

## Hybrid Strategies for Coexistence Intervention Application Study: Israel/ Palestine

15 March 2014

Walter Sebastian Adler and Yousef Bashir



### Abstract

I would like to offer the initial critique that the peacebuilding sector has *comprehensively* failed to bring normative “peace” to any strategic field it has touched. Its inability to provide results is matched with its equal inability to provide hard data. Wrapped in the rhetoric of “coexistence”; hegemon powers apply selective conflict freezes. Propensity for success has been applied in predominantly European contexts to force violence cessation/mitigation but no means real peace<sup>1</sup>. I have used the opportunity of this briefing to advocate for hybridization of conflict analysis approaches that will allow field practitioners and their regional leaderships to a) rapidly interpret meaningful conflict data, b) approximate harm/benefit of intervention and c) place the intervention in a wider context of outcomes that secure human rights obligations.

There is no objective peace, there is however, a measureable cessation of active violence. Similar to the word “development”, it means nothing (or too much) and always disguises an underlying political contextual motivation. There are however objective, normative treaty-bound

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<sup>1</sup> There have been conflict “freezes” that masquerade as successful “peace processes” in Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia and Israel-Palestine. There are far more numerous conflict pauses or ongoing violent low intensity conflicts that persist because demographically they lack Europeans.

human rights measurable by indicators (World Bank, Human Rights Indicators, 2011). Fusion of conflict analysis tools allows a full yet immediate context to then apply rights based measurement of impact.

Swiss “FAST” (for predictive trending), CARE “Benefits/Harm Handbook” (to rationalize intervention) and “Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts” (MSTC)/ (for long term contextual planning). Rather than identify one and invalidate others for approach we seek to make a base line conflict analysis using a fusion of three. None of them are complete enough for field level practitioners to comprehensively offer meaningful intervention solutions. But each offers possibility in hybrid for definitive action to interdict mass violence.

I will focus this hybrid conflict analysis on **Israel/Palestine**. As a briefing we ask the reader to evaluate the analysis as the cumulative work of three coordinated, multi-nationalized<sup>2</sup> teams a “FAST” monitoring team, a “Harm/Benefit” intervention team on the ground, and a “MSTC” research team in a secure location removed from conflict directing policy advocacy toward outside stakeholders and manipulating the public via the media.

All three teams are vital to comprehensive and meaningful analysis guiding targeted intervention. It is assumed for the purpose of this study that we are non-politically aligned, human rights oriented NGO operating with local staffing in Israel, West Bank, Gaza and Cyprus.

### *Interventions supported with Information & Intelligence*

#### **Tool: FAST**

#### **“Rapid Interpretation of Meaningful Data”**

***Application purpose of FAST:*** An office staff is set up in Cyprus to monitor the following communications data coming out of the conflict zone. Their objective is acquire qualitative data to determine “**root, proximate, and intervening factors that can lead to the outbreak of a violent conflict or shape an existing conflict**” and quantitative data based on daily event indicators.

***Methodology:*** Tool allows a trained bi-national data collection team to selectively analyze big data trending from a) internet reports from factional monitoring groups, b) news/social media content from institutions of influence by faction c) monitor civilian radio communications in zones, d) collate incoming first hand field reports to flag indicators based on conflict variables.

***Qualitative data methods:*** Arabic/Hebrew/Farsi language news/social media; reports from leading CBO monitoring groups; Benetech open source reports; data triangulation via UN and NGO reports; Palestinian & Israeli governmental data.

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<sup>2</sup> Multi-nationalization is deliberate and strategic diversification of a project’s field team to recruit and include a composition of staff whereby harm directed against this staff is mitigated by their groupings of foreign nationals. This strategy plays directly to racist/ nationalist media tendencies and multiplies the “outsider Impact” of the field teams effort. Multi-nationalization is however completely subordinated to leadership directives of the CBOs the effort helps facilitate the impact of.

**Primary Root: Physical integrity of bi-national territory.**

**Primary Proximates: Apartheid, Settlement Expansion, US Military Aid, Iranian technical assistance, demographic changes based on birth rates, overall regional instability, Palestinian division of leadership and AIPAC lobby operations in USA.**

*Intervening Factors:* Boycott, Divest and Sanction Operations (BDS), ISM Multi-nationalization, expansion of apartheid<sup>3</sup> measures, # population transfers, # prisoner releases/exchanges, #/ quality of confidence building measures on resources, instances of development & security tri-lateral co-operation<sup>4</sup>, track 1, 2, 3 Exchanges.

**Quantitative factors measurements:** the following are primary tracking indicators although the system can allegedly process up to 198 effectively. # Instances of mass violence reflected via hospitalizations/ reported casualties. # Instances of arrest. Weekly prison population. # of demonstrations/ funeral processions in approximate participating numbers. # targeted assassinations quarterly. # exchanges of fire with casualties. # Suicide attacks/Rocket attacks. Settlement expansion by m<sup>3</sup>. \$ US aid/remittances to both sides civilian/ military per quarter. Quantity # of multinationals present in occupied territories. Quarterly demographic reviews.

**Assumptions:** Presence of bi-lingual, bi-national data analysis team. Operational relationship with understood mutual aid agreements with monitoring agencies based in Gaza, Israel, West Bank and United States. Open channels of communication with all major factions. Aggregate software to recommend daily threat levels and trend annual data in means that as politically useful for the peace process. All operational imperatives meet two decisive bottom lines; a) violence cessation and b) the right of both peoples to exist within the territory of Palestine within three administrative units; Gaza, Israel and West Bank as a confederated entity.

**Resource Implications/ Availability:** Office staff of 24 staff/ 24 volunteers to utilize tool 24/7 based in Cyprus. Regional administrative bases in Gaza, Jerusalem, & Nablus. Strategic Autonomous Partner Action Organizations in every population center above population 25,000 capable of monitoring and actionable effect<sup>5</sup>.

**Conflict intervention recommendations:** The FAST team in Cyprus will issue daily reports to all allied Partner Organizations; make weekly 'process threat' advisories; hold monthly web briefings on findings and trends, and issue quarterly summaries directly to the communications/ diplomatic representatives of all Israeli/Palestinian/American Jewish factions. It will issue twitter and text message alerts in the event of imminent hostilities to all subscribers. It will maintain clear line of communication open between a) Hamas leadership, b) Fatah

<sup>3</sup> The physical construction of barriers, utilization of ethnic identity cards, and ethno-economic separations enforced by state coercion constitute instances of apartheid.

<sup>4</sup> Tri-lateral cooperation assumes triumvirate confidence building with inclusion of Hamas, Fatah, and Israeli Coalition government functioning as three cooperative administrative units. All confidence measures revolve on acceptance of eight core agreements; 1) Israel's' right to exist in historic Palestine, 2) Palestine's right to exist in modern Israel, 3) Agreement to thirty year Hudna (ceasefire) that rewards security and development cooperation will roll back of military presence to 1967 borders 4) Right to return of all foreign nationals with one Jewish/Palestinian grandparent to areas under respective tri-national control, 5) Palestinian (Arab-Israeli) populations centers inside pre-1967 Israel fall administratively under Palestinian control if 67% Arab 6) Israeli settlement expansion freeze and 1 m<sup>3</sup>/ for 1m<sup>3</sup> reciprocity of pre-1967 Israel in exchange for West Bank territory settled, 7) Bi-nationalization of Jerusalem 8) All political office based on democratic election, peace process governed by human rights indicators & tri-state administration of Gaza, Israel & West Bank.

<sup>5</sup> **Actionable Effect** includes but is not limited to human rights monitoring; BDS economic operations, popular mobilization, use of mass platforms such as Mosques/Churches/Synagogues/Media, and direct access to factional leadership.

leadership, c) the Israeli party in power/ the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> largest Israeli parties by seat in Knesset d) AIPAC e) U.S. State Department.

Intervention recommendations will proceed via three levels. A) Public Address via mass advisories, b) Partnership Network Alliance and 3) External Factions of influence. All will embrace free association<sup>6</sup>, autonomous action, explicit non-violence and human rights based approach via Benefit/Harms Handbook (BHH) Tool.

*“The Projects as the Interventions”*

### **Tool: BHH**

#### **Application of Benefits/Harms Handbook (BHH) in “Approximate benefit/harm of threat & intervention:**

“Perhaps the most important distinction between rights-based and needs-based approaches arise because rights always trigger responsibilities, whereas needs don’t. Rights-based approaches focus both on rights and responsibilities, and decision tools aim to help rights-based programmers think through the responsibility side of the “rights = responsibilities” equation. They aim to strengthen our ability and willingness to respond when we are the problem, and they aim to push us towards rights-based action when others are responsible, either for causing human rights problems or for addressing them. Thus, decision tools aim to push us not only to take immediate action to address unintended negative consequences, but also to situate future action within the wider matrix of rights and responsibilities within which we work. (HRH, p.14)”

Application purpose is to “to help actors take responsibility for the impact of their work on people’s human rights. It offers a set of simple interrogative tools that help staff think more deeply and effectively about the impacts of their work, and taking responsibility for both positive and negative impacts. It also provides a framework for monitoring potential negative or unintended impacts, as well as ways to mitigate these.”(Action Alert, 2004).

**Methodology:** BHH is centered on weighing the impact of ones interventions though three delineated categories of existing human rights: **Security Rights (RR)**, **Civil/Political Rights (CPR)**, and **Economic/Social/Cultural Rights (ESCR)** along with their indicators, impacts and logical framework outcomes.

The Tool applies a Human Rights Based Approach to the logical framework modal. It best used in local operations and not well suited for conflict management at large short term.

**Assumptions:** Participation of organized Palestinian and Israeli NGOs with indigenous bases of support to accurately conduct Human Rights centered DME of recommended interventions is imperative. Each is operating autonomously in our network with daily operations, budgeting, and operational protocols independent of central authority. Symmetric

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<sup>6</sup> **Free Association** assumes non-binding mutual aid based alliances formed via “functional reliance theory”; the political calculation that when combination of resources is advantageous it will proceed via confidence building on agreed to terms; when disadvantageous the alliance will dissolve without the presence of force or resource coercion.

indicators<sup>7</sup> agreed to by all parties in conflict utilized throughout engagement. Demographic disaggregations of quantitative data based on religion, ethnicity, political faction utilized in FAST are withheld as this system centers on overall human rights implications.

A focused BHH application to an intervention is up to the discretion of the faction or operational body recommended to. Non-discrimination/ protected categories are selectively applied as needed. Broad Segment data is used to guide operational discretion on intervention usage. For our system, we will have provided training to each of our allies to apply a Logical Framework Approach algorithm to assess use of an intervention based of level of potential war violation (harm) with level of peaceful rights advancement (benefit). The fundamental process revolves around ‘Symmetric Indicators’ being agreed to within the analytical process.

“The practice of human rights actors in development reveals little consistency in the formulation of indicators. A bewildering diversity prevails, whether actors are focusing on duty-bearer compliance at the macro-level or on performance of planned development change at the micro-level. One overriding challenge is therefore how to establish greater consistency in the design of indicators to facilitate horizontal comparisons between countries or between state parties” (Human Rights Indicators, WB p.15)

### **Analytical Framework: Main Steps and Suggested process**

BHH contains “tools for situation analysis (profile tools), impact assessment (impact tools), and project (re)design (decision tools)” (Action Alert, 2004). Profile tools allow us to achieve a human rights-centered, balanced assessment of the perceived impact an intervention will achieve. The objective supply of data to aid the best practice implementation of the tool will be supplied by the FAST team making the intervention recommendation. BHH will allow the local operational leadership to act.

Consultation with local contacts in the community, organizational review of the FAST data and individual partner organizations’ information & intelligence capacities will ultimately guide the decision to select the intervention.

### **Guiding Questions / Pre-Arranged Indicators**

Two quotes serve to illustrate the challenge and dilemma. In the OHCHR Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction, from 2003, it was argued that “most of the indicators proposed in these Guidelines are standard indicators of socioeconomic progress, although it should be observed that some human rights indicators, especially those relating to civil and political rights, do not usually figure in measures of socio- economic progress. Essentially, what distinguishes a human rights indicator from a standard disaggregated indicator of socio-economic progress is less its substance than (a) its explicit derivation from a human rights norm and (b) the purpose to

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<sup>7</sup> Symmetric Indicators exist where opposing parties/ factions in a violent conflict can agree to a means to measure and quantify violations of SR, CPR & ESCR rights in similar frameworks throughout conflict regardless of scope, scale and duration of confrontation. This allows objective monitoring of peace process and accurate external depiction of greed/grievance.

which it is put, namely human rights monitoring with a view to holding duty-bearers to account. (OHCHR Indicators Draft)

The Profile, Impact and Decision sub-tools are each organized according to the three categories of human rights:

**A) Security Rights (SR):**

Right to a) life b) liberty c) security of person d) Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

**B) Civil/Political Rights (CPR):**

Right to a) participate in public affairs, b) freedom of opinion/expression c) a fair trial

**C) Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ESCR):**

Right to a) the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health b) to adequate food c) to adequate housing d) to education e) to social security f) to work with paid leave & ability to form trade unions.

**Special Protective Categories:** a) women, b) children, c) migrant workers, d) demographic minorities.

The tool addresses the full action impact of rights holders/ duty bearers and the underlying causes of the potential harm or benefit via action. Actions, Attitudes and Artifices are the focus of the tool.

Human rights-based approach to relief and development presupposes that all people are entitled to certain minimum conditions of living with dignity (human rights). Relief and development organizations aim to help people achieve these conditions, thereby acknowledging their human responsibility to do so. This implies they take responsibility for the human rights impact of their work –whether positive or negative. Human rights are therefore the central criteria for analyzing the overall impact of a project.” (Action Alert, 2004.)

**Quantitative/ Quantitative data measurements:** Agreed to “Symmetric Indicators for Separation & Economic Development in Israel Palestine 2020.”

**Resource Implications/ Availability:** Utilizing DME/BHH trained staff, regional leadership assesses a threat and intervention response via 3 categories of benefit/harm to rights (Security, CPR, ESCR) posed by threat/event/action looking at its history-nature via PROFILE. That threat/event/action data is plugged into IMPACT TOOL algorithm which weighs the Benefit/Harm Level (potential rights violation) on a scale of 58. Each increment has corresponding intervention recommendations made via the DECISION. The 3 rights categories via benefits/harms are then again re-assessed and intervention is selected.

**Conflict Intervention Recommendations:** The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a multi-dimensional, ongoing low-intensity mass human rights violation that directly aids in fueling the instability of the region at large. One of the least understood aspects of the occupation and conflict has been the role of non-Israeli/ non-Palestinian multinational volunteers. Although

comparatively low in overall casualty count<sup>8</sup> compared to other global conflicts since the 1991 Palestinian Uprising, a steady cohort of European, Latin American, American, and Iranian volunteers have changed the overall strategic calculus.

Military intelligence officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps have highly enhanced Palestinian capacity for military action and terrorism since the first intifada. Multinational actions via the International Solidarity Movement have smuggled thousands of Euro-American volunteers to serve in Palestinian development capacities as well as human shields in the occupied territories. The combination of capacity to inflict harm, European non-violent foreign volunteers embracing the BDS movement, the Israeli embrace of structural apartheid via the Security Wall, and the takeover of Gaza by Hamas have all worked to reduce the levels of violence that peaked in the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Surely track 1, 2, 3, & 4 peace work has contributed as well.

Our intervention recommendations involve measured, scalable responses in the following categories based on threat levels corresponding to rights violations in the 3 categories. For the sake of vast simplification of the algorithm findings matrix, here are the intervention recommendations:

### **Non-State Actors**

1. Multi-nationalizing the conflict decreases impunity of Israeli reprisals. Increasing overall levels of Developed-nation volunteers serving in territories is ideal especially during escalation of conflict.
2. Gaza blockade naval runs should be stepped up.
3. Boycott, Divestment, Sanction campaigns directed against Israeli economic, educational and cultural sectors should be strengthened.
4. Refusals to serve in occupied territories and diversions to National Service should be encouraged.
5. Person-to-person correspondence campaigns increased.
6. 'Seeds of Peace' style camps and activities should be stepped up and further established in Egypt and Jordan.
7. Joint Palestinian-Israeli economic ventures should be encouraged things that link asset ownership and management.
8. Palestinian populations in diaspora should be organized into administrative units, politically organized and administered by either Hamas, Fatah or a new Party. Arab states not recognizing citizenship of Palestinian diaspora pursue annexation efforts of territory into Greater Palestine.
9. Mobilization of Arab Lobby to harness Arab-American remittances and votes.
10. Occupational Annexes<sup>9</sup>

### **State Actors**

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<sup>8</sup> The overall Palestinian/Israeli casualty county wide since 1948 is estimated to be

<sup>9</sup> Occupy territory and declare it part of a respective factions' "state". It seems to have work since beginning of conflict.

1. Recognition of Bi-partisan Palestinian State in exchange for recognition of Israeli Administrative control of pre-1967 borders excluding population centers with 67% Palestinian Arab majority. Further equalizing administrative land disputes proceed to equalize land holdings to 1m3/1m3, a 50/50 land and resource split involving trading taxation/ administration of Arab-Israeli population centers for Jewish Settlement in West Bank.
2. Settlement freezes/ scheduled settlement turn over.
3. Prisoner amnesty for quarterly periods of violence cessation.
4. Israeli Development assistance in exchange for periods of violence cessation.
5. Institute full draft in Israel with enlargement of National Service to channel Arab-Israeli intuitional exclusion into capacity building in Gaza and West Bank.
6. Piecemeal, scheduled administrative turnovers proceed for periods of violence cessation.
7. Targeted kidnappings of soldiers are only traded one for one.
8. Scholarships for Palestinian students at Israeli universities.
9. Extension of Joint-Palestinian Israeli Civil Service inclusion.
10. Mashav will develop modules to teach Palestinians cooperative economic and organizational frameworks necessary for state capacity.

All interventions are reviewed once implemented via BHH Human Rights implications, impacts, and outcomes. Each side should adopt a 1 for 1 approach. Harm for Harm & Benefit for Benefit.

### *The Long Game Approach*

**Application of “Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts” (MSTC)** to “place the intervention in a wider context of outcomes that secure rights obligations and make complex ethno-political phenomena understandable to outside parties.”

**Primary Purpose:** The MSTC Tool’s primary purpose is to render highly complicated, protracted ethnic conflicts understandable to internal and external actors.

### **Conceptual Assumptions**

“Turbulent Contexts” refers to “Situations of Chronic Political Instability (SCPI).”

This term expands the notion of ‘complex humanitarian emergency’ to reflect the long-term, cyclical and political nature of many of these contexts. It covers phenomena such as cyclical conflict, violence against civilians, political unrest, extreme polarization of wealth, natural disasters over a number of years, population displacement, and the need for humanitarian assistance. The emphasis is on the chronic and political nature of these contexts. (Action Alert, 2004)

The goal is to analyze greed/ grievance as well as historic and current perceptions in light of complicated political science/ identity driven variables.

### **MSTC Tools: Five Key Question Tools**

#### **1. What phases has the context moved through?**

“Rapid Historical Phase Analysis”

##### **Jewish/Israeli Perception:**

*a) Canaanite Conquest, b) First Hebrew Commonwealth, c) Babylonian Exile, d) Second Hebrew Commonwealth, e) Roman Occupation, f) Judeo-Roman Wars, g) Diaspora, h) Zionist Congressional Organizing, i) Shoah, j) Independence War, k) Sinai War 1956, l) 1967 Six Day War, m) 1973 Yom Kippur War n) 1982 Lebanon Occupational War, o) Intifada One, p) Oslo Process, q) Intifada Two, r) post 2005 Separation Barrier, s) 2008 Hezbollah War, t) Gaza War 2010, u) Post 2010 Intractability.*

##### **Palestinian Perception:**

*a) Caliphate-Ottoman Rule, b) British Rule, c) 1948 Catastrophe, d) 1967 Occupation of West Bank and Gaza, e) Post-1967 Resistance Period, f) 1970 Black September Massacres in Jordan, g) 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War, h) Sabra-Shatilla Massacres, i) First Intifada One, j) Oslo, k) Second Intifada l) 2005 Hudna/ Apartheid Wall m) 2006 Hamas Electoral Victory/ Hamas/Fatah Civil Conflict n) 2010 Gaza War, o) post 2010 Intractability.*

#### **2. What are the symptoms of instability?**

*Refer to Instability Analysis.*

**Primary:** Settlement expansion, low grade violence, BDS/ Apartheid expansions, intractability, misery of Gaza blockade, demographic displacement of Jews inside pre-1967 Israel. Continued to regional instability.

#### **3. What kinds of actors are at play in the growing instability?**

*Refer to Actor Characteristics Analysis.*

##### **Actor Short List:**

By no means exhaustive, but listed in order of political/economic importance.

##### **Israeli/ Jewish:**

Sabra Ashkenazi Elite in Avodah/ Likud/ Kadima  
 American Jewish Diaspora via AIPAC umbrella  
 Sephardic Elite  
 Ultra-Orthodox Parties/ Sects  
 Russian-Israeli leadership  
 Ethiopian Israelis

Druse

### **Palestinian/Arab/Iranian**

Fatah (West Bank Palestinian Elites)  
 Hamas (Gaza leadership)  
 “Arab-Israeli” Palestinians  
 Palestinian Euro-American Diaspora  
 Jordanian Palestinians  
 Palestinians in Syria/ Lebanon/ Iraq /Egypt  
 Iranian Revolutionary Guard  
 Hezbollah

#### **4. What struggles over resources and power have played a role in the growing instability?**

*See detailed Political Economy of Instability Analysis.*  
**Territory, Water, Security and National identity.**

#### **5. What resentment and stereotypes have played a role in the growing instability?**

*See Inter-group Relationship Analysis.*

##### **Short summary:**

**Israeli Jewish Narrative:** “This is our historic homeland and without US military support and strong military-industrial complex we will be annihilated by our neighbors. The Palestinians have never been an existential threat to Israel as compared to Egypt, Syria and Iran, but they remain the most serious catalyst of organized political violence against Israel. Ultimately whatever political color Israelis have three deep resentments that will shape the peace process: a) there are dozens of Arab States and this is the only Jewish state. Our historic persecution necessitates a national home. B) Whatever we have done to the Palestinians is pale in comparison of what other groups have done in the same situation. c) If this is not resolved in the next forty years the Arab-Israeli population will grow inside pre-1967 Israel to point where ensuring a “Jewish State” will become impossible.

##### **Palestinian Narrative:**

“The Europeans and Americans helped the Jews build a Zionist colony on our historic homeland. In some cases we fled to Arab nations that reduced us to permanent internal refugees and others that massacred and expelled us. After being betrayed by the other Arab leaderships we were forced into an extended exile that continues to this day. The Americans, controlled by the Zionist Lobby will arm and support the Israelis no matter what human rights violations are committed. Currently, not only has every Arab nation

for the post part failed to help us or defeat Israel; the Americans have invaded Iraq and removed our ally Saddam Hussein, our political leadership has been completely divided between Gaza ( Hamas) and Fatah (West Bank); and Israelis settlement expansions in the West Banks are proceeding to displace us from whatever bi-national settlement potentially is achieved.”

**US-Russian Cold War considerations repeatedly fueled the four major “Arab-Israeli Wars”. Iranian-Israeli relations repeatedly utilize Palestinians and Lebanese in their proxy wars. Arab Spring uprisings will continuously bring to power regimes that are anti-Israel.**

### **Methodology:**

**After detailing the conflict via the above tools (to be undertaken in the second class assignment)** “There are two further tools, one to synthesize the analysis (SCPI Mapping) and the other to outline possible future scenarios (Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis).” (Action Alert, 2004).

### **Assumptions:**

**Resource implications/ Availability:** Research department must be established with objective materials and access to synthesize the strategic/ political/ economic calculus of all factions down to understandable bottom lines and predictive.

### **Long Term Conflict Intervention Recommendations (based on MSTC):**

This list provided in class will be more detailed in recommendations in second part of assignment.

### **Political/Diplomatic tools**

- Outsider Mediation for implementation of localized programs.
- Coexistence-Coordination Offices established in each village, town and city.
- Political Capacity and Aid assistance to all factions espousing peace and recognition.
- Hudna/Recognition/Normalization especially between Israel-Hamas; Israel-Iran, and Israel-Hezbollah.
- Human Rights Defense Missions increased inside Syria along with continued non-military support for any Syrian factions that might recognize Israel.
- Dispute resolution mechanisms further established.
- Crisis Management Systems better implemented.
- Public Diplomacy/Pressure: USA must cut off military aid to Israel.

- Threat/Use of diplomatic sanctions: A regional arms embargo must be put in place to curtail weapons flow into a region that will be plagued by increasing civil unrest.

### **Legal/Constitutional tools**

- Constitutional Reforms in place in both Israel & Palestine to better reflect Human Rights obligations.
- Formal power-sharing mechanisms set in place to create a functional bi-partisan Palestinian State alongside an Israeli one.
- Human Rights monitoring must be carried out by outside multi-nationals.
- Police, judiciary, corrections capacity assistance must increase in Palestine.

### **Economic/Social tools**

- Conflict-sensitive Israeli led Development Assistance via Mashav.
- Intergroup dialogue interactions stepped up on all four tracks.
- Restrictions on US financial flows.
- Conditional incentives/inducements: (debt relief, trade preferences, investment)
- Threat/Use of targeted economic sanctions (BDS)

### **Military/Security tools**

- Security guarantees including “Arab-Israeli” units of the IDF to help in security of West Bank and Gaza. Joint defense training between Israeli, Hamas, and Fatah fighters.
- Systematic Confidence-building measures
- Security Sector Reform: All Israelis and Palestinians to be drafted into either IDF or PDF (Palestinian Defense Force) regardless of ethnicity. Only way out universal draft will be enrolment in a revised National Service Corps to be radically expanded in scope to all civil services.
- Joint Israeli-Palestinian Military Observer/ Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Missions will be enhanced via the United Nations.
- Arms Embargos will be encouraged between Russia and America to cut arms flow into the Middle East generally.
- Preventive Military/Police deployment will cease except by combined units. All Israeli security-intelligence forces will be pulled out of post-1967 borders except to facilitate settlement turn over.
- Threat of Force/Deterrence