Brian M., and Charlotte Beck, The Oxford Companion to Archeology, entry on the “Dead sea scrolls”, Oxford University Press, 1996.
504. ^ Archer, Gleason (1964). A Survey of Old Testament Introduction. Chicago: Moody Press. p. 65.
505. ^ Jump up to:^a b Martin G. Abegg; Peter Flint; Eugene Ulrich (2012). The Dead Sea Scrolls Bible. HarperCollins. pp. 16–. ISBN 978-0-06-203112-9. Retrieved 3 April 2013.
506. ^ Abegg et al. “The Dead Sea Scrolls Bible: The Oldest Known Bible Translated for the First Time into English.” 1999.
507. ^ “The Dead Sea Scrolls”. Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious Scholarship. Archived from the original on 6 August 2012. Retrieved 13 June 2012.
508. ^ Gaster, Theodor H., The Dead Sea Scriptures, Peter Smith Pub Inc., 1976. ISBN 0-8446-6702-1.
509. ^ E. Tov, “Joshua, Book of,” in Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls (eds. L. H. Schiffman and J. C. VanderKam; 2 vols.; New York: OUP, 2000) 1: 431
510. ^ von Weissenberg, Hanne. “The Twelve Minor Prophets at Qumran and the Canonical Process:Amos as a “Case Study””. The Hebrew Bible in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls: 357–76. Retrieved 3 October 2014.
511. ^ A.A. Di Lella, New English Translation of the Septuagint, “Tobit” (PDF), 2007.
512. ^ Rezetko, Robert (2013). “The Qumran Scrolls of the Book of Judges: Literary Formation, Textual Criticism, and Historical Linguistics”. Journal of Hebrew Scriptures. 13 (2): 9. doi:10.5508/jhs.2013.v13.a2.
513. ^ Jump up to:^a b Nóra Dávid; Armin Lange; Kristin De Troyer; Shani Tzoref (2012). The Hebrew Bible in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. pp. 9–. ISBN 978-3-525-53555-4. Retrieved 16 March 2013.
514. ^ “Art: Endless Cave in Jerusalem”. Time. 30 April 1965.
515. ^ “- Map of the Shrine”. imj.org.il. Archived from the original on 26 March 2013.
516. ^ “Archived copy”. Archived from the original on 4 May 2012. Retrieved 2012-06-10.
517. ^ Jump up to:^a b “The new Jordan Museum”. ritmeyer.com. 11 May 2011.
518. ^ “Visit at the Jordan Museum, July 2013 (blog with pictures; in Russian)”. Retrieved 19 October 2014.
519. ^ “The Dead Sea Scrolls – Discovery and Publication”. Israel Antiquities Authority. Retrieved 4 May 2015.
520. ^ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. “Consumer Price Index (estimate) 1800–”. Retrieved 1 January 2020.
521. ^ “History & Overview of the Dead Sea Scrolls”. Jewish Virtual Library.
522. ^ “Dead Sea Scrolls scam: Dozens of recently sold fragments are fakes, experts warn”. The Times Of Israel. 3 October 2017.
523. ^ https://www.apu.edu/media/news/release/25415
524. ^ “Fragment of a scroll (Palestine: Qumran, Cave 4, 6.4 cm H, 4.2 cm W)”. Archived from the original on 20 May 2013. Retrieved 14 June 2012.
525. ^ “Fort Worth seminary unveils newly acquired Dead Sea Scrolls fragment”. 14 April 2012. Archived from the original on 15 November 2012. Retrieved 14 June 2012.
526. ^ Amir Drori. “The Completion of the Publication of the Scrolls”. Israel Antiquities Authority.
527. ^ Pnina Shor. “Conservation of the Dead Sea Scrolls”. Israel Antiquities Authority.
528. ^ “12. Dead Sea Scrolls”. The Schoyen Collection.
529. ^ Jump up to:^a b Pruitt, Sarah (11 October 2016). “Secrets of New Dead Sea Scrolls Come to Light”. history.com. Archived from the original on 13 October 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2018.
530. ^ “Museum of the Bible Releases Research Findings on 13 Unpublished Dead Sea Scrolls Fragments”. Archived from the original on 24 September 2016.
531. ^ Gannon, Megan; October 22, Live Science Contributor |; ET, 2018 06:31pm. “Dead Sea Scroll Fragments in Museum of the Bible Are Fake”. Live Science. Retrieved 2 July 2019.
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533. ^ “Jordan Claims Ownership of Dead Sea Scrolls”. CBN.
534. ^ “Arabs Claim Dead Sea Scrolls”. Arutz Sheva.
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536. ^ McGregor-Wood, Simon (14 January 2010). “Who Owns the Dead Sea Scrolls?”. ABC News.
537. ^ Khatib, Ahmad (11 January 2010). “Jordan wants the Dead Sea Scrolls back from Israel”. Agence France-Presse.
538. ^ Ross, Oakland (9 April 2009). “Dead Sea Scrolls stir storm at ROM”. Toronto Star.
539. ^ “Jordan demands return of Dead Sea Scrolls ‘seized’ by Israel”. Haaretz. 13 January 2010.
540. ^ “Canada rejects Jordan’s claim to Dead Sea scrolls”. Digital Journal. 4 January 2010.
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Sources[edit]

Books

• Abegg, Jr., Martin, Peter Flint, and Eugene Ulrich, The Dead Sea Scrolls Bible: The Oldest Known Bible Translated for the First Time into English, San Francisco: Harper, 2002. ISBN 0-06-060064-0, (contains the biblical portion of the scrolls)
• Abegg, Jr. Martin, James E. Bowley, Edward M. Cook, Emanuel Tov. The Dead Sea Scrolls Concordance, Vol 1. “The Dead Sea Scrolls Concordance, Volume 1”. Brill.nl. 2007. Archived from the original on 5 November 2009. Retrieved 21 October 2010. Brill Publishing 2003. ISBN 90-04-12521-3.
• Allegro, John Marco, The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Christian Myth (ISBN 0-7153-7680-2), Westbridge Books, UK, 1979.
• Berg, Simon. Insights into the Dead Sea Scrolls: A Beginner’s Guide, BookSurge Publishing, 2009.
• Boccaccini, Gabriele. Beyond the Essene Hypothesis: The Parting of Ways between Qumran and Enochic Judaism, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998.
• Burrows, Millar (1955). The Dead Sea Scrolls. New York: Viking. ISBN 0-5176-2535-0.
• Burrows, Millar (1958). More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls; New Scrolls and New Interpretations, with Translations of Important Recent Discoveries.New York: Viking.
• Charlesworth, James H. “The Theologies of the Dead Sea Scrolls.” pp. xv–xxi in The Faith of Qumran: Theology of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Edited by H. Ringgren. New York: Crossroad, 1995.
• Chernoivanenko, Vitaly. “The Jerusalem Theory of the Dead Sea Scrolls Authorship: Origins, Evolution, and Discussions,” in Ukrainian Orientalistics: Special Issue on Jewish Studies, Кyiv: NaUKMA Omeljan Pritsak Center for Oriental Studies, 2011: 9–29.
• Collins, John J., Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, New York: Routledge, 1997.
• Collins, John J., and Craig A. Evans. Christian Beginnings and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006.
• Cook, Edward M. (1994). Solving the Mysteries of the Dead Sea Scrolls: New Light on the Bible, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
• Cross, Frank Moore (1995). The Ancient Library of Qumran, 3rd ed., Minneapolis: Fortress Press. ISBN 0-8006-2807-1
• Davies, A. Powell (1956). The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Signet.
• Davies, Philip R., George J. Brooke, and Phillip R. Callaway (2002). The Complete World of the Dead Sea Scrolls, London: Thames & Hudson. ISBN 0-500-05111-9
• de Vaux, Roland, Archaeology and the Dead Sea Scrolls (Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1959). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
• Dimant, Devorah, and Uriel Rappaport (eds.), The Dead Sea Scrolls: Forty Years of Research, Leiden and Jerusalem: E.J. Brill, Magnes Press, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1992.
• Eisenman, Robert H., The Dead Sea Scrolls and the First Christians, Shaftesbury: Element, 1996.
• Eisenman, Robert H., and Michael O. Wise. The Dead Sea Scrolls Uncovered: The First Complete Translation and Interpretation of 50 Key Documents Withheld for Over 35 Years, Shaftesbury: Element, 1992.
• Eisenman, Robert H. and James Robinson, A Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls 2 vol., Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeology Society, 1991.
• Fitzmyer, Joseph A., Responses to 101 Questions on the Dead Sea Scrolls, Paulist Press 1992, ISBN 0-8091-3348-2
• Fitzmyer, Joseph A. (2008). A Guide to the Dead Sea Scrolls and Related Literature. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. ISBN 9780802862419.
• Galor, Katharina, Jean-Baptiste Humbert, and Jürgen Zangenberg. Qumran: The Site of the Dead Sea Scrolls: Archaeological Interpretations and Debates: Proceedings of a Conference held at Brown University, 17–19 November 2002, Edited by Florentino García Martínez, Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah 57. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
• García-Martinez, Florentino, The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated: The Qumran Texts in English, (Translated from Spanish into English by Wilfred G. E. Watson) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994).
• García Martínez Florentino, Eibert J.C. Tigchelaar, Editors, The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition, Brill, 1999
• Gaster, Theodor H., The Dead Sea Scriptures, Peter Smith Pub Inc., 1976. ISBN 0-8446-6702-1
• Golb, Norman, Who Wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls? The Search for the Secret of Qumran, New York: Scribner, 1995.
• Golb, Norman, On the Jerusalem Origin of the Dead Sea Scrolls, University of Chicago Oriental Institute, 5 June 2009.
• Heline, Theodore, Dead Sea Scrolls, New Age Bible & Philosophy Center, 1957, Reprint edition 1987, ISBN 0-933963-16-5
• Hirschfeld, Yizhar, Qumran in Context: Reassessing the Archaeological Evidence, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004.
• Israeli, Raphael, http://www.transactionpub.com/cgi-bin/transactionpublishers.storefront/en/Product/1-4128-0703-4^{[permanent dead link]} Piracy in Qumran: The Battle over the Scrolls of the Pre-Christ Era], Transaction Publishers: 2008 ISBN 978-1-4128-0703-6
• Khabbaz, C., “Les manuscrits de la mer Morte et le secret de leurs auteurs”, Beirut, 2006. (Ce livre identifie les auteurs des fameux manuscrits de la mer Morte et dévoile leur secret).
• Magen, Yizhak, and Yuval Peleg, The Qumran Excavations 1993–2004: Preliminary Report, JSP 6 (Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2007) Download
• Magen, Yizhak, and Yuval Peleg, “Back to Qumran: Ten years of Excavations and Research, 1993–2004,” in The Site of the Dead Sea Scrolls: Archaeological Interpretations and Debates (Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah 57), Brill, 2006 (pp. 55–116).
• Magness, Jodi, The Archaeology of Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002.
• Maier, Johann, The Temple Scroll, [German edition was 1978], (Sheffield:JSOT Press [Supplement 34], 1985).
• Milik, Józef Tadeusz, Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judea, London: SCM, 1959.
• Muro, E. A., “The Greek Fragments of Enoch from Qumran Cave 7 (7Q4, 7Q8, &7Q12 = 7QEn gr = Enoch 103:3–4, 7–8).” Revue de Qumran 18, no. 70 (1997): 307, 12, pl. 1.
• O’Callaghan-Martínez, Josep, Cartas Cristianas Griegas del Siglo V, Barcelona: E. Balmes, 1963.
• Qimron, Elisha, The Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Harvard Semitic Studies, 1986. (This is a serious discussion of the Hebrew language of the scrolls.)
• Rengstorf, Karl Heinrich, Hirbet Qumran und die Bibliothek vom Toten Meer, Translated by J. R. Wilkie. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960.
• Roitman, Adolfo, ed. A Day at Qumran: The Dead Sea Sect and Its Scrolls. Jerusalem: The Israel Museum, 1998.
• Sanders, James A., ed. Dead Sea scrolls: The Psalms scroll of Qumrân Cave 11 (11QPsa), (1965) Oxford, Clarendon Press.
• Schiffman, Lawrence H., Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls: their True Meaning for Judaism and Christianity, Anchor Bible Reference Library (Doubleday) 1995, ISBN 0-385-48121-7, (Schiffman has suggested two plausible theories of origin and identity – a Sadducean splinter group, or perhaps an Essene group with Sadducean roots.) Excerpts of this book can be read at COJS: Dead Sea Scrolls.
• Schiffman, Lawrence H., and James C. VanderKam, eds. Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
• Shanks, Hershel, The Mystery and Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Vintage Press 1999, ISBN 0-679-78089-0 (recommended introduction to their discovery and history of their scholarship)
• Stegemann, Hartmut. “The Qumran Essenes: Local Members of the Main Jewish Union in Late Second Temple Times.” pp. 83–166 in The Madrid Qumran Congress: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Dead Sea Scrolls, Madrid, 18–21 March 1991, Edited by J. Trebolle Barrera and L. Vegas Mountainer. Vol. 11 of Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
• Thiede, Carsten Peter, The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Jewish Origins of Christianity, Palgrave 2000, ISBN 0-312-29361-5
• Thiering, Barbara, Jesus the Man, New York: Atria, 2006.
• Thiering, Barbara, Jesus and the Riddle of the Dead Sea Scrolls (ISBN 0-06-067782-1), New York: Harper Collins, 1992
• VanderKam, James C., The Dead Sea Scrolls Today, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994.
• Vermes, Geza, The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English, London: Penguin, 1998. ISBN 0-14-024501-4 (good translation, but complete only in the sense that he includes translations of complete texts, but neglects fragmentary scrolls and more especially does not include biblical texts.) (7th ed. 2011 ISBN 978-0-14-119731-9)
• Wise, Michael O., Martin Abegg, Jr., and Edward Cook, The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation, (1996), Harper San Francisco paperback 1999, ISBN 0-06-069201-4, (contains the non-biblical portion of the scrolls, including fragments)
• Yadin, Yigael. The Temple Scroll: The Hidden Law of the Dead Sea Sect, New York: Random House, 1985.

Other sources

• Dead Sea Scrolls Study Vol 1: 1Q1 – 4Q273, Vol. 2: 4Q274 – 11Q31, (compact disc), Logos Research Systems, Inc., (contains the non-biblical portion of the scrolls with Hebrew and Aramaic transcriptions in parallel with English translations)
• Comprehensive Cross Reference interactive module for Dead Sea Scrolls, Josephus, Philo, Nag Hammadi Library, Pseudepigrapha, Old Testament Apocrypha, New Testament Apocrypha, Plato, Pythagoras, Dhammapada, Egyptian Book of the Dead, Tacitus, Talmud, New and Old Testaments, Apostolic and Early Church Fathers

Further reading[edit]

• Harrison, R.K., The Dead Sea Scrolls: an Introduction, in series, The Cloister Library, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961.